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Résumé 
Cette thèse présente l’évolution temporelle du lien entre les variables politiques et la mobilité 
des élites administratives dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada. Considérant la 
relation entre le gouvernement et l’administration comme une relation mandant-mandataire 
(principal-agent), la littérature en administration publique décrit l'influence de diverses 
dynamiques politiques – par exemple un changement de parti au pouvoir – sur le degré 
d’intervention des gouvernements dans la dotation du personnel administratif.  
 S’appuyant sur la notion de marché bureaucratique (Public Service Bargain) de Hood et 
Lodge (2006), la présente thèse estime que la relation entre les dynamiques politiques et la 
mobilité des fonctionnaires s’inscrit dans un contexte sociohistorique. Plutôt que de percevoir 
l’ensemble des relations politico-administratives comme présentant les caractéristiques de la 
théorie mandant-mandataire, avec de nombreux conflits pour l’atteinte des objectifs et une 
grande asymétrie des informations, cette thèse suggère que la mesure dans laquelle diverses 
dynamiques politiques poussent les gouvernements à procéder à des mises à pied ou à des 
nominations stratégiques varie avec le temps, en suivant les changements dans ce qui entoure 
les relations politico-administratives.  
 Les statistiques descriptives et la régression logistique sont principalement utilisées pour 
analyser l’association entre les variables politiques et la mobilité, à l’aide d’une base de données 
originale repostant des changements de sous-ministres dans la fonction publique provinciale au 
Canada de 1920 à 2013. Les résultats empiriques permettent de conclure que l’influence des 
dynamiques politiques sur la mobilité des fonctionnaires varie en fonction des différents 
marchés bureaucratiques. 
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 Avant la mise en place d’une fonction publique professionnelle, où les relations politico-
administratives s’inscrivaient dans un spoils bargain, les changements de gouvernement 
entraînaient une importante rotation des fonctionnaires. Cette pratique est conforme à un marché 
bureaucratique où les critères de compétences des fonctionnaires sont indéfinis, et où les 
fonctionnaires sont loyaux au parti au pouvoir. 
 Dès la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, jusqu’aux années 1980, l’association entre 
les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité diminue grandement. Cette pratique correspond au 
marché bureaucratique de Schaffer (Schafferian bargain), où les gouvernements favorisent la 
connaissance technique des politiques et la bonne volonté des fonctionnaires à donner des 
conseils avisés aux membres du gouvernement, peu importe le parti au pouvoir. 
 Dès les années 1980, les dynamiques politiques sont de nouveau associées à la mobilité. 
Or, non seulement les changements de parti, mais également l’élection de nouveaux chefs à la 
tête de ceux-ci entraînent une plus grande mobilité. Cette pratique va dans le sens du managerial 
bargain, où les nominations sont utilisées pour encourager l’allégeance à l’agenda 
gouvernemental et la compétence est comprise comme étant la bonne gestion du personnel et 
des ressources dans le but de répondre aux directives du gouvernement. 
 Étudiant les actions stratégiques des gouvernements dans leur contexte sociohistorique, 
cette étude contribue de manière originale à l’administration publique et à la politique 
canadienne, en démontrant que les dynamiques politiques jouent un rôle quant à la mobilité des 
fonctionnaires, bien que la nature de ces dynamiques et l’étendue de leurs effets varient selon 
les époques, qui présentent des marchés bureaucratiques distincts. 
Mots-clés : Bureaucratie, Politique exécutive, Contrôle, Nomination, Mobilité du personnel, 
Marché bureaucratique, mandant-mandataires, Patronage, Politisation, Westminster, Canada, 
Provinces. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation studies temporal variances in the relationship between political variables and 
the mobility of administrative elites in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies. Conceptualizing the 
association between the government and the bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship, 
research in public administration has identified how various political dynamics – such as a 
transition in the governing party – affects the extent to which governments interfere in the 
staffing of bureaucratic personnel; removing incumbents and replacing them with persons who 
are believed to be loyal to government’s policy agenda. This dissertation contributes to this 
literature by identifying the historical contingencies with which political dynamics effect 
mobility.  
 Drawing upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain (PSB), the 
relationship between political dynamics and mobility is situated within a more precise social-
historical context. Rather than approaching political-administrative relationships as universally 
reflecting the specifications of principal-agent theory – exhibiting a high incidence of goal 
conflict and information asymmetry – this work claims that the extent to which political 
dynamics prod governments to strategically dismiss and appoint personnel has varied over time, 
in tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships; specifically, the 
nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and its loyalty. 
 Primarily using descriptive statistics and logistic regression the association between 
political variables and mobility is tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in 
Canada’s provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Overall, the empirical evidence 
supports the conclusion that the effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility has 
varied over time across distinct PSBs.  
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 Prior to the development of the modern professional bureaucracy, where political-
administrative relationships reflected a spoils bargain, transitions in the governing party resulted 
in increased mobility. Such actions are congruent with a PSB where the nature of governance is 
of a minimal character; there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy’s competency; 
and the bureaucracy’s loyalty is of a partisan nature towards the governing party.  
 Starting in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, the association between 
political dynamics and mobility is significantly reduced. Such is congruent with a Schafferian 
bargain where governments encourage technical knowledge of policies and a willingness 
amongst bureaucrats to provide frank counsel to government office holders, regardless of the 
party in power. 
 Starting in the 1980s however, political dynamics are once again positively associated 
with mobility. Yet now, not only transitions in party, but all newly elected heads of government 
lead to increased mobility. This is consistent with a managerial bargain where appointments are 
used to encourage loyalty to the government’s policy agenda and competency is understood as 
the ability to manage personnel and resources to realizing the directives dictated by the 
government. 
 Situating the strategic actions of governments within their social-historical context, this 
work makes original contributions to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics 
by showing that when it comes to bureaucratic mobility, political dynamics matter; but which 
dynamics, and the extent of their effects, vary over time across distinct PSBs. 
 
Keywords: Bureaucracy, Executive politics, Control, Appointment, Mobility, Public Service 
Bargain, Principal-agent theory, Patronage, Politicization, Westminster, Canada, Provinces. 
iv 
 
 
Contents 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... vii 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................... ix 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 2 
Chapter one summary. .......................................................................................................................... 2 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
The Politics of Mobility: Practical Implications and Normative Debate .............................................. 4 
Practical implications: Elite mobility and organizational performance. ......................................... 4 
Normative debate: The proper relationship between politics and administration. .......................... 6 
The Politics of Administrative Mobility: The State of the Discipline .................................................. 9 
From methodological limitations to theoretically puzzling results. ................................................. 9 
Advancing research: A proposed solution to the puzzling results. ................................................. 12 
Beyond Agency Theory: Situating Strategic Actions within the Sociohistorical Context ................. 15 
Contributions ...................................................................................................................................... 19 
Contributions to public administration. .......................................................................................... 19 
Contributions to Canadian political science. ................................................................................. 19 
Plan of Dissertation ............................................................................................................................. 22 
Conclusion of Chapter One................................................................................................................. 23 
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework..................................................................... 25 
Chapter two summary ......................................................................................................................... 25 
What Explains Administrative Mobility? ........................................................................................... 26 
Organization and management studies. .......................................................................................... 26 
Organization and management studies: Where’s the power? ........................................................ 28 
The Politics of Mobility ...................................................................................................................... 30 
Positions of importance and the power to appoint. ........................................................................ 30 
Mobility and control. ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Prominent Political Factors ................................................................................................................. 36 
Political culture. ............................................................................................................................. 36 
Formal political institutions ........................................................................................................... 37 
Government’s incentive to appoint. ................................................................................................ 42 
Time since change in government. .................................................................................................. 44 
v 
 
 
Political ideology. ........................................................................................................................... 46 
From partisan to personal politics: Change in premier. ................................................................ 47 
Legislative strength. ........................................................................................................................ 51 
Methodological and Theoretical Difficulties ...................................................................................... 52 
Public Service Bargains ...................................................................................................................... 55 
Spoils-type PSB. .............................................................................................................................. 58 
Schafferian PSB. ............................................................................................................................. 59 
Managerial PSB. ............................................................................................................................. 63 
The Politics of Mobility Revisited: Variation across PSBs ................................................................ 67 
Conclusion of Chapter Two ................................................................................................................ 71 
Chapter Two Appendix I .................................................................................................................... 72 
Chapter 3. Research Design, Data and Methods ..................................................................................... 73 
Chapter three summary. ..................................................................................................................... 73 
Research Design ................................................................................................................................. 74 
Data ..................................................................................................................................................... 79 
Variable Operationalization ................................................................................................................ 81 
Dependent variable operationalization. ......................................................................................... 81 
Independent variable operationalization. ....................................................................................... 82 
Control variable operationalization. .............................................................................................. 83 
Description of Variables ..................................................................................................................... 86 
Research Methods ............................................................................................................................... 89 
Quantitative methods. ..................................................................................................................... 89 
Qualitative methods. ....................................................................................................................... 96 
Conclusion of Chapter Three .............................................................................................................. 98 
Chapter 3 Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 100 
Chapter 4. The Politics of Mobility: A Quantitative and Qualitative Descriptive Investigation .......... 101 
Chapter four summary. ..................................................................................................................... 101 
Temporal Trends in Mobility ............................................................................................................ 102 
Political Dynamics and Mobility: Evidence from Descriptive Statistics .......................................... 106 
Change in the governing party. .................................................................................................... 106 
Change in party and time previous government was in power. .................................................... 109 
Mobility and political ideology. .................................................................................................... 112 
vi 
 
 
Change in premier. ....................................................................................................................... 118 
Mobility and legislative strength. ................................................................................................. 125 
Underlying Motives of Appointments: A Qualitative Assessment ................................................... 127 
The spoils bargain: Unspecified competence and partisan loyalty. ............................................. 128 
The Schafferian bargain: Technical prowess and neutral competence. ....................................... 131 
Managerial bargain: General manager and responsive competence. ......................................... 139 
Conclusion of Chapter Four .............................................................................................................. 147 
Chapter 4 Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 149 
Chapter 4 Appendix II ...................................................................................................................... 150 
Chapter 4 Appendix III ..................................................................................................................... 152 
Chapter 5. The Politics of Mobility: A Difficult Test of Competing Explanations .............................. 154 
Chapter five summary. ...................................................................................................................... 154 
Regression Models ............................................................................................................................ 155 
Spoils bargain. .............................................................................................................................. 156 
Schafferian bargain. ..................................................................................................................... 164 
Managerial bargain. ..................................................................................................................... 168 
Conclusion of Chapter Five .............................................................................................................. 179 
Chapter 5 Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 180 
Chapter Six. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 183 
Chapter six summary. ....................................................................................................................... 183 
Main Objective, Central Argument, Empirical Evidence and Conclusion ....................................... 184 
Contributions .................................................................................................................................... 187 
Limitations and Future Avenues for Study ....................................................................................... 192 
Notes ..................................................................................................................................................... 195 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 201 
 
vii 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Concentration of first ministerial power in parliamentary countries ....................................... 49 
Figure 2: Flow chart classifying organizational persistence and termination ....................................... 100 
Figure 3: Annual mobility in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies, by decade....................................... 103 
Figure 4: Fluctuations in DM mobility, selected provinces, 1920s -1950s .......................................... 105 
Figure 5: Annual DM mobility, discriminating for change in party, by decade ................................... 107 
Figure 6: DM mobility discriminating for political party, by PSB ....................................................... 115 
Figure 7: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier ..................................................................... 120 
Figure 8: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013. ........................... 150 
Figure 9: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, spoils PSB ............................ 150 
Figure 10: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, Schafferian PSB ................. 151 
Figure 11: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, managerial PSB ................. 151 
Figure 12: Average number of departments in provincial bureaucracy, 1920-12013 .......................... 167 
Figure 13: Real GDP (Canada) 1926-1986 ........................................................................................... 168 
Figure 14: Mobility, predicted probability when change in premier .................................................... 171 
Figure 15: Mobility, predicted probability when change in party by PSB ........................................... 174 
Figure 16: Mobility, predicted probabilities by legislative strength ..................................................... 176 
Figure 17: Mobility, predicted probability by time DM in position ..................................................... 177 
Figure 18: Predicted probability of mobility by province, spoils-type bargain (1920-1949) ............... 180 
Figure 19: Predicted probability of mobility by province, Schafferian bargain (1950-1979) .............. 181 
Figure 20: Predicted probability of mobility by province, managerial bargain (1980-2013) ............... 182 
  
viii 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Typology of executive appointments in selected Westminster jurisdictions ............................ 39 
Table 2: Strategic appointment of personnel in Public Service Bargains ............................................... 60 
Table 3: Hypotheses between political dynamics and mobility by PSB ................................................. 68 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, DM mobility 1920-2013 ........................................................................ 87 
Table 5: Odds ratio calculation: Cross-tabulation of election and DM mobility .................................... 95 
Table 6: Annual percentage DM mobility by province and decade ..................................................... 104 
Table 7: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013 and PSB .............. 111 
Table 8: Mobility following a change in premier, 1920-2013 and by PSB .......................................... 123 
Table 9: Mobility following election of interim and re-election of incumbent premiers ..................... 125 
Table 10: Mobility and legislative strength of government, 1920-2013 and PSB ................................ 126 
Table 11: Annual mobility by decade, change in party. ....................................................................... 149 
Table 12: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier. ................................................................... 149 
Table 13: Mobility discriminating for political party by PSB .............................................................. 152 
Table 14: Mobility, logistic regression models 1-4 across PSBs .......................................................... 158 
Table 15: Mobility, logistic regression models 5-7 across PSBs .......................................................... 162 
Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and conclusions ............................................................................. 187 
 
ix 
 
 
Abbreviations 
CCF  Co-operative Commonwealth Federation  
CEO  chief executive officer 
COO  chief operating officer 
DM  Deputy Minister  
ENPC  elected-but-no-party-change 
GDP  gross domestic product  
NDP  New Democratic Party 
NPM  New Public Management  
UN  Union Nationale 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PC  Progressive Conservative 
PM  Prime Minister 
PQ  Parti Québécois 
PSB  Public Service Bargain  
UK  United Kingdom  
 
Abbreviations Canadian Provinces 
BC  British Columbia 
AB  Alberta 
SK  Saskatchewan 
MB  Manitoba 
ON  Ontario 
QC  Québec 
NB  New Brunswick 
NS  Nova Scotia 
PEI  Prince Edward Island 
NL  Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We were once asked by sociologist C. Wright Mills to use our sociological imagination to 
understand better the environmental factors affecting what otherwise appears to be our 
individual success and failure. While successfully completing my Ph.D. has been one of my 
greatest achievements, using my sociological imagination to reflect on the past four years I 
spent at the Université de Montréal is a humbling exercise. 
From my very first days, the warmth with which I was welcomed at large by the university 
community made me feel a part of an intellectually vibrant community and was a great source 
of constant encouragement.  
The faculty in the Department of Political Science have been an important component of my 
success. Observing and working in an environment with many first-rate professors was central 
in my professional development.  While they are unlikely aware of it, the demeanour with which 
André Blais, Jane Jenson, Éric Montpetit, Jean-Francois Godbout, Christine Rothmayr and 
Laurence Bherer (to name a few), approached their work was an aspect I remarked upon and 
sought to emulate.  
I have also been fortunate to have shared an office with many talented individuals. Alison Smith, 
Jean-Philippe Gauvin, Maxime Boucher and Nordin Lazreg were not only a constant source of 
encouragement and helpful advice, but were also a great source of friendship.  
A determinate factor in selecting where to pursue my doctoral studies was the advisor I would 
likely have. The high esteem with which everyone spoke of Denis Saint-Martin made my choice 
very easy. And what good counsel I received! Generous with his time, during our long 
conversations Denis would challenge my thinking about public administration and politics; but 
always in a manner that led me to move my research forward. It would be unfair, however, to 
simply refer to Denis as my thesis advisor, and my gratitude to him goes far beyond this work. 
A terrific and well-rounded academic, Denis constantly provided me with sound professional 
advice beyond my dissertation. Working alongside Denis has been central in developing my 
academic phronesis – I already miss being able to stop by his office.  
Finally, a great source of support has been my best friend Geneviève Denis. During the last four 
years, Geneviève constantly displayed a great degree of personal sacrifice and understanding; 
always willing to do more so I could spend time studying, researching and writing. I dedicate 
this work to her. 
Finally I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Chapter one summary. This introductory chapter offers a synopsis of the dissertation. After 
briefly outlining the practical and intellectual reasons for why the mobility of administrative 
elites is a valuable topic of study, the research question is outlined, and the theoretical 
framework, research design and methods are described. The conclusions main findings of this 
work are stated. The primary contributions this work makes to the fields of public administration 
and Canadian politics are identified. The structure of the dissertation is presented and a brief 
summation of each chapter is provided. 
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Introduction 
At a roundtable panel sponsored by the Journal of Canadian Studies to discuss the ostensibly 
increased political interference in the staffing of administrative personnel by the Progressive 
Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, former political advisor, lobbyist, and policy 
consultant, William Neville, made the following remark: 
I can’t tell whether this media and public criticism of patronage is just a thing of the moment 
arising out of circumstances of the last election, or whether there is a more rooted trend 
there. It bothers me because the only alternative to the exercise of political discretion is 
bureaucratic discretion....It’s unaccountable. It’s undemocratic. (Panel on Patronage  1987, 
191) 
 
With 30 years having passed since Neville’s comments, it seems fair to conclude that such 
curiosity was not of a fleeting nature, simply reflecting the ebb and flow of a more systemic 
‘issue-attention cycle’ (Downs 1972). Reviewing print media before and after Mulroney’s time 
as prime minister displays an enduring interest in the appointment, rotation and dismissal of 
bureaucratic elites. With fanfare and flourish, headlines have reported; ‘Ottawa bureaucrats get 
axe’; ‘Tory policies weed out 16 deputy ministers’; ‘Deputy Ministers shuffle revealing’; ‘La 
haute function publique retourne au rouge’ and ‘Top civil servants engaged in musical chairs’  
(The Ottawa Bureau of The Globe and Mail 1977; Winsor 1993; Mackie 1997; Winsor 1999; 
Lessard 2014).  
 Interest in the mobility of administrative elites has not been limited to the media. 
International organizations, public servants, and political parties, have voiced concern over what 
they perceive to be the increasing propensity of governments to remove and appoint bureaucratic 
elites (Matheson et al. 2007; CBC 2013, 2014). From an academic perspective, interest in 
mobility is well warranted. Political interference in the staffing of administrative personnel goes 
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to the heart of longstanding normative question over the appropriate relationship between 
politics and administration and also touches upon a more recent body of research empirically 
examining how turnover affects organizational performance. 
 Accordingly, scholars have become interested in the various factors influencing 
mobility. Yet as this chapter makes clear, research studying the politics of mobility faces some 
pressing challenges. Most notably, recent studies using longitudinal data have failed to find any 
relationship between mobility and some of the foremost political variables (Dahlstrom and 
Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014). This work argues that a key 
reason for the puzzling results is that the relationship between politics and mobility has shifted 
over time across historical periods. Whereas researchers have largely approached the 
relationship between politics and mobility by drawing upon principal-agent theory – assuming 
that governments universally desire administrative elites who display an unquestioning 
willingness to carry out policy directives – from a theoretical perspective that is more 
sociological, this work instead argues that the extent to which political variables prod 
governments to dismiss and appoint administrative elites is contingent on the types of 
professional behaviours governments wish to foster amongst bureaucrats. While concurring 
with principal-agent theory that governments strategically appoint bureaucratic elites as a means 
to ‘control’ the bureaucracy’s behaviour, this work problematizes the notion of control by 
challenging its implied usage by principal-agent theory as exclusively meaning that bureaucrats 
display an unquestioning responsiveness to realize the government’s policy agenda. 
 Drawing upon the Public Service Bargain (PSB) literature to identify changes in the 
nature of political-administrative relationships over time, this work outlines three ideal-type 
bargains – spoils, Schafferian and managerial – each varying in the types of professional traits 
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that governments desire bureaucrats to display. Using quantitative and qualitative data of 
administrative mobility over approximately the last 100 years in Canada’s provincial 
bureaucracies, this work finds empirical support that the extent to which political variables prod 
governments to interfere in the staffing of administrative officials is contingent on the types of 
competency and loyalty that governments seek to foster amongst bureaucrats. 
 
The Politics of Mobility: Practical Implications and Normative Debate 
 
Practical implications: Elite mobility and organizational performance. An increasing body of 
research suggests that administrative mobility can positively affect a battery of socioeconomic 
indicators. Since Seymour Martin Lipset first articulated his economic development thesis in 
1959, a tenant within the social sciences has been the positive correlation between democracy 
and socioeconomic growth (Heo and Tan 2001; Lipset 1959; Midlarsky 1997; Przeworski  et al. 
2000). Emerging research in political science (Evans and Rauch 1999; Rothstein and Stolle 
2008; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016) and economics (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; 
Brousseau, Schemeil, and Sgard 2010) however, suggests that while democracy is certainly a 
central component of socioeconomic development, another key facilitator is the nature of a 
state’s administrative apparatus. 
 Crucially, many of the characteristics positively associated with socioeconomic 
development reflect Weber’s (1991) ideal-type bureaucracy, including, permanent office 
holders, the appointment of personnel according to merit, and the implementation of impersonal 
rules in a hierarchical structure (Fukuyama 2013; Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrugghe 
2015; Bersch, Praça, and Taylor Forthcoming). Amongst these components, the stability of 
bureaucratic personnel and the sheltering of their career from political interference, have been 
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associated with greater levels of economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999), democratic stability 
(Cornell and Lapuente 2014) as well as lower levels of corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, and 
Teorell 2012; Bersch, Praça, and Taylor Forthcoming). 
 Beyond socioeconomic development, scholars in public administration as well as 
organization and management studies have also studied the association between an 
organization’s performance and the stability of personnel (March 1991; Waldman et al. 2004; 
Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer 2010; Boyne et al. 2011; He, Sommer, and Xie 2011; Cornell 
2014; Villadsen 2016). When it comes to the turnover of administrative elites, there are good 
theoretical reasons for believing that mobility can have a direct impact on an organization’s 
operations.  
 Since Chester Barnard’s The Functions of the Executive (1938) challenged Frederick 
Taylor’s (1911) theory of scientific management by insisting that an organization’s efficiency 
stemmed from the behaviour of the executive rather than the structural division of tasks, scholars 
have been interested in the role of executives in determining organizational performance 
(Selznick 1957; Conger 1999). On the one hand, turnover of personnel has been identified with 
positively affecting performance. By bringing in new actors, mobility is believed to introduce 
new ideas into the organization and can serve as an important source of innovation (March 1991; 
Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003; Teodoro 2009). Being unfamiliar with the organization’s culture, 
turnover can also serve to counter the behavioural pathology of ‘goal displacement’ prone to 
bureaucratic organizations (Merton 1940), whereby an emphasis on routines can lead to ‘trained 
incapacity’ (Veblen cited in Merton 1940, 198) and actions that are ultimately detrimental to the 
organization’s original objectives, negatively affecting performance, and in the case of public 
6 
 
bureaucracies, the overall quality of democracy (Brewer and Walker 2010; Moynihan and Herd 
2010). 
 Yet on the other hand, others suggest that mobility can negatively affect performance. 
Identifying replacements, training new employees and socializing them into the organization’s 
culture, all place demands on the organization’s financial and human resources (Waldman et al. 
2004).  Turnover can also deplete organizational memory, impede long-term planning and direct 
attention away from ongoing projects (Cohen 1998; Lewis 2007; Gallo and Lewis 2012; Cornell 
and Lapuente 2014; Cooper and Marier Forthcoming). Moreover, when the mobility of public 
officials is politically motivated, some link this to weakening the overall quality of governance, 
by reducing their willingness to voice opinions contrary to those of the government (Weller 
2001; O’Toole 2006; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Aucoin 2012; Resh 2015), a possibility that 
is particularly troublesome for those who believe the bureaucracy is an independent political 
institution entrusted with representing interests different than those of the elected government 
(Rohr 1998; Cooper 1998). 
 
Normative debate: The proper relationship between politics and administration. Beyond 
affecting organizational performance, government meddling in the staffing of bureaucratic 
personnel also touches upon a central and longstanding normative issue within the discipline of 
public administration: what should be the proper relationship between politics and 
administration?  
 On one side of the debate are proponents drawing heavily upon the formative writings 
of Woodrow Wilson (1887) and Frank Goodnow (2003), contending that politics and 
administration are separate realms, and that the intrusion of the former into the latter, is 
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detrimental to the quality of governance (Blinder 1997; Meier 1997; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 
2016). As stated by Wilson in one of the earliest treatises on the study of administration: 
Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon 
by our civil service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of 
politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the 
tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. (1887, 210) 
 
The extent to which governments influence the appointment of administrative personnel has 
also been a long-standing issue in the public realm. Many of the formative reforms leading to 
the development of the modern professional bureaucracy such as the United States’ Pendleton 
Act and the UK’s Northcote-Trevelyan Report aimed at constraining government intervention 
in staffing administrative personnel (Dreyfus 2000). Yet while institutional reforms via the 
establishment of Public Service Commissions during the 19th and 20th centuries limited the 
government’s power to freely appoint and dismiss persons to administrative offices (Scarrow 
1957; Love 1988; Juillet and Rasmussen 2008), in large part such modifications never made 
their way to the apex of the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the Westminster tradition of government, 
found in Canada’s federal and provincial governments, the appointment and removal of the 
highest-ranking bureaucrats (deputy ministers) has largely continued to be the exclusive 
pleasure of the Crown outside the dominion of any Public Service Commission (Neilson 1984; 
Smith 1987; Bourgault and Dunn 2014).1  
 Questions concerning the extent to which governments should be able to staff elite 
bureaucrats continue to remain politically charged. For instance, in response to a scathing report 
from Auditor General Sheila Fraser chastising the behaviour of senior public servants in 
awarding public contracts to Liberal-friendly firms, the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (Gomery Commission) established by the 
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government to study the issue improve the quality of governance, identified the need to better 
isolate the careers of DMs from political interference and recommended eliminating the first 
minister’s power to appoint and dismiss DMs. 
 With an underlying normative tone alluding to a preference for the rule of the technocrat 
over that of the elected, the belief that better decisions would be made if the careers of 
administrative elites were sheltered from political interference is a contributing factor in recent 
reforms of certain elite administrative positions, such as fiscal councils (Kopits 2011), and is an 
opinion still defended by many within public administration. For instance, seeking to improve 
the quality of government, Kenneth Meier, a leading voice in contemporary public 
administration, has suggested that “our basic problem of governance is that the long-running 
interplay between bureaucracy and expertise on one hand, and responsiveness and democracy 
(read electoral institutions) on the other hand, has swung too far in the direction of democracy” 
(1997, 196). 
 On the other side of this debate, are those who prefer the rule of the elected politician to 
the appointed official. Proponents of this position tend to concur with the writings of Dwight 
Waldo (1948) and Paul Appleby (1947) rejecting the notion that politics and administration are 
separate realms, and are generally uncomfortable with the prevalent antipathy towards politics 
voiced by some, that, in an effort to improve the quality of governance, seeks to shift decision-
making powers away from democratically elected governments and into the hands of insulated 
officials. Michael Spicer’s recent book, In Defense of Politics in Public Administration, 
excellently illustrates this position. Drawing upon the writings of Bernard Crick, Spicer asserts 
that: 
…there is reason to worry, in my view, when those who would seek to advice and educate 
our public policy-makers and administrators so often express what is clearly an anti-
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political attitude. There is a danger here that the public administrators we help train might 
internalize such an attitude and actually come to see themselves as somehow superior to, or 
above politics. Crick, recognizes this danger when he warns of “those who think that 
administration can always be clearly separated from politics, and that if this is done, there 
is really very little, if anything, that politicians can do that administrators cannot do better.” 
This is “the view of the servant who would not merely be equal, but who would be master, 
of the administrator who feels constantly frustrated in his work by the interventions of 
politicians”. (2010, 5) 
 
Exponents of this perspective defend political control of staffing administrative elites as a 
necessary means to ensure that the democratically elected are well dispositioned to govern as 
they desire (Flinders and Matthews 2010; Meyer, Höllerer, and Leixnering Forthcoming). 
 Proponents of this normative position can also be found in contemporary the public 
arena. Vehemently opposed to the Gomery Commission’s recommendation that the prime 
minister’s power to appoint DMs be reduced, a number of actors comprising business CEOs, 
academics, consultants, former deputy ministers, political advisors, and politicians, publicly 
reproved the idea in an open-letter addressed to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, proclaiming 
that: 
We also believe that the selection of these officials [deputy ministers], who will be a key 
source of support to you and your Cabinet colleagues, is too important a task to entrust to 
any kind of independent selection system detached from the political process. You [the 
prime minister], as the head of the government, need the ability to organize it in ways that 
best respond to your objectives, and to place in the most senior positions the professionals 
who, in your judgment, are best able to meet the needs of a particular department and 
agency. It is difficult to contemplate how any large business organization would survive if 
vice presidents and senior officers were selected by a group independent of the CEO. 
(Canada 2006) 
 
 
 
The Politics of Administrative Mobility: The State of the Discipline 
From methodological limitations to theoretically puzzling results. Although the politics of 
bureaucratic mobility has received interest from the media, political parties, international 
governmental organizations and government mandated commissions, scholarship in public 
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administration has been somewhat more laggard in its efforts to apprehend the extent to which 
politics affects bureaucratic mobility (for some notable early exceptions see, Finer 1952; Derlien 
1988; Bourgault and Dion 1989a; Weller 1989; Neilson 1990). Instead, largely influenced by 
research in organization and management studies, a prominent body of research has focused on 
the role that nonpolitical variables have in influencing mobility (Caillier 2011; Bertelli 2007; 
Cho and Lewis 2012; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). The slow manner in which public 
administration has moved to consider the politics of mobility is part of what some see as a larger 
trend within the discipline to move away from its roots in political science and its preoccupation 
with relationships of power (Lodge and Wegrich 2012; Meier 2007; Fry and Raadschelders 
2008).  
 In contrast to this general trend, a growing number of scholars have taken-up interest in 
studying the political dimensions of bureaucratic mobility (Grzymala-Busse 2003; Peters and 
Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2008; Boyne et al. 2010; Flinders, Matthews, and 
Eason 2012; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014; 
Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a, 2014b; Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa 2014; Veit and Scholz 2016). 
Recognizing the power that the heads of government in some countries have in staffing 
administrative elites, this research draws primarily (albeit often implicitly) upon principal-agent 
theory to hypothesize as to how political dynamics2 – such as a transition in the governing party 
or the government’s legislative strength – affect the extent to which governments strategically 
remove and appointment bureaucratic elites.  
 Yet despite its merits, this burgeoning research faces two difficulties, one 
methodological and one theoretical. Methodologically, as noted by others (Boyne et al. 2010; 
Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 892; Veit and Scholz 2016), few studies have tested 
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simultaneously competing explanatory factors. Instead, research has tended to rely on 
descriptive statistics and only focus on one political variable. For instance, in one of the earliest 
empirical works, Bourgault and Dion (1989) limit their study of DM mobility in Canada’s 
federal bureaucracy to transitions in the governing party. More recent work by Bierling et al. 
(2000; 2014) studying the mobility of deputy and assistant deputy ministers in Canada’s 
provincial bureaucracies from 1987 to 2007, constrain their attention to whether an election has 
occurred. 
 One reason for the inability to test competing explanatory variables is difficulty 
generating datasets with enough observations to test multiple independent variables at the same 
time. This problem is even greater for scholars studying parliamentary countries, where, in 
contrast to the United States where the president controls approximately 3, 000 administrative 
offices (Lewis 2008), there are fewer positions under the command of the first minister. 
Recognizing the need for more rigorous empirical tests, recent attempts have been made to 
generate larger datasets. Notable examples include work by Dahlstrom and Niklasson (2013) 
and Ennser-Jedenastik (2014a), who, by enlarging their sampling population across spatial units 
and through time, have produced some of the first large-N studies in parliamentary systems, 
encompassing 1, 608 and 1, 671 observations, respectively.  
 A second difficulty with the emerging literature on the politics of administrative mobility 
is theoretical. Compared to previous work, the findings of these recent studies using longitudinal 
data are leading to a confounded set of conclusions. For instance, using data extending back to 
1970, Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup (2014) find no statistically significant 
relationship between a change in the governing party and the replacement of bureaucratic elites 
– a main supposition of the literature. Elsewhere, using data sampling back to 1960, Dahlstrom 
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and Niklasson fail to discover a statistically significant relationship between mobility and any 
political variable. In light of the puzzling results, the authors conclude that “none of the 
previously used explanations – ideological bias of the government, the number of years that the 
government has been in power, and the parliamentarian support for the government – holds. Our 
general conclusion is therefore negative and emphasizes the need for more systematic research 
on this question” (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 891). In sum, as researchers have developed 
larger datasets by drawing upon observations further back in time, the relationships previously 
believed to exist between political dynamics and administrative mobility are no longer holding-
up. Of course, contradictory and inconclusive results are a normal part of science (Lakatos 
1970), encouraging the kind of additional research suggested by Dahlstrom and Niklasson. 
Advancing research: A proposed solution to the puzzling results. This dissertation advances the 
literature by overcoming the long-standing methodological and more recent theoretical 
difficulties by retesting the most prominent hypotheses with an original dataset of deputy 
minister mobility in Canada’s ten provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Although 
used less frequently in public administration than in other fields of social science, panel data 
(sometimes referred to as time-series cross-sectional or pooled data) offers advantages helping 
to overcome the methodological and theoretical difficulties identified above (Pitts and 
Fernandez 2009; Zhu 2013). Unfortunately, because of the high financial cost and time required 
to develop such data, its use continues to be sparse in many fields of science (Hardy 2001, 1341). 
 Methodologically, by collecting data from the ten Canadian provinces over a period of 
approximately 100 years, this study increases the number of observations roughly tenfold 
without introducing as much variation in alternative explanatory variables specific to spatial 
units, such as political culture and institutions, as would be the case if drawing observations 
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from across different countries. Comparativists in political science frequently identify the 
Canadian provinces as an ideal case selection when desiring a greater deal of control in 
institutional variables (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 2011; Turgeon et al. 2014).  
 By collecting data across the ten Canadian provinces over approximately 100 years this 
project joins in the recent effort by some to overcome methodological difficulties by 
simultaneously testing explanatory variables. By collecting observations across so many 
jurisdictions over a such a long period of time the dataset generated for this work contains 16, 
660 observations, approximately ten times greater than the previous large-n study of 
bureaucratic mobility in a parliamentary system (Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a).  
 In addition, the large number of observations over an extended period of time also offers 
a means to potentially overcome theoretical difficulties by exploring temporal variances in the 
relationship between politics and mobility. Specifically, it puts principal-agent theory in its 
historical context by discerning whether the relationship between political dynamics and 
mobility varies across historical periods embodying distinct political-administrative 
relationships.  
 Importantly, research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility has predominantly 
drawn upon principal-agent theory (sometimes referred to simply as ‘agency theory’), a variant 
of rational choice theory, to hypothesize over the causal relationships between political variables 
and the strategic removal and appointment of bureaucratic elites. By paying attention to the 
preferences and strategic actions of individuals, rational choice theories have been an important 
theoretical guide in understanding the underlying dynamics of social phenomena, including, the 
development and transformation of institutions (North 1981), joining an organization (Olson 
1965), participating in a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), the actions of social movements 
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(McCarthy and Zald 1977), voting in a democratic election (Blais 2000), engaging in corrupt 
behaviour (Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1994), as well as in the field of public administration, 
government control of the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002), including the appointment of 
administrative elites (Lewis 2008). 
 As the use of rational choice amongst social scientists began to grow in the 1990s 
however, so too did it attract a great deal of criticism (Green and Shapiro 1994). At times 
originating from within its own ranks (Bates et al. 1998), some of the more constructive critiques 
helped improve its theoretical rigour and empirical application. Amongst the various points 
raised, one issue was the static nature of the models. As stated by two proponents of principal-
agent theory in public administration: 
While this principal-agent model has been well articulated, its assumptions rarely have been 
analyzed. The principal-agent literature in political science has paid little attention to these 
key elements, contending only that they exist and then going on to the other empirical 
questions at hand. Information and goal conflict both are treated as constants in the model, 
with little change over time or across settings. As a result the theory becomes static rather 
than dynamic and may force the analyst to frame questions in an inappropriate manner. 
(Waterman and Meier 1998, 177) 
 
Recent work studying political-administrative relationships has begun to allow the components 
of these models to vary (Gailmard and Patty 2012; Krause and O’Connell Forthcoming). Yet 
when it comes to studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, research has generally continued 
to apply a static version of principal-agent theory. Reflecting the influential descriptions of 
Weber (1991), Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971), hypotheses assume that political-
administrative relationships are fraught with goal conflict and information asymmetry that are 
assumed to be problematic for governments presumed to desire bureaucrats who accept and 
enthusiastically work towards realizing the government’s policy directives. Governments are 
then assumed to strategically use administrative appointments to ensure that bureaucrats are 
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responsive to their policy agenda. The problem, however, is that these hypotheses may not be 
suitable for different historical periods in which governments do not have the same core 
preference that bureaucrats simply accept and work towards realizing the government’s policy 
agenda. 
 
Beyond Agency Theory: Situating Strategic Actions within the Sociohistorical Context 
Influenced by the sociological writings of Marx (1963), Weber (1978) and Polanyi (1944), other 
social scientists have brought attention to the antecedent social context in which individuals 
develop their preferences (March and Olsen 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Jenson and 
Mérand 2010). What individuals come to recognize as good and desirable, how they interpret 
the intentions of others, and what they view as appropriate behaviour in pursuit of their 
preferences, are not universally given to the individual, but rather, are influenced by the larger 
sociohistorical setting in which they belong. True, individuals act strategically in pursuit of their 
preferences, but the nature of these preferences are embedded within a larger sociohistorical 
context.3 While the strategic nomination of administrative elites in the modern period may 
reflect the assumptions of agency theory – that governments view goal conflict and information 
asymmetry as problematic due to their preference for bureaucrats who indisputably accept the 
government’s policy directives and manage resources towards making them reality – this may 
not be the case in sociohistorical periods defined by fundamentally different political-
administrative relationships.  
 The 20th century was a period of profound social, industrial and technological 
transformation (Inglehart 1977). The same is also true of our systems of governance and the 
relationship between elected governments and administrators, including the nature and purpose 
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of governing, the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency as well as its loyalty (Aberbach, 
Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Silberman 1993; Savoie 2003; Yang and Holzer 2005; Chapman 
and O’Toole 2009). Research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, however, has not 
yet considered that the relationship between politics and the strategic appointment of 
bureaucrats may vary alongside historical transformations in political-administrative 
relationships. While principal-agent theory has explained the underlying motivates as to why 
governments remove and appoint bureaucratic elites (responsiveness to their directives in an 
environment where goal conflict and information asymmetry are viewed as problematic), these 
hypotheses may be contingent to a specific modern, managerial, era of governance, witnessed 
in many industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1980s (Pollitt 1993; Saint-Martin 
2000). This dissertation postulates that as the nature of governance and the contours of political-
administrative relationships have shifted during the 20th century there have been changes in the 
extent to which political variables are associated with bureaucratic mobility, thus potentially 
explaining the puzzle that as researchers have begun to use longitudinal data pooling 
observations back in time before the 1980s, the association between political dynamics and 
bureaucratic mobility is no longer present. 
 To understand better how the relationship between politics and administrative mobility 
has varied over time, this dissertation draws upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept of Public 
Service Bargain (PSB) to outline the contours of different political-administrative relationships 
appearing over the course of the 20th century, specifically, differences in the nature of the 
bureaucracy’s competency as well as its loyalty. Unlike previous research that has assumed 
governments use appointments to ensure responsiveness to the government’s directives, this 
dissertation reformulates prominent hypotheses by situating the actions of governments within 
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their sociohistorical context embodying distinct PSBs. It is argued that as the nature of the 
competency and loyalty which governments seek to encourage amongst bureaucrats has shifted 
across PSBs, so too have there been changes in the extent to which political variables prod 
governments to move persons in and out of administrative offices in an effort to encourage such 
traits. 
 Change in the relationship between politics and administrative mobility over time across 
PSBs is tested primarily with descriptive statistics and logistic regression using an original 
dataset measuring yearly change in personnel holding DM positions for each department in 
Canada’s provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. The empirical evidence supports 
the conclusion that the association between mobility and several key political dynamics does 
exhibit a great deal of variation across different PSBs.  
 Specifically, before the advent of the modern professional bureaucracy, a transition in 
the governing party is most associated with increased mobility. This is congruent with a spoils-
type Public Service Bargain where the nature of governance is of a minimal and incremental 
character, there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy’s competency and the its 
loyalty is of a partisan nature oriented towards the party in government. In the spoils bargain, 
incoming governments, no matter how long the previous party had been in power, strategically 
use their prerogative to staff administrative offices to reinforce this partisan loyalty by 
nominating individuals who had supported their party. Equally important, when controlling for 
a transition in party, changes in premier have no relationship with mobility. This reflects a 
strategic staffing of bureaucratic elites by governments, which is not preoccupied with limiting 
bureaucratic drift and ensuring commitment towards the head of government’s policy agenda, 
but instead, is oriented towards reinforcing partisan electoral support to the party.  
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 Beginning in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, however, the relationship 
between most political dynamics and mobility is significantly weakened. The weak association 
between political dynamics and mobility corresponds with a Schafferian bargain, where the 
competency governments desire bureaucrats to possess is a more detailed knowledge of policy 
issues, meanwhile the loyalty preferred is of an impersonal nature oriented to the office of the 
government which encourages bureaucrats to provide honest and frank advice on the basis of 
their expertise regardless of the party in power. To foster such qualities governments 
strategically leave elite bureaucrats in their positions regardless of a change in party or premier. 
 From the 1980s and onward, political dynamics once again begin to have a marked effect 
on mobility. This time, however, in contrast to the spoils bargain, all changes in the first 
minister, rather than a transition in the governing party, are positively associated with mobility. 
The shift from a partisan to a personal political dynamic reflects the political-administrative 
relationship found in a managerial bargain. Here, the type of competency governments want the 
bureaucracy to possess is the ability to effectively manage personnel and resources towards 
realizing the government’s policy agenda, and not, as in the case of the Schafferian bargain, 
provide advice about the nature of policy decisions. The type of loyalty desired by politicians 
in the managerial bargain is oriented to the policy agenda set by the head of government. The 
result is that even when there has been no change in party, all newly elected heads of government 
are now associated with increased levels of mobility. Different than the spoils bargain, when 
controlling for transitions in the governing party, changes in the first minister heading the 
government, are most strongly associated with mobility.  
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Contributions 
Contributions to public administration. This dissertation makes original contributions to the 
fields of public administration and Canadian politics.4 By situating the government’s strategic 
actions within a sociohistorical context, a primary contribution of this dissertation to public 
administration is the demonstration that the relationship between politics and bureaucratic 
mobility is historically contingent, varying alongside changes in the contours of political-
administrative relationships. When it comes to the mobility of bureaucratic elites, this work 
shows that politics matters, but which political variables, and the strength of their relationship 
with mobility, varies across periods embodying distinct PSBs. 
 By providing one of the first applications of PSBs to formally postulate and empirically 
test how a government’s strategic actions are mediated by the character of the sociohistorical 
institutional setting, this work deviates from the dominant use of PSBs by scholars to describe 
changes in the roles of bureaucrats over time and across countries (Lodge 2010; Bourgault 2011; 
Steen and Van der Meer; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 
2011; Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; Hondeghem and Van Dorpe 2013; van der 
Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013), and attests to its utility 
to understand how the nature of political-administrative relationships influences government 
action. 
 
Contributions to Canadian political science. By studying a key aspect of political-
administrative relationships amongst the Canadian provinces through an extended period of 
history, this dissertation also makes an important contribution to Canadian political science. A 
key issue of interest amongst Canadian political scientists is the decision-making style of the 
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executive (Heeney 1946; Lindquist and White 1997; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005; 
Lewis 2013), and more precisely, the increasing centralization of power of the Prime Minister 
(PM). In his Governing from the Centre, Donald J. Savoie forcefully argues that since the end 
of the 1970s, decision-making within the Canadian federal government has become centralized 
in the hands of the PM. Speaking to the minimal role of cabinet in Canadian politics, Savoie 
boldly asserts that “no one, at least in government in Canada, believes any longer that the prime 
minister is primus inter pares” (1999, 13). 
 Yet others have been somewhat sceptical of Savoie’s conclusions. Some question the 
validity of Savoie’s deductions given that the research methods used were a non-random 
selection of interviews with political elites from within the executive (Clercy 2000). Concerns 
have been raised that the failure to triangulate conversations with other sources of evidence, or 
even conduct interviews with actors outside the executive centre of government, may have 
biased Savoie’s conclusions, especially considering the penchant for political elites to 
exaggerate the accuracy of events to emphasize their importance (Berry 2002). 
 Others take issue with the assertion that the exercise of first ministerial power has 
become more centralized since the 1980s, claiming that earlier PMs were also autocratic (Bakvis 
2001). Some research of the Canadian provinces suggests that the temporal component of 
Savoie’s “governing from the centre” thesis is less valid at the provincial level where 
governments have only known a dominant premier (White 2005). Likewise, in his historical 
comparative study of cabinet in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, Christopher 
Dunn (1995) has noted a historical change in the cabinet style emerging after the Second World 
War, from an unaided to an institutionalized cabinet structure. While the two cabinet styles are 
distinguished by formal organizational differences such as the introduction of cabinet 
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committees, they also involve a behavioural shift in the distribution of power. In contrast to 
Savoie, who sees a centralization of power, Dunn claims that the transformation from the 
unaided to the institutionalized cabinet witnessed a shift in the decision-making style of 
premiers from a dominant style to a “general tendency for collective decision-making and a less 
dominant premier” (1995, 13). More recent applications of Dunn’s work, however, in light of 
Savoie’s differing conclusion, provide evidence of an increased centralization of power from 
the institutionalized cabinet, to a premier minister-centered cabinet (Bernier, Brownsey, and 
Howlett 2005). 
 Without empirical evidence that can be systematically compared, disagreements over 
the centralization of power in the first minister are difficult to resolve. By analyzing the mobility 
of bureaucratic elites from before the development of the professional Weberian bureaucracy 
into to the modern era this dissertation provides one means of measuring the centralization of 
power. Importantly, amongst the various indicators suggesting a centralization of power 
identified by Savoie, is the increased reappointment of bureaucratic elites. As he explains: 
A minute of council first issued in 1896 and last reissued in 1935 gives the prime minister 
the power to appoint deputy ministers. All prime ministers have made it a point to retain 
this power in their own hands and for good reason. It is key to controlling government 
operations and to ensuring that the government goes in the intended direction. (Savoie 2005, 
37-38)  
 
Critically, while all PMs have retained their power to appointment DMs, prime ministers since 
Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) have increasingly made use of this prerogative as a 
means to increase their control of the bureaucracy. Savoie alleges that:  
Trudeau believed that entrenched bureaucrats in line departments had too much influence, 
if not power, over policy and administration. He became convinced that they ran 
departments like personal fiefdoms and all too often left outsiders, including ministers out 
of the loop. They could not be easily challenged either by line ministers, central agencies 
or cabinet because of their intimate knowledge of the sector, the department, and the 
department's policy and program history. Rotating civil servants would serve many 
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purposes, one of which was that it would place ministers and senior bureaucrats on a more 
equal footing, since both would become birds of passage in government departments and 
agencies. (2008, 224-225) 
 
 
By being able to identify trends in the mobility of DMs over the course of the 20th century, this 
dissertation provides an empirical test as to the first minister’s centralization of power in 
Canada. The evidence from this dissertation lends strong support to Savoie’s thesis. Whereas 
prior to the 1980s changes between premiers from within the same party were not associated 
with increased bureaucratic mobility, since this period, newly elected first ministers, regardless 
of whether or not the new premier is from the same party, are now associated with higher levels 
of mobility, congruent with an increased concentration of power in the first minister. 
 
 
Plan of Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into five chapters. After briefly reviewing 
explanations in organization and management studies, Chapter 2 turns to research studying the 
politics of mobility. Noting the tendency of principal-agent theory to universalize the 
preferences of heads of government underlying the strategic manipulation of bureaucratic 
offices, this review introduces Hood and Lodge’s concept of a Public Service Bargain to better 
understand how the relationship between political variables and mobility may vary over time 
alongside changes in political-administrative relationships, specifically concerning the type of 
competency and loyalty governments desire bureaucrats to possess. Chapter 3 outlines the 
research design, data, variable operationalization and methods used to test the hypotheses. The 
strengths and limitations of these choices are also discussed. The empirical analysis of this work 
is divided into two chapters.  
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 Chapter 4 takes a first step to investigate changes in the relationship between mobility 
and politics over time. Evidence based on descriptive statistics generally suggests that the 
relationship between most political dynamics and mobility has varied over time across distinct 
PSBs in a manner congruent with theoretical expectations. In addition to descriptive statistics 
Chapter 4 also draws upon a body of primary and secondary sources to conduct a qualitative 
inquiry to identify whether the strategic reasons as to why governments remove and appoint 
administrative elites over the last 100 years have shifted in tandem with changes in the contours 
of political-administrative relationships in a manner congruent with theoretical expectations. 
 The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) then makes use of statistical regression to 
simultaneously test the association between key political variables and mobility while 
controlling for alternative predictors identified by organization and management studies. Even 
when controlling for additional factors influencing mobility, the findings support the conclusion 
that the extent to which some key political dynamics have influenced mobility has shifted across 
diverse PSBs. 
 The concluding chapter reviews the dissertation’s objectives, its central argument, the 
empirical evidence, as well as its main conclusions. The findings implications for scholarship 
studying administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics are considered. Limitations of this 
study and potentially promising future avenues of research unaddressed in this project are also 
identified. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter One 
This introductory chapter has provided a synopsis of the dissertation. After introducing the topic 
of bureaucratic mobility, it was claimed that despite its merits, burgeoning research studying the 
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politics of bureaucratic mobility has continued to face methodological and theoretical 
challenges. Most importantly, as researchers have developed larger datasets by using 
observations further back in time, the empirical results have led to conclusions challenging the 
most prominent hypotheses. It was postulated that one reason for these puzzling results may be 
due to variation in the contours of political-administrative relationships.  
 As the nature of governance has changed over the last 100 years, and the type of 
competency and loyalty governments want bureaucrats to exhibit has accordingly shifted also, 
so too, it is postulated, has there been changes in the extent to which political dynamics prod 
governments to strategically manipulate elite administrative offices. It is worth emphasizing that 
this theoretical position does not oppose the tenant of agency theory that governments 
strategically appoint administrative elites in order to control the behaviour of the bureaucracy. 
Instead this work asserts that while all governments seek to control the bureaucracy’s behaviour, 
the nature of the behaviour sought by governments varies across historical periods.   
 The theoretical framework, research design and methods used to test this possibility were 
also discussed. By studying the mobility of DMs in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies over a 
period of 94 years, this dissertation creates the largest dataset to date of administrative mobility 
in a single parliamentary system (N = 16, 660). Drawing upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept 
of a Public Service Bargain, a primary contribution of this dissertation is the demonstration that 
the relationships between political dynamics and mobility vary alongside historical changes in 
political-administrative relationships. This chapter concluded by outlining the structure of the 
dissertation and providing a synopsis of each successive chapter.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
Chapter two summary. This chapter reviews previous research studying the causes of 
administrative mobility. It is observed that whereas research strongly influenced from the fields 
of organization and management studies have overlooked political dimensions, a second 
growing corpus of research drawing upon principal-agent theory has begun to explore the effects 
that political variables can have on mobility. After reviewing the central hypotheses identified 
by this emerging research, this chapter claims that the underlying causality between political 
variables and mobility underpinning the hypotheses may be contingent on a specific managerial 
type of political-administrative relationship, unique to the contemporary era of governance.  
 From a sociological perspective there are good reasons for postulating that the 
relationship between political dynamics and mobility may vary over time. To understand how 
the association between political variables and mobility may vary alongside historical variations 
in political-administrative relationships, this chapter draws upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) 
concept of a Public Service Bargain to place the strategic actions of governments within three 
distinct sociohistorical contexts of a spoils-type, Schafferian, and a managerial bargain. 
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I share quite a lot with those rational choice theorists who are 
willing to situate actors in a given and partially manipulable 
institutional context... I call them institutionally situated rational 
choice analysts. They do not presume that the entire world is one 
big Adam Smith-style free market. They ask about strategies and 
outcomes within settings that have institutional rules of the game in 
place.  
- Theda Skocpol (1995, 106) 
 
 
Patronage appointments are those that can be made by elected 
politicians without any encumbrance in terms of due process or 
transparency. In reality, even patronage powers exist within a 
certain bounded rationality which constrains choices such as 
political calculations or informal brokering. 
 
- Matthew Flinders and Felicity Matthews  (2010, 647) 
 
 
 
What Explains Administrative Mobility? 
Organization and management studies. Strongly influenced by organization and management 
studies, a prominent body of research in public administration has focused on the relationship 
between the turnover of personnel and an individual’s characteristics, an organization’s features 
as well as labour market conditions. Generally, this research tends to operationalize mobility by 
asking individuals whether they intend to leave their position in the near future. Personal 
characteristics observed with influencing an individual’s intention to depart include age, gender, 
education, and the amount of time they have been in their position. 
  Age has been shown to have a U-shaped relationship with mobility, with the youngest 
and oldest displaying a greater propensity to leave than those in the middle (Borman and 
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Dowling 2008; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011). Similarly experience with the organization 
is found to have the same U-shaped relationship (Lewis and Park 1989). A higher portion of 
persons first entering their position leave within an initial period due to a discrepancy between 
the actual responsibilities of their job and their expectations prior to beginning. Those persons 
remaining in their position after this initial period, however, are generally satisfied with their 
job and thus have lower levels of mobility. Yet towards the end of their career, time is once 
again associated with turnover as persons are likely to retire from the work place.  
 Education has been shown to be inversely associated with an intention to depart (Cho 
and Lewis 2012). Others have shown that the field of study is an important factor affecting 
mobility. Persons having degrees in subjects with greater commercial value in the private sector 
such as science and mathematics are associated with higher levels of turnover (Ingersoll and 
May 2012). Conventionally, males have been identified with lower levels of turnover (Lewis 
and Park 1989), albeit some suggest that as the prevalence of ‘male-breadwinner’ family model 
has lessened and women’s income is no longer supplementary, the relationship between gender 
and mobility no longer exists (Moynihan and Landuyt 2008). An employee’s satisfaction with 
remuneration, their decision-making autonomy, and their ability to influence the direction of 
policy, have all been found to be negatively associated with an employee’s intention to quit 
(Arcand, Tellier, and Chretien 2010; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011). Beyond individual 
characteristics, economic growth is positively associated with mobility (Kirschenbaum and 
Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013). By expanding the labour market, economic 
growth creates more employment opportunities and fosters confidence amongst employees that 
they can easily find employment elsewhere. Beyond demand, the supply of labour may also 
affect mobility. When the pool of candidates is small, employers are more likely to provide more 
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generous remuneration, and may be less willing to dismiss staff. Conversely, when the supply 
of qualified personnel available is large, employees may receive less generous salaries and face 
employers more willing to dismiss them (Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). The same is also 
true of the size of the organizations. Larger organizations may be associated with higher levels 
of mobility due to the larger resource pool from which employers can draw upon to replace 
personnel (Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin 1988). As the organization grows larger, the 
costs associated with searching for and identify replacements decreases, thereby increasing the 
probability of mobility. 
 
Organization and management studies: Where’s the power? Despite contributing to our 
understanding of administrative mobility by uncovering the individual, organizational and 
market characteristics affecting mobility, two critiques can be launched against this literature. 
First, rarely do these works study actual levels of mobility. Instead, turnover of personnel is 
operationalized via the individual’s stated intention to leave their position in the near future. 
While this method has the advantage of allowing researchers to gather additional information 
of the employee alongside questioning them about their intentions to quit, such as their age, 
gender and feelings of empowerment, an important limitation of this method is that intention to 
leave is not actual departure. A few studies having tested the association between intentions and 
actual departure have found less than convincing evidence. For instance, in one study of public 
school teachers, only 20 percent of persons having expressed an intention to depart had left their 
position two years later (cited in Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). Given the weak link between 
intention and actual departure, some researchers have warned that, “the argument for the use of 
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intent to turnover as a surrogate for actual turnover might be less than compelling” (Dalton, 
Johnson, and Daily 1999, 1343). 
 A second shortcoming of this body of research is that by limiting analysis of mobility to 
an employee’s intention to depart leaves unexamined another important cause of mobility: 
involuntary forced departure. While voluntary withdrawal is likely a predominant cause of 
turnover amongst lower tier staff, there are good reasons for believing that it accounts for much 
less mobility at the apex of the bureaucracy.  
 First, bureaucratic elites generally exhibit those personal traits and hold jobs whose 
characteristics are associated with lower intentions to leave, such as middle age, greater 
influence over policy and higher financial remuneration (Evans, Lum, and Shields 2014; 
Zussman 2014). Research from the public service motivation literature also notes that those in 
executive positions are more likely to be generally more satisfied with their position (Jabes and 
Zussman 1988; Camilleri 2007; van der Wal 2013). As former Canadian Clerk of the Privy 
Council and Secretary to Cabinet, the highest-ranking public servant, Alex Himelfarb (2002-
2006), stated in his address to the annual Public Policy Forum Dinner in 2013, “My hunch is 
that I can speak for all the former clerks here this evening that for us public service was deeply 
satisfying, a privilege, a source of pride, an opportunity to make a difference. Public service was 
more often than not fulfilling, and, believe it or not, even fun” (Himelfarb 2013, par. 2).5 
 Studies based on the direct observed behaviour of administrative elites also suggest that 
voluntary departure is less common than other positions. Studies documenting actions of 
bureaucrats following their dismissal have noted disappointment or even anger amongst the 
departed (Cooper Forthcoming). As noted by professor of sociology, policy consultant, and 
former DM in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, John. D. House:  
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Whenever there is a change in government, particularly when a new party comes into 
power, the established senior bureaucrats fear for their jobs. The transition period between 
the old regime and the new regime is when they are most likely to be replaced. (1999, 75) 
 
Furthermore, House observes that in addition to fearing for their jobs, the ‘Old Guard’ of 
incumbents sought to deter the government from dismissing them. Speaking of the phases 
undertaken by elites upon a change in government, House remarks that: 
The first and most fundamental was survival. They were quick to disavow any particular 
political affiliation with or personal loyalty to the old regime. They presented themselves 
as being loyal public servants to whichever party was in power and whoever was premier. 
While often critical of the premier and various ministers behind their backs – sometimes 
scathingly so, [sic] the Old Guard were always careful to be completely obedient, 
supportive, and loyal to their faces. (1999, 76) 
  
Beyond demonstrating that bureaucratic elites tend to enjoy their positions of power, House’s 
observation brings attention to the central place that forced departure plays in bureaucratic 
mobility as well as highlighting the essential fact that underlying such staffing decisions is a 
strong political dimension. By failing to consider forced departure, a severe shortcoming of 
organization and management studies is its failure to study mobility from a perspective of 
power. 
 
The Politics of Mobility 
Positions of importance and the power to appoint. There are two primary reasons for why 
considerations of power and political dynamics are an important component in understanding 
the mobility of bureaucratic elites. The first is the importance of administrative offices for heads 
of government. As the highest ranking non-political position within each ministry, DMs can 
have enormous responsibilities and can possess a great degree of discretion in decision-making 
(Weller and Rhodes 2001). Deputy ministers are also invested with a vast deal of resources. 
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Bureaucratic elites are also in a position of being able to develop substantive knowledge of 
policy issues and organizational logistics in addition to fostering important relations with key 
stake holders (Heclo 1978; Evans 1995; Carpenter 2001), who can be essential in the 
development and implementation of policies and programs. This knowledge asymmetry 
favouring the ‘trained expert’ over the ‘political master’ has since Weber (1991, 232) been 
recognized by students of bureaucracy (Finer 1941; Putnam 1973). With potential to have such 
a great deal of discretion in matters of administration, policy, and even politics, governments 
have a pronounced degree of interest in who occupies these elite administrative positions. To 
borrow a metaphor from Richard Rose (1987), governments wishing to ensure that the ship of 
governance sails in the direction they so desire, have a great deal of interest in the characteristics 
and intentions of those persons holding the helm. 
 More than having an interest in who the occupants of these elite administrative are, the 
second reason for why considerations of power and political dynamics are an important aspect 
of mobility is the discretion governments enjoy in staffing these offices. As elaborated upon in 
greater detail below (p. 39), the power governments wield in staffing elite administrators is 
especially true in the Canadian variant of Westminster, where, as Order-in-Council 
appointments resting at the exclusive ‘pleasure of the crown’ (represented by the first minister), 
there are no institutional constraints impeding the first minister from appointing and dismissing 
deputy ministers (Neilson 1984; Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009; Boston and Halligan 2012; 
Aucoin 2012; Bourgault and Dunn 2014). Although voluntary departure is beyond the 
government’s control,6 the reappointment, demotion, promotion and dismissal of DMs are not. 
Simply put, when it comes to staffing bureaucratic elites, personnel decisions, are decisions, 
steeped in politics. 
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Mobility and control. Recognizing the interest and power that governments have in staffing 
administrative elites, a second body of research in public administration has been more attuned 
to political factors affecting mobility. While not constituting a monopoly of the field, the earliest 
and largest body of this research comes from the American ‘Control of the Bureaucracy’ 
literature. Having identified various ways governments control the bureaucracy, such as 
budgetary reports, legislative hearings, and third-party monitoring (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; Huber and Shipan 2008), researchers have 
recognized the ex-ante appointment of administrative personnel as one of the most common and 
efficient means for presidents to increase their control (Nathand 1983; Waterman 1989; Wood 
and Waterman 1991; Bertelli and Feldmann 2007; Aberbach 2009; Moe 2012; Lewis and 
Waterman 2013;). Conceptualizing the rapport between politicians and bureaucrats as a 
delegated relationship between a principal and an agent, this scholarship has predominantly 
drawn upon principal-agent theory to hypothesize about the causal relationships between 
political dynamics and mobility (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Lewis 2008; Clinton et al. 
2012).  
 While the majority of this research has emerged from the United States, researchers 
studying parliamentary countries have also remarked of the propensity of first ministers to 
strategically staff administrative personnel as a means to increase their control (Bourgault and 
Dion 1989a; Boyne et al. 2010; Flinders, Matthews, and Eason 2012; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 
2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a; Park and Kim 
2014). Despite the commonality of viewing the appointment of administrative elites as a means 
33 
 
of control, there are some important differences between the American and parliamentary 
systems that deserve mentioning.  
 A first difference concerns the absolute number of appointees. Whereas the American 
president has the power to make more than 3, 000 appointments to government agencies and 
bureaus (Lewis 2008), first ministers in parliamentary systems have much fewer positions at 
their disposal. What they lack in quantity, however, first ministers make up for in quality, 
ultimately having a great deal more of power to appoint and dismiss the top administrative 
positions within each ministry as well as various government agencies, boards and committees 
than compared to the United States, where Congress approval if often necessary (Lewis 2008). 
As will be mentioned below in the discussion of institutional constraints limiting appointments 
(p. 39), the power of the first minister is especially strong in some countries such as Canada, 
where the appointment and removal of DMs is the sole prerogative of the first minister, 
unhindered by any institutional constraint. 
 A second difference between the United States and parliamentary countries concerns the 
nature of the appointees themselves. Whereas in the United States most elite appointees are 
recruited from outside the civil service (Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2014), constituting 
what has been referred to as an ‘in-and-outer’ system (Heclo 1988), in parliamentary systems, 
research suggests that first ministers tend to draw from within the bureaucracy (Barberis 1996). 
For instance, studying the effect that a change in government has on DM mobility in Canada 
between 1887 and 1986, Bourgault and Dion (1989a) claim that while there were some 
dismissals, mobility was mostly a mixture of horizontal reappointments, demotions, and 
promotions.  
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 Nevertheless, by instilling the belief amongst bureaucrats that “their survival in office 
depends on the survival of the government” (Bourgault and Dion 1989a, 126), this act of 
‘musical chairs’ is nonetheless a deliberate tactic used by governments to gain control of the 
bureaucracy. Reappointing an agent to an elite position by heightening her awareness that the 
office she holds is at the grace of the principal’s approval. Knowing who appointed them, civil 
servants are reminded that if they do not meet the first minister’s expectations, their appointer 
can just as easily remove them.  
 A few examples illustrate the intentions underpinning the staffing of administrative 
personnel in parliamentary systems. Wanting to increase her control of a civil service she felt 
was serving its own interest rather than the government’s, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher came to rely upon the appointment of elite administrative offices to encourage the type 
of behaviour she desired. Reflecting on this point, Thatcher stated in her memoir that “it became 
clear to me that it was only by encouraging or appointing individuals, rather than trying to 
change attitudes en bloc that progress would be made. And that was to be the method employed” 
(as cited in Richards 1996, 669). Likewise, in the Canadian context, evidence of this logic is 
glimpsed in a memorandum sent to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney from political advisor Peter 
G. White. Following his electoral victory, White briefed Mulroney that: 
 
No single area of government is more important than the management or deployment of 
senior personnel…we must make an early start on gaining control of the bureaucracy by 
identifying and installing some of our own chief operating officers [deputy 
ministers]…This should not be done with fanfare and only at long intervals, but routinely 
and continuously over the government’s mandate. (cited in Newman 2005, 456) 
 
For scholars of parliamentary systems of government, the tendency for heads of government to 
draw from within the civil service when making strategic appointments arises from the first 
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minister’s dual preferences to both increase her control over the bureaucracy and efficiently 
realize policy objectives. One means of achieving both objectives is to nominate persons 
believed to be enthusiastic towards the government’s policy agenda by drawing from a pool of 
candidates already acquainted with the administrative structures necessary to efficiently 
implement the government’s policy agenda: public servants.  
 By strategically using the power of appointment to increase responsiveness without 
having to resort to recruiting from outside the civil service, parliamentary heads of government 
have been hailed by some as having found a way to improve bureaucratic responsiveness all the 
while gleaning some of the advantageous of a professional public service (Institute for Public 
Policy Research 2013, 53).7 In this manner, the strategic appointment of administrative elites in 
many parliamentary systems reflects an important equilibrium concerning the long-standing 
question within public administration as to the proper balance between the independence of the 
bureaucracy and its capacity to ‘speak truth to power’ on the one hand, and responsiveness from 
administrators towards realizing the policy directives of the elected government, on the other 
hand (West 2005; Aucoin and Savoie 2009). Thus whereas some view the strategic appointment 
of administrative personnel by governments as constituting an act of ‘politicization’, due to the 
incursion of political considerations into the realm of administration (Peters and Pierre 2004; 
Hustedt and Salomonsen 2014), scholars of parliamentary systems tend to speak of such 
strategic appointments with careful nuance, referring to the practice as a form of ‘moderate’ 
(Bourgault and Dion 1989a) ‘functional’ (Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014), 
‘managerial’ (Mulgan 1998, 7), ‘personal’ (Richards 1996), or ‘bounded’ (Meyer-Sahling 2008) 
politicization. 
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 In sum, despite disparities between the United States and parliamentary systems as to 
the number of bureaucratic appointees and their career backgrounds, researchers studying both 
systems agree that the appointment and dismissal of bureaucratic elites is a central instrument 
used by governments to control the bureaucracy. The following section reviews the most 
prominent hypotheses between political variables and administrative mobility from this 
literature. 
 
Prominent Political Factors 
Political culture. One group of scholars have focused on political culture to explain differences 
in the degree to which governments interfere in the nomination of administrative personnel. 
These works generally follow the practice of Almond and Verba (1965) and view political 
culture as embodied in the political attitudes of the citizenry. Variation in political interference 
by governments in administration is thus explained by the embedded attitudes and values held 
by the members of society (Sotiropoulos 2004; Taylor and Williams 2008). Simply put, in some 
societies political interference in administration is accepted amongst the citizenry, while in 
others, it is not.  
 In Canada there is a long tradition of explaining differences in political behaviour as 
stemming from differences in political cultures across regions of the country (Simeon and Elkins 
1974; Boychuk 1998; Wiseman 2007; Anderson 2010; rejecting the presence of inter-regional 
differences in culture see, Porter 1965; Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams 1980). As stated by 
Bell, “regionalism, like other ‘isms’, involves values, sentiments, and beliefs” (1992, 127), and 
differences in values, sentiments and beliefs lead to different political behaviours. Various 
studies have used regional and political culture to explain the degree with which provincial 
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governments dismiss and appoint administrative elites (Heintzman 1983; Noel 1987; Crossley 
2000; Johnson 2005; MacLeod 2006; McKenna 2014; Lindquist and Vakil 2014; Rasmussen 
2014).  
 A problematic issue with explanations resting on political cultural, however, is that so 
many works suggest that the province they are studying has a culture favourable to the dismissal 
and appointment of administrative elites. With regional cultures having a positive disposition to 
political manipulation of administrative personnel being so ubiquitous, such explanations offer 
little prowess in understanding variation across provinces who all share a similar cultural 
disposition, nor does it offer an explanation for intra-provincial differences over time. 
 Many critiques have been made against cultural theories as offering ‘just so’ 
explanations for the minimal attention they give to the preferences and actions of individuals 
(see reviews by, Formisano 2001; Wedeen 2002). Relying on culture has possibly led scholars 
in Canadian public administration to overlook other possible explanations. What appears to be 
culture may in fact be explained by differences in the political parties forming government, the 
length of time a party stays in power, the frequency of elections and government’s legislative 
strength.  
 
Formal political institutions. A second explanation for differences in the degree to which 
governments remove and appoint bureaucratic elites is the formal institutional constraints 
limiting the government’s role in the appointment process. When compared to other systems of 
government, the fusion of the legislative and executive branches and the custom of responsible 
government within the Westminster tradition gives the head of government a great deal of 
power. This power has traditionally been extended to making appointments to various powerful 
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and prestigious political and administrative positions, including; department ministers, judges, 
members of the upper house of bicameral legislatures, ambassadors, ministerial exempt staff, 
elite bureaucratic officials, executives in arm’s length government agencies, boards and 
commissions, and in the case of the United Kingdom, even ecclesiastical positions (Bakvis 
2001; Flinders 2012). In the last 20 years, however, some Westminster countries have 
introduced institutional reforms designed to limit the first minister’s power in appointing these 
offices, including deputy minister positions (Elgie 1998; Pond 2008; Matthews and Flinders 
2015).  As shown in Table 1, amongst the Westminster countries of the United Kingdom (UK), 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia, a distinction can be made between two broad appointment 
processes, varying in the extent to which the first minister’s power in the appointment process 
is limited. 
 On the one hand are countries with an appointment process that can be referred to as a 
‘decisional body’ system. In this model, found in New Zealand and to a lesser extent in the UK, 
an administrative body is invested with the responsibility of undertaking and making decisions 
concerning the appointment of administrative executives. These tasks include advertising, 
searching, interviewing, short-listing, and most essentially, the selection of the successful 
candidate.  
 In the UK the body is the Civil Service Commission made-up of commissioners and 
non-executive directors outside the civil service. In New Zealand this body is the Chief 
Executive of the State Services Commission (also known as the Commissioner). While 
consulting with members of the government and the civil service, the Commissioner is solely 
responsible for searching, short-listing, interviewing and selecting the successful candidate 
(Institute for Public Policy Research 2013). 
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Table 1: Typology of executive appointments in selected Westminster jurisdictions 
State Appointment 
Model 
Role of 
Third-party  
 
Clerk of 
Executive 
Council 
and 
Cabinet 
Secretary 
Role of First 
Minister 
Justify 
Decision 
Transparency 
of Process 
New 
Zealand 
Decisional 
body 
Advertise, 
interview and 
select 
appointee. 
(State 
Services 
Commission) 
 
Advisory Veto decision by 
State Services 
Commission.  
 
Yes High 
United 
Kingdom 
Decisional 
body 
Advertise, 
interview, 
recommend 
candidates, 
approve final 
selection. 
(Civil Service 
Commission) 
 
Advisory Accept or veto 
decision by 
Commission. 
No Moderately 
low 
Australia Advisory 
body 
Advises  
(Public 
Service 
Commission) 
 
Advisory Appointment 
and dismissal.  
 
No Low 
Canada Advisory 
body 
Advises Clerk 
of EC of 
talent within 
civil service 
(Committee 
of Senior 
Officials) 
 
Advisory Appointment 
and dismissal 
No Low 
Canadian 
Provinces 
Advisory 
body 
Advises Clerk 
of EC of 
talent within 
civil service 
Advisory Appointment 
and dismissal 
No Low 
 
(Source: Aucoin 2006; Matheson et al. 2007; Institute for Public Policy Research 2013; Paun, Harris, 
and Magee 2013) 
Yet despite the fact that in the decisional body model many of the steps in the nomination of 
bureaucratic elites are made by a decisional body, the first minister ultimately has the final say 
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in who is appointed. In the UK the appointment and dismissal of permanent secretaries must 
still be approved by the PM, who is not obligated to justify any such decision. In New Zealand 
the final appointment of chief executives does not need the explicit approval of the PM, although 
the prime minister retains the power to veto any appointment, which unlike the UK, must be 
publicly justified.   
 To avoid the embarrassment of having a selection vetoed by the first minister, the 
decisional body consults with the prime minister as well as the relevant minister to ensure an 
appropriate and acceptable selection. Importantly, while this decisional body model limits the 
power of the first minister, such restrictions are not definitive. At any time, the first minister can 
override the staffing decisions of the decisional body. According to the authors of a report 
commissioned by the Cabinet Office in the UK studying the appointment process of 
administrative elites, despite the involvement of the Civil Service Commission in the selection 
of permanent secretaries “there is a long history of Prime Ministers taking advantage of this 
power: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair reportedly were very involved in the appointment of 
Permanent Secretaries” (Institute for Public Policy Research 2013, 15). In sum, Rhodes’ 
statement of the power of the executive in the Westminster tradition that “there is no 
constitutional constraint on that executive beyond those it chooses to accept” (1999, 353), 
remains an accurate description of the first minister’s power in staffing administrative elites in 
a decisional body model, where the degree to which any staffing decision made by the decisional 
body is accepted by the first minister, rests at her unrestrained discretion.  
 On the other hand, there is an appointment process that can be referred to as an ‘advisory 
body’ model. Found in Australia and Canada, in this model the first minister is provided with 
advisory assistance in identifying and selecting candidates. Assistance, however, is strictly 
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advisory in nature and this body does not have the power to make and present the first minister 
with a decision. In this system the final selection is at the unfettered discretion of the first 
minister. Whereas in the decisional body model the process of identifying and selecting a 
candidate is outside the direct oversight of the first minister (although the first minister is 
consulted and retains the ultimate power to accept or decline the selected candidate), in the 
advisory body model, the degree to which the first minister is involved in the entire process of 
searching, identifying and selecting candidates is itself determined by the first minister.   
 Without any formal institutional constraint limiting the power of the first minister in the 
advisory body model, there is potential for a greater variety of voices advising the first minister. 
The members of this advisory body are fluid and itself at the discretion of the first minister. 
Such actors can include, the head of the civil service (herself selected by the first minister), 
interested ministers, political advisors and party loyalists, interested stake holders, as well as 
other deputy ministers. In the end, however, the involvement and power which this body has is 
always at the discretion of the first minister who retains an unchecked degree of power over the 
appointment, retention, and dismissal of bureaucratic elites.  
 Another difference between the decisional and advisory selection models is the degree 
of transparency of the processes. In the advisory model there is much less transparency or 
conformity as to the process by which candidates are selected (Bourgault 2014). For instance, 
based on his time as Public Service Commissioner in Australia, Andre Podger (2002-2005) 
criticized the nominally reduced role of Australia’s PM to appoint bureaucratic elites. Podger 
remarks that “…neither Moore-Wilton nor Shergold directly sought my views on specific 
appointments. They were not legally obliged to, and perhaps Prime Minister Howard’s desire 
for tight control precluded any involvement of the Commissioner” (2007, 135). Offering his 
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reason for the dismissal of some civil servants but the renewal of contracts for others, Podger 
claims that “A better explanation is that there are favoured and not so favoured secretaries, and 
that the prime minister favours closer control and greater flexibility in managing the senior 
echelons of the APS [Australian Public Service] (2007, 137). 
 Ultimately however, regardless of whether the selection process of administrative elites 
is a decisional or an advisory body model, the constraints limiting the first minister to influence 
the nomination of administrative elites rests weakly on the first minister’s good will to accept a 
limited role. Without institutional constraints able to effectively tie the hands of the first 
minister, institutional explanations offer little explanatory power as to the degree with which 
first ministers appoint and remove administrative personnel. With so much power invested in 
the hands of the first minister, attention instead needs to focus on those political factors varying 
within each country that can influence the incentives and the propensity of governments to 
reappoint bureaucratic elites.  
 
Government’s incentive to appoint. Although often done so implicitly, research placing the 
preferences of heads of government at the centre of theoretical explanations of mobility has 
predominantly drawn upon principal-agent theory. Surfacing in political science (Mitnick 1973; 
Mitnick and Weiss 1974) independently (Shapiro 2005, 271; Mitnick 2013) and approximately 
at the same time as it first appeared in economics (Spence and Zeckhauser 1971; Ross 1973), 
by the 1980s agency theory had become a prominent theoretical approach to analyze 
relationships in which one actor, the principal, delegates responsibility for carrying out tasks to 
another, the agent. In political science this theory was quickly adopted by scholars in public 
administration to examine one of the most vital cases of delegation in representative democracy: 
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the delegation of tasks from the elected government to the unelected administrative official 
(Mitnick 1975; Moe 1984).  
 Importantly, postulates concerning the behaviour of principals forwarded by principal-
agent theory are based on presumed characteristics of the relationship between politicians and 
public administrators, heavily influenced from an earlier body of research applying economic 
theories to study the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, including the writings of 
Parkinson (1957), Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), and Niskanen (1971).  
 A first presumption of agency theory is that the preferences of politicians and civil 
servants are dissimilar. Describing this goal conflict, Niskanen claimed that whereas by desiring 
to be re-elected, politicians want to implement policies reflecting the public interest, the same 
preference is not shared by bureaucrats. Refuting the notion that administrators primarily seek 
to serve the public interest, Niskanen famously claimed the preferences of bureaucrats as 
seeking to maximize their budget, stating that: 
 
It is impossible for any one bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of the limits of 
his information and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal 
motivations...A bureaucrat who may not be personally motivated to maximize the budget 
of his bureau is usually driven by conditions both internal and external to the bureau do just 
that. One should not be surprised, therefore (as I was initially), to hear the most dedicated 
bureaucrats describe their objectives as maximizing the budget for the particulars service(s) 
for which they are responsible.  (1971, 39) 
 
Alongside divergent preferences, a second maxim of principal-agent theory is that 
administrative officials possess more information than politicians concerning the agent’s own 
competencies and behaviour, as well as the details of policies and programs. As Weber famously 
noted: 
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Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by 
keeping their knowledge and intentions secret…In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy, 
out of pure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by 
means of its own experts or from interest groups. Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly 
informed and hence a powerless parliament. (1991, 233-234)  
 
These two aspects of agency theory – goal conflict and information asymmetry – lead to 
expectations that bureaucrats, in pursuit of their own preferences, will behave in ways that go 
against the preferences of politicians. Desiring agents who will loyally execute tasks in 
conformity to the principal’s policy agenda, agency theory further postulates that politicians will 
appoint agents to ensure such loyalty. As Downs states: 
 
Personal loyalty to one’s superior, and from one’s subordinates, plays vital functional roles 
within a bureau. Its first role stems from the rarely discussed fact that all top-level officials 
(and many others) are frequently in danger of being embarrassed by revelations of their 
illegal acts, failures, lack of control over their subordinates and sheer incompetence. If their 
subordinates are personally loyal to them, they can rely upon those subordinates to be 
discreet in the handling of information dealing with these potentially scandalous matters. 
Therefore, in order to protect themselves, they tend to select subordinates who exhibit such 
loyalty...Because superiors value personal loyalty in their subordinates, such loyalty is one 
of the qualities they look for when deciding whom to promote. As a result, subordinates 
seek to exhibit personal loyalty so as to increase their chances of promotion. (1967, 71-72) 
 
In sum, based on the presumption that politicians desire bureaucrats who will carry out tasks 
congruent with their directives, and that goal conflict and information asymmetry are viewed as 
an impediment to such, agency theory has developed hypotheses between various political 
dynamics and the propensity with which governments remove and appoint administrative elites 
in an effort to limit bureaucratic drift and ensure that tasks are carried out as directed.  
 
Time since change in government.  In his seminal history of the British civil service, Parris 
described the meaning of permanence in the Westminster tradition asserting that; “… 
permanence in a civil servant means something more than security of tenure or the mere 
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retention of a job for a long time. It means the retention of that job during a change in 
government” (1969, 27). While permanency of position may be an ideal feature of the modern 
bureaucracy in Whitehall, a major tenet of research studying the politics of mobility is the 
reappointment of administrative elites by newly elected governments. Following a transition in 
power, the newly elected government may be prone to questioning the willingness of officials 
to provide enthusiastic and impartial service, who, all but a short period ago, had worked for the 
previous governing party (Bourgault and Dion 1989a; Boyne et al. 2010).  
 Yet not all changes in government are the same. Accordingly, others specify that the 
degree to which newly elected governments dismiss and appoint administrative elites is a 
function of the duration of time the previous party had formed the government. An entrenched 
period of time in power can lead opposition parties to view the bureaucracy as closely associated 
with the political agenda of the government, resulting in increased levels of mobility once a 
change in party takes place (Michelmann and Steeves 1985; White 1993; Lewis 2005; Derlien 
1988).  
 An example of this type of thinking is demonstrated in the memorandum sent to 
Progressive Conservative (PC) Prime Minister Brian Mulroney by his close political confidant 
Peter G. White shortly after taking power, insisting that: 
 
The Liberal Party, in office for 20 years out of 21 up to 1984, built the public service that 
we have inherited….These appointments were made in a conscious and perfectly proper 
effort to fashion a senior public service that would be compatible with Trudeau’s style and 
approach – the very style and approach that Canadian voters so emphatically rejected in 
September 1984. It is idle to think that these men and women, who have spent most of their 
public service careers designing and implementing the Trudeau-Pitfield approach to 
government, could suddenly become strongly committed to radically altering their own 
creation. (Newman 2005, 545) 
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Studying the mobility of DM in Canada’s federal bureaucracy between 1867 and 1986, 
Bourgault and Dion (1989a) note that after decades of rule by the Liberal party, the PC 
government of Brian Mulroney, in a manner congruent with counsel from his political advisors, 
removed every incumbent DM. The meaning of this action was Mulroney’s concern for control. 
As Bourgault and Dion explain, “this series of transfers was seen as a way of quickly 
establishing political control of bureaucrats. Administrative officials judged too imbedded with 
the thinking of the previous government or too compromised by some of the government’s 
policies were expelled from their lairs” (1989a, 144).  
 
Political ideology. The political ideology of governments is another key factor believed to affect 
efforts to control the bureaucracy. Preferring the provision of goods and services via markets 
rather than through state involvement, governments on the ideological right are commonly seen 
as being more suspicious of bureaucrats whose careers are linked to the vitality of state 
programs. For example, studying the relationship between political parties and public sector 
employees in Canada, Britain, France and the United States, Blais, Blake and Dion (1997) show 
that governments on the ideological left display more favourable treatment towards the 
bureaucracy than governments on the right. Research from the United States also suggests that 
making appointments is primarily a Republican strategy, due to their belief that public 
administrators have an ingrained bias towards the expansion of social programs (Waterman 
1989; Rourke 1992; Dickinson and Rudalevige 2004; Moynihan and Roberts 2010). 
 Similar relationships between a political ideology and mobility have not been shown in 
other countries, however (Bourgault and Dion 1989b; Rouban 2004; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 
2013). This may also be the case in Canada, where some maintain that ideological differences 
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between political parties have never been greatly pronounced (Clarke et al. 1996; Brodie and 
Jenson 2007).  
 In addition to the strong presence of ‘brokerage parties’, case study research studying 
the behaviour of political parties in Canada suggests that while prior to the Second World War 
patronage was a defining mechanism used by parties to maintain support in a party system where 
there was “almost complete agreement between Liberals and Conservatives both in theory and 
in policies” (Dobie 1936, 154), that eventually some parties believing in the perils of patronage, 
halted the practice to a greater extent than others. In The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives 
and the Party System 1901-1920, John English (1977) describes how the Conservative Party in 
Canada under the leadership of Robert Borden sought to ‘bring an end to patronage’ at both the 
federal and provincial orders of government (also see, Dutil and MacKenzie 2011).8 Meanwhile 
the Liberal party continued to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel to administrative 
positions based on partisan loyalty to a greater extent than other parties (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; 
Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; Smith 1975; Campbell 1988; Marier 2013; for a dissenting 
opinion see Dobie 1936; Laycock 1990). 
  
From partisan to personal politics: Change in premier. Certainly an important factor, a 
transition in the governing party is not the only variable associated with increased mobility. 
Others have noted that even when there is no transition in the party, a simple change in the 
individual heading the government can lead to increased levels of turnover. Studying Denmark, 
Christensen, Klemmensen and Opstrup (2014) observe that while a change in the governing 
party does not lead to an increase in mobility, a change in the head of government from within 
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the same party does. One possible reason for this outcome offered by the authors is because of 
the problem of adverse selection that new heads of government face in choosing personnel.  
 Desiring to increase their control over the bureaucracy as well as ensure the efficient 
implementation of programs, newly elected heads of government appointed following a 
transition in the governing party may be more cautious in reappointing incumbent bureaucrats 
than newly appointed heads of government from within the same party as the previous 
government. All else being equal, heads of government following a change in party are less 
familiar with administrative personnel and the inner workings of programs than are heads of 
government whose party was previously in power. Fearing that a poor staffing decision could 
harm administrative outputs, new heads of government arising from a transition in party are less 
likely to alter administrative personnel than new heads of government from the same party.
  
 The suggestion that a simple replacement in the head of government matters at least as 
much as transitions in the governing party may be especially true of parliamentary countries in 
the last thirty years where research suggests there has been simultaneous trends towards; (a), a 
personalization of politics centering around the personality of the party leader and away from a 
previous era of party-led politics (Peters and Savoie 2000; Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 
2012); and (b), an increased centralization of decision-making power around the first minister 
and away from a more consensual decision-making style amongst cabinet members (Savoie 
1999; Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009; Karvonen 2010). Trends, which taken together have 
been referred to by some as a ‘presidentialization’ of politics in parliamentary systems 
(Poguntke and Webb 2005). 
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 Furthermore, research suggests that the increased centralization of power around the first 
minister has been most pronounced in Westminster countries. Figure 1 displays the results from 
an expert survey measuring the concentration of power of first ministers in 22 parliamentary 
countries (O’Malley 2007). Comparing scores amongst the Westminster countries of the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand against other parliamentary countries indicates 
a score 18 percent higher for Westminster countries than other parliamentary countries. Equally 
important is that amongst Westminster countries, Canada was viewed as the country with the 
greatest concentration of power, with a measurement 18 percent higher than Australia, 21 
percent greater than the UK and 34 percent higher than New Zealand. 
  What’s more, scholars of Canadian politics claim that the concentration of power has 
been even greater at the provincial level where the smaller scale and less complex nature of 
governing  has led to an even more personal style of governing concentrated in the hands of the 
first minister. Reviewing recent developments in provincial politics, White concludes his 
comparison of first ministers Canada’s federal and provincial governments, stating that 
“provincial government is indeed premier’s government” (2005, 77). Now with an 
individualized style of governance centered on the first minister’s preferences, being a member 
of the same party as the previous leader is no longer enough to warrant the presumption that the 
new first minister automatically has the loyalty of the bureaucracy.  
 
Figure 1: Concentration of first ministerial power in parliamentary countries 
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 (Source: O'Malley 2007, 20-24) 
 
A possible exception to the above, however, is temporary ‘interim’ premiers. Often due to the 
resignation of the premier following dissatisfaction amongst party members as to the party 
leader’s performance and their concern with the prospects of the party to be re-elected to 
government (Cross and Blais 2012), the party may nominate a temporary premier to head the 
government until the next election. It is probable that such interim premiers hold a different 
orientation to governing that is unique amongst premiers finding themselves at the head 
government.  
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 According to Savoie, one of the reasons for why there is such a centralization of power 
in the first minister is the personalization of politics, including the outcome of elections (1999, 
96). Savoie states that: 
 
Winning candidates on the government side know full well that their party leader’s 
performance in the election campaign explains in large measure why they themselves were 
elected…It should come as no surprise then that if the leader is able to secure a majority 
mandate it is assumed that the party is in his debt, and not the other way around. (1999, 80) 
 
As party leaders now take on a great deal of responsibility for the electoral success of their party, 
they also now command a greater degree of control over the directions of policy (also see, Pal 
1992; Cross and Blais 2012). This is not likely to be the case, however, of interim premiers. 
Without yet having brought their party to victory, interim premiers are not likely to exhibit as 
much ability to control the policy agenda within cabinet as are those premiers who brought their 
party to victory and have been legitimatized by the electorate. Equally true, due to the shorter 
time horizon in front of them, interim premiers are also constrained in their ability to introduce 
new policies, and instead are more likely to turn their attention to the next election (Cooper, 
Marier, and Halawi 2014). In sum, as they are less likely to unilaterally control the policy agenda 
and bring forth new policies, interim premiers may have a lessened disposition to seek 
responsive competence from the bureaucracy.9  
 
Legislative strength. Another variable believed to affect the degree to which bureaucratic elites 
are strategically reappointed is the government’s legislative strength. One body of research 
suggests that legislative strength is negatively related to mobility. Governments with only a 
minority of the seats in the legislature face a greater degree of uncertainty over their future; any 
mishap reflecting poorly on the government could push opposition parties to bring forth an 
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undesired election (Hodgson 1976). Minority and coalition governments may therefore be more 
obsessed with controlling all aspects of governance, including the actions of the bureaucracy. 
Using descriptive statistics of DM mobility during minority governments at the federal level in 
Canada since the 1960s, Bourgault (2011) notes that newly elected minority governments have 
made a large number of bureaucratic reappointments.  
 At the same time, however, there are good theoretical reasons for hypothesizing that 
legislative strength is positively associated with bureaucratic mobility. Economic theories of 
behaviour suggest that minority governments uncertain over how long they will remain in power 
may refrain from purging the civil service for fear that the incoming party will do the same 
(Hammond 1996; Christensen 2004). Ting et al. (2013) have shown that governments lacking 
confidence in their future prospects of power are more likely to refrain from politicizing the 
bureaucracy. Likewise, studying East Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2003) observes that 
legislatively weak governments make fewer political appointments.  
 
Methodological and Theoretical Difficulties 
By studying how considerations of power influence bureaucratic mobility, the literature 
reviewed above provides an important deviation from research heavily influenced by 
organization and management studies tending to overlook the role of political dynamics. Yet 
despite its merits, this emergent literature has faced both methodological and theoretical 
difficulties. Methodologically, as noted by others, while research has identified several 
explanatory variables these “have rarely been tested in a systematic way, and even more seldom 
tested together” (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 892). A likely reason for this is the tremendous 
effort involved in generating datasets with a sufficient number of observations capable of 
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simultaneously testing multiple predictors. This problem is especially true for scholars studying 
parliamentary countries, where, in contrast to the United State, there are fewer administrative 
positions controlled by the first minister. 
 To overcome this methodological challenge a few researchers have recently generated 
some of the largest datasets of administrative mobility by enlarging their sampling population 
across spatial units and over time (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a; 
Christensen et al. 2014). Yet as researchers have taken the first steps to overcome these 
methodological challenges, a new theoretical difficulty has arisen. Compared to previous work, 
the findings of these recent studies, specifically those using longitudinal data collecting 
observations prior to the 1980s, are challenging the most standard hypothesized relationships 
between political dynamics and mobility. Whereas transitions in the governing party, 
government ideology and legislative strength were all once believed to be strongly associated 
with bureaucratic mobility, research testing these explanatory variables with longitudinal data, 
are showing few if any significant associations between the political dynamics and 
administrative mobility.  
 Perplexed, and likely somewhat dismayed, scholars have suggested the need for further 
research. Venturing some reasons for the null findings in their recent study, Dahlstrom and 
Niklasson (2013) note that amongst other factors such as the predominance of studies from the 
United States compared to the few empirical studies conducted in parliamentary systems that 
“[another possible] reason for this [i.e. the inconclusive results] might be that many of the 
studies from which these explanations stem are case studies from one specific point in time” 
(2013, 905).10 While merely an additive remark at the end of their work, the authors are well 
justified in making this point.  
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 Research studying the politics of administrative mobility has predominantly used data 
drawn from the 1980s and onward. This is possibly a significant detail because the hypothesized 
relationships tested by this research have drawn heavily upon principal-agent theory, which, 
while possibly an appropriate theoretical depiction of political-administrative relationships in 
the modern era of governance in which the theory was first developed (as shown above p. 43-
45), may be less suitable for historical periods where the contours of political-administrative 
relationships are quite different. When considering historical variations in the nature of political-
administrative relationships and the core preferences of governments the hypotheses generated 
from the literature is problematically static: goal conflict and information asymmetry are 
presumed to be present and problematic to governments that are presumed to prefer principles 
that carry out directives as articulated to them (Waterman and Meier 1998).  
 Over the last 100 years, however, political-administrative relationships have undergone 
considerable changes including the characteristics government’s desire the bureaucracy to 
possess (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Silberman 1993; Savoie 2003; Yang and 
Holzer 2005; Chapman and O’Toole 2009). These changes may have important consequences 
for the degree to which political variables prod governments to strategically remove and appoint 
administrative elites. Research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, has not yet 
considered that the relationship between mobility and politics may vary over time alongside 
historical changes in the political-administrative relationships. While principal-agent theory has 
explained the motivations for removing and appointing bureaucratic elites, these may be 
historically contingent to a specific modern, managerial, era of governance, witnessed in many 
industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1980s (Pollitt 1993; Saint-Martin 2000). As 
the contours of political-administrative relationships has shifted throughout the 20th century, it 
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is possible that there have been changes in the nature and extent to which political dynamics 
prod governments to strategically staff bureaucratic elites. This is because of the differences in 
the underlying nature of political-administrative relationships and the traits government’s desire 
bureaucrats to exhibit. To better explore this possibility the next section draws upon Hood and 
Lodge’s (2006) concept of Public Service Bargain to understand how the relationship between 
mobility and politics may vary according to different political-administrative relationships 
found in diverse historical periods.  
 
 
Public Service Bargains 
Several different concepts have been developed to describe variances in political-administrative 
relationships across jurisdictions and over time (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Peters 
1987; Hood 1998; Knill 1999; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005). That of a Public Service 
Bargain, first put forward by Hood (2000, 2002) and advanced by Hood and Lodge (2006), is 
particularly advantageous due to its detail and clarity, and has consequently become a popular 
analytical tool to understand shifts in political-administrative relationships (Lodge 2010; 
Bourgault 2011; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 2011; 
Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; van der Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; 
Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013). 
 Hood defines a PSB as “any explicit or implicit understanding between (senior) public 
servants and other actors in a political system over their duties and entitlements relating to 
responsibility, autonomy and political identity, and expressed in convention or formal law or a 
mixture of both” (2000, 8).11 As an ideal-type, PSBs can be analyzed and distinguished 
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according to three primary components of; (a) the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency, the 
knowledge and skills public servants are expected to possess; (b) the nature of the bureaucracy’s 
loyalty, whom public servants are expected to work for; and (c) rewards, what civil servants 
receive in return for carrying out their duties in a manner that conforms to expectations (Hood 
and Lodge 2006).  
 Importantly, PSBs advance models studying the strategic behaviour of governments by 
paying greater attention to the sociohistorical context within which such action is oriented. 
Using PSBs as a theoretical framework constitutes a variant of historical institutionalism (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998) that complements, rather than opposes, methodological 
individualist approaches focusing on the purposive actions of persons. As stated by Hood: 
Viewing the relationship between public servants and other social actors as some form of 
bargain…puts the spotlight on the balance between inducements and contributions faced 
by each of the actors, and so lends itself both to strategic-interaction or ‘gaming’ analysis 
and to constitutional and historical analysis of the part played by public servants in a society. 
(2000, 8) 
 
Importantly, PSBs informs us that rewards, to which the nomination of individuals to elite 
offices certainly belongs, is a central means used by governments to encourage and reinforce 
the type of traits they desire bureaucrats to display. As stated by Hood and Lodge: 
But who or what controls the rewards of public servants…is always central to the politics 
of PSBs. So it is not surprising that those who wish to reform bureaucracies and change 
bureaucratic behaviour – whether it be to reduce corruption or shirking, make bureaucrats 
more responsive, more entrepreneurial, more independent, or whatever other purpose it is 
that reformers seek – often see the reward component of PSBs as the most important thing 
they have to change to achieve their goals. (2006, 64) 
 
Unlike principal-agent theory, however, theorizing about the strategic staffing of administrative 
elites through a framework of PSBs leads to expectations that the relationship between politics 
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and mobility will vary across social-historical contexts because of differences in the type of 
competency and loyalty governments desire bureaucrats to possess.  
 To be clear, using PSBs as a theoretical framework does not lead to the conclusion that 
some governments are unconcerned with ‘controlling’ the bureaucracy. The principle that all 
governments, regardless of the historical period, desire that the bureaucracy’s actions are 
compatible with its own preference is congruent with a framework of PSBs. The difference 
between the theoretical approach advanced here and agency theory, is that the former postulates 
that the end towards which governments seek to steer the bureaucracy – the objectives they have 
in mind when deciding to strategically appoint and dismiss administrative elites – are not 
universal, and vary across historical periods embodying fundamentally different political-
administrative relationships, whereas the former offers a static vision of control assuming that 
governments desire bureaucrats who unquestionably accept directives and manage resources 
towards making orders reality. 
 Drawing upon Hood and Lodge (2006), as well as scholarship studying the history of 
politics in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies, Table 2 summarizes three ideal-type PSBs along 
the dimensions of the bureaucracy’s competency as well as its loyalty. Table 2 also includes a 
category concerning the nature of governance. Although not a formal element of a PSB, the 
overarching nature of governance is a differentiating component of distinct temporal periods 
embodying unique political-administrative relationships (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1993).12 The 
contours of bargains shift as changes take place in the “purposes, values, and preoccupations of 
the regime” (Hood and Lodge 2006, 91), and thus allows each PSB to be better situated in its 
historical period. Table 2 also specifies how bureaucratic offices are used as a reward by 
governments to encourage those traits they desire bureaucrats to display. As a means of 
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exemplification, Table 2 also provides an illustration of the political attitude underlying the 
staffing of administrative offices in each PSB.  
 In sum, the theoretical framework advanced here postulates that the extent to which 
political dynamics, such as a change in the governing party or a transition in the head of 
government, prod governments to strategically reappoint administrative elites varies according 
to the type of competency and loyalty the government is seeking to reinforce. Simply put, 
political variables do not have the same relationship with mobility in dissimilar PSBs, because 
the qualities governments want bureaucrats to possess are not the same. 
 
Spoils-type PSB. Previous research studying political-administrative relationships in Canada up 
until the first half of the 20th century describe what can be characterized as a ‘spoils-type’ 
bargain (MacKinnon 1951; Love 1988; Granatstein 1982; Gow 1985; Noel 1990; Dyck 1991; 
Saywell 1991; Aucoin 2000; McDonald 2009; McKenna 2014). Not yet having moved towards 
the development of the welfare state, governing in the provinces was of a minimal and 
incremental nature. Governing entailed little need for the study of issues and the planning of 
programs. As a result, governments did not require, nor expect, a great degree of technical 
competency from the bureaucracy.  
 While the bureaucracy’s competency is an unspecified afterthought, loyalty, is well 
stipulated and oriented to the political party in power. Unlike the managerial bargain discussed 
below, loyalty to the political party is not directed towards realizing the government’s policy 
objectives, but instead is a partisan loyalty to the governing party’s electoral success. Whereas 
in the managerial bargain support to the policy agenda of the government concerns actions after 
the government is in power, and is thus forward-oriented action (to realize the policy agenda), 
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loyalty in the spoils bargain is oriented towards rewarding past actions that helped the party 
form government. 
 
Schafferian PSB. Labeled a Schafferian bargain after Bernard Schaffer’s (1973) description of 
political-administrative relationships in Whitehall, the second PSB marks a shift in the 
relationship between the government and administrators spearheaded by a transformation in 
nature of governance. Reflecting a trend witnessed in many Western countries during the 20th 
century, the use of administrative offices by political parties to reward and encourage partisan 
electoral support came to be viewed unfavourably, and was associated with corrupt behaviour 
and government incompetency (Silberman 1993; Dreyfus 2000; Juillet and Rasmussen 2008). 
Expressing his frustration with the spoils bargain during his time as Prime Minister of Canada 
(1911-1920), Robert Borden lamented that:  
 
Three-fourths of the time of members supporting a government is occupied with matters of 
patronage. Party patronage and party service have more weight than character and capacity. 
The public service is cumbered with useless officials. I am convinced that we shall perform 
a great public duty by establishing in this country that system which prevails in Great 
Britain, under which a member of Parliament has practically no voice in or control over any 
appointment to the civil service. (cited in Simpson 1988, 127)  
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Table 2: Strategic appointment of personnel in Public Service Bargains 
 Nature of 
Governance 
Competency Loyalty Utility of office/ Reward Political attitude towards offices13 
Spoils-type Minimalist/ 
incremental.  
Little substantive 
skills. 
Party loyalist/ 
Personal loyalty 
to the political 
party. 
Used by political parties to 
reward partisan electoral 
support/Based on personal 
relationship with party. 
“The Spoils System has for years been in full force 
in Newfoundland. Given the conception that it is 
quite fair, whilst one's party is in power, to make 
what one can for oneself and one's friends, it is 
natural, that in the minds of many people politics 
should be regarded simply as job farming.” 
- Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933 
(Amulree 1933, 229) 
Schafferian ‘Puzzling’ 
/Technocratic 
planning. 
Policy advisor. 
Knowledge of policies 
and programs. 
Serial loyalist/ 
Impersonal 
loyalty to the 
office. 
 
Used by governments to 
strengthen issue specific 
expertise and willingness to 
provide honest advice based 
on expertise/Based on merit 
and seniority. 
“I can’t understand why some political leaders insist 
on clearing out the upper echelon of the public 
service when they come into office. You are just not 
able to pick up a deputy minister caliber individual 
on a street corner.”  
- Richard Hatfield, (New Brunswick Premier 1970-
1987) (cited in Savoie 1989, 40) 
Managerial Market efficiency/ 
Top-down 
democracy. 
Manager. Motivator 
of personnel and 
resources towards 
deliverance. 
Executive 
loyalist/ Personal 
loyalty to the 
premier and her 
policy agenda. 
Used by head of government 
to ensure responsiveness to 
her policy agenda and limit 
information 
asymmetry/Based on 
competition and chance. 
“…it is clearly essential for any government to have 
its own people in these key positions [deputy minister 
offices]. If the ministers are the CEOs, clearly they 
must have compatible people as their chief operating 
officers – people who share the goals and 
convictions of the government.” 
- Peter G. White, Advisor to PM Brian Mulroney. 
(cited in Newman 2005, 453) 
 
(Based on Hood 2000; Hood and Lodge 2006)
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In the Canadian provinces distaste with the spoils bargain came to a head in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. As with other parts of the world (Korpi 1989), in the provinces the postwar 
years witnessed a shift in the nature of governance that replaced the minimalist state with one 
that had a greater presence in society through the development and implementation of social and 
economic policies, constituting what is sometimes referred to by scholars of Canadian politics 
as a period of “province building” (Chandler and Chandler 1982; Black and Cairns 1966; Finkel 
2006; Rice and Prince 2013). Explaining change in the role of provincial governments in the 
postwar years, Hodgetts and Dwivedi note that one reason for this is “attributable to changing 
philosophies of state intervention, which in turn provide support for new roles and functions for 
the state, as well as for enlarged expectations of the populace for more and better services” 
(1974, 14). 
 In tandem with increased state involvement is a qualitative change in how policies are 
developed. Whereas during the minimalist state policy decisions were made in an incremental 
manner, the new more interventionist state developed policies through a rational and scientific 
study of problems and a laborious planning of programs. To borrow terminology used by Heclo 
(1974, 304), the formulation of policy was no longer viewed as an exclusive political activity; 
governments not only ‘powered’, they now also ‘puzzled’. Much more than before, 
policymaking now required detailed study and planning to identify the causes of problems and 
the most efficient means of alleviating them. Critically, desiring to develop, plan and implement 
larger and more complex policies, governments identified the bureaucracy as the means to foster 
such expertise. Civil servants were expected to possess knowledge gained from education and 
experience in the policies and programs overseen by their departments. Speaking of the change 
in the Canadian provinces and the need for such knowledge, Hodgetts and Dwivedi note, that 
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“the shift to white-collar work, requiring managerial, administrative, professional, scientific, 
and technical knowledge and aptitudes of a higher order, is a prominent feature of modern 
government bureaucracies” (1974, 13). 
 Yet in addition to desiring that civil servants possess policy relevant knowledge, there is 
also a corresponding change in the type of loyalty governments want to bureaucracy to exhibit. 
Public servants are no longer expected to display a partisan loyalty to the political party. Instead, 
now possessing such desired technical knowledge, governments want public servants to advise 
them on policy matters with frank counsel on the basis of their expertise and experience, 
regardless of who is in power, reflecting what is described by some scholars as ‘neutral 
competence’ (Kaufman 1956; Rourke 1992). In this manner civil servants are now serial 
loyalists impersonally serving all governments with the same advice founded on their expertise 
and experience. 
 Rather than viewing dissenting opinions from bureaucrats as a manifestation of goal 
conflict, such expert, and potentially conflictual advice, is not only tolerated but in fact desired 
by governments. As expressed by Mitchell Sharp (1911-2004), former deputy minister, turned 
politician: 
 
Politicians, particularly Ministers, require the best impartial advice that they can get if they 
are to make wise decisions. Sycophants who echo their boss’s views are of little value; 
indeed they can be positively dangerous as advisers if they are not prepared from time to 
time to tell their bosses the painful truth that their pet idea is unworkable. That is one of the 
reasons why I am not in favour of the principle, which is sometimes advanced, that the top 
positions - the heads of departments - should be filled by those who are in sympathy with 
the views of the party in power and should depart with their Ministers when the government 
is replaced. (1977, 180) 
 
 
63 
 
Importantly, in the Schafferian bargain governments cultivate such competency and loyalty by 
strategically leaving individuals in their positions. This allows civil servants to accumulate 
detailed knowledge of issues and programs and fosters confidence that they can provide candid 
advice without fear of admonishment. This type of competency and loyalty reflects former 
British Cabinet Secretary Sir Edward Bridges’ description of the role of civil servants as 
developing and advising on the basis of a ‘departmental philosophy’. As stated by Bridges in 
his treatise A Portrait of a Profession: 
 
There has been built up in every Department a store of knowledge and experience in the 
subjects handled, something which eventually takes shape as a practical philosophy, or may 
merit the title of a departmental point of view…But in most cases the departmental 
philosophy is the result of nothing more startling than the slow accretion and accumulation 
of experience over the years...These departmental philosophies are of the essence of a Civil 
Servant’s work. They are the expression of the long continuity of experience which can be 
one of the strongest qualities of an institution, if well organized. (1950, 16) 
 
Permanency of position is thus an integral part in fostering the type of competency and loyalty 
desired by governments in the Schafferian bargain.14 As noted by one scholar of the Canadian 
provinces, the desire for greater government intervention through the development and 
implementation of policies and programs during this period meant that: 
 
..there was greater need for more competent and qualified DMs. It became clear to the 
political executive that this could best be accomplished by tapping into the expertise and 
knowledge of an existing permanent officialdom. Many of those who became DMs during 
this period, then, had actually worked their way up the bureaucratic ladder or came up 
through the ranks of an incipient provincial public service. (McKenna 2014, 76) 
 
 
Managerial PSB. Beginning in the 1980s however, the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats abruptly changed. Principals of the Schafferian bargain once esteemed as ensuring 
good governance had now become identified as a key source of what plagued modern 
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government. Writing in the journal Papers on Non-market Decision Making (renamed in 1968 
Public Choice), Gordon Tullock claimed with sincerity that  “the word ‘bureaucratic’ in fact, 
can legitimately be used to replace ‘inefficient’ in many uses without changing the meaning of 
the sentence” (1967, 93). The result was a drastic change in the nature of political-administrative 
relationships, constituting a new ‘managerial’ bargain.  
 Whereas the postwar era exhibited an approach to governance emphasizing technical 
expertise and long-tern planning, beginning in the 1980s a new way of thinking had emerged. 
Inspired by the same work applying economic theories of decision-making that is at the origins 
of principal-agent theory such as that by Downs and Niskanen, this new approach placed a 
greater emphasis on governing with improved efficiency by relying less on the bureaucracy 
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1971). In pursuit of purging modern governance of its inefficiencies, this 
managerial bargain sought to run government more like a private business operating in a free 
market economy (Hood 1989; Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1993).  
 Whereas in the Schafferian bargain, competency of public servants required technical 
knowledge of past policies and programs, in the managerial bargain such detailed knowledge is 
now seen as a problem of information asymmetry enabling bureaucrats to shirk and pursue their 
own preferences. In the managerial bargain, governments no longer desire bureaucrats boasting 
in-depth knowledge of policies and programs, but instead they want individuals who are capable 
of mobilizing resources and personnel towards the realization of the government’s already 
established policy objectives. The shift in competency from the Schafferian to the managerial 
bargain is captured by Dargie and Locke who remark that governments now desire ‘can do’ 
managers rather than ‘wait a minute’ advisors (Dargie and Locke 1999, 181). Similarity, Siegel 
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describes this shift in competency from a ‘manager as policy advisor’ to a ‘manager as 
manager’:  
 
The conventional wisdom now is that the role of the manager as policy adviser has been 
supplanted by the role of the manager as manager. In the halcyon days of expanding 
government, the minister needed policy advice about which initiatives to pursue and which 
new programs to adopt. In an era of restraint, the emphasis is on a manager who is able to 
do more with less or who is able to motivate employees even though the financial and other 
rewards are no longer there. (1988, 189) 
 
 
The managerial bargain also involves as shift in the type of loyalty bureaucrats are now wanted 
to display. Whereas in the Schafferian bargain loyalty is of an impersonal commitment to serve 
government in a frank manner on the basis of expertise, this is no longer sought after. Any will 
politicians once had for bureaucrats to loyally serve them in a spirit akin to ‘speaking truth to 
power,’ has vanished. Holding the view that politics and administration are two distinct realms, 
and that bureaucrats should not be involved in deciding the objectives of policy, providing 
opinions that are contrary to the government’s is seen as indicating the presence of goal conflict. 
In the words of Aucoin, “the managerialist paradigm…reasserts the policy/administration 
dichotomy with a vengeance” (1990, 127). 
 In this managerial bargain, loyalty is instead directed to the policy directives as 
stipulated by the head of the government. Like the spoils bargain previously, loyalty of the 
bureaucracy is of a personal nature. This time, however, loyalty is not of a partisan nature 
dedicated to the electoral success of the party, but instead a commitment to the policy objectives 
as expressed by the head of the government. As Prime Minister Margret Thatcher famously 
insisted, the ultimate question in staffing permanent secretaries was whether they were ‘one of 
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us’, to which she meant that they shared a commitment and enthusiasm to realize the 
government’s policy agenda, and not that they were partisan Tories (Aucoin 2012, 187).  
 This new type of loyalty is sometimes referred to by scholars of public administration as 
‘responsive competence’. Explaining responsive competence and the commitment to the 
government’s policy objectives, Aberbach and Rockman maintain that:  
 
The administration, in such circumstances, wants responsive appointees and, when they can 
find them, equally responsive career civil servants in top positions. Their job is to do what 
the administration wants. In the extreme case, the responsive individuals are there because 
they share the world-view of the president. Analysis of problems is unnecessary because 
the answers are already known. All that may be required is advice on a strategy for 
implementing solutions, advice that one could only trust from other believers. In this 
scheme of things, the role of civil servants is to administer solutions decided by others. 
Their advice is not wanted. As a leading figure in the Nixon White House (John 
Ehrlichman) is reputed to have said of the proper role of civil servants: “When we say jump, 
their only question should be ‘How high?’”. (1994, 466) 
 
 
Finally, the use of administrative offices by governments in the managerial bargain is used to 
encourage the type of competency and loyalty they now desire from bureaucrats. Once seen as 
being an important component in making good decisions, knowledge of past policies and 
programs is also no longer positively viewed. A long period of time in the same department 
impedes both the government’s efforts to control the bureaucracy and the development of 
loyalty to the government’s policy agenda. Permanency of position is believed to accentuate 
information asymmetries between politicians and bureaucrats which can impede governments 
from realizing their policy objectives. Spending too much time in the same position is seen as 
fostering loyalty to their department rather than to the head of the government and her policy 
agenda. To alleviate the “centrifugal tendencies of modern bureaucracies” (Bourgault, Dion, 
and Lemay 1993, 73), governments seek to foster a spirit of “solidarity above all with the 
corporate authority [of the government] instead of the line department” (Bourgault, Dion, and 
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Lemay 1993, 77). Alongside other tactics such as performance appraisals, and the proliferation 
of central agencies; rotating deputy ministers is identified as a principle means to prevent 
bureaucrats from developing and pursuing “parochially defined interests” (1993, 73), and 
instead, induce allegiance to the corporate culture of the government. To reorient their loyalty, 
governments remove incumbents and replace them with persons believed to have a greater 
degree of loyalty to the policy agenda (Savoie 2008). Manipulating administrative offices in this 
manner is seen as an essential tool enabling governments to effectively realize their policy 
objectives (Flinders and Matthews 2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
The Politics of Mobility Revisited: Variation across PSBs 
Having reviewed three ideal-type PSBs, it is now possible to revise the most prominent 
hypotheses between political dynamics and administrative mobility by taking into consideration 
the varying types of political-administrative relationships. Table 3 outlines the expected 
relationship between political dynamics and administrative mobility in each PSB. 
 In the spoils bargain, with a central preference that bureaucrats exhibit loyalty to the 
political party, transitions in the governing party are expected to have the strongest association 
with mobility as incoming governments remove incumbents and nominate their own supporters. 
As long as the same political party remains in power, little mobility is expected. Transitions in 
the governing party are expected to lead to an initial increase in mobility, after which mobility 
should be much lower. Furthermore, appointments are used to reward partisan loyalty to the 
party and not to ensure the realization of policy objectives while in power, factors associated 
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with decreasing the bureaucracy’s willingness to implement the government’s policy agenda are 
not expected to have any effect. 
 Time prior to a change in government is therefore not expected to be associated with 
increased mobility. A newly elected party has little concern whether the previous party was in 
power for one year or 10 years. All that matters for governments in the spoils bargain is that 
they now have the opportunity to reward loyalists with administrative offices. Likewise, changes 
in the head of government, when coming from the same party as the previous first minister, also 
are not expected to be positively associated with mobility. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Hypotheses between political dynamics and mobility by PSB 
 Spoils-type Bargain Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain 
    
H1) Transition in the governing 
party is positively associated with 
mobility 
 
Expected Not Expected Expected 
H2) Interaction of a transition in 
governing party AND the time the 
previous party was in power is 
positively associated with 
mobility 
 
Not Expected Not Expected Expected 
H3) Ideologically right 
governments are positively 
associated with mobility 
Not Expected Not Expected Expected 
 
H4) Change in premier is 
positively associated with 
mobility 
 
Not Expected Not Expected Expected 
H5) Legislative strength 
is positively associated with 
mobility 
 
Expected Not Expected Expected 
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Nor are there expected to be differences between which parties take power. Distrust in the 
intentions of bureaucrats has little to do with the strategic staffing of bureaucrats. Governments 
are more concerned instead with maintaining the electoral support of partisan loyalists. Hence 
left/right ideology representing divergent preferences for the provision of services via markets 
or government involvement is not expected to play a role in the politics of mobility. 
 Legislative strength, however, could be linked to lower levels of mobility. Research 
suggests that regardless of whether the nomination of administrative elites is aimed at rewarding 
partisan supports or ensuring commitment to the government’s policy objectives, weaker 
governments unsure about their future may refrain from interfering in the careers of civil 
servants (Ting et al. 2013). 
 During the Schafferian bargain, the relationship between political dynamics and mobility 
is expected to be severally reduced. Desiring bureaucrats who possess expertise and experience 
and a willingness to advise any government on the basis of such knowledge, political events are 
expected to have little effect on mobility. On the heels of a transition in the governing party or 
a change in the head of government, incumbent officials should remain in their position. In its 
ideal form, political dynamics should not to be associated with increased mobility during this 
PSB. 
 In the managerial bargain, the relationship between political dynamics and increased 
mobility is once again expected. Wising to diminish information asymmetry and ensure that 
civil servants are motivated managers working towards realizing the government’s policy 
objectives, certain political dynamics should have a strong association with mobility. Unlike the 
70 
 
spoils bargain however, the strategic use of appointments is not oriented to reward and ensure 
partisan loyalty to the governing party.  
 With the appointment of administrative elites by governments being motivated to foster 
‘can do’ managers loyal to the head of government’s policy directives and mitigate goal conflict 
and information asymmetry, political variables leading governments to question the intentions 
of bureaucrats are now expected to have a greater effect on administrative mobility. Hypotheses 
developed drawing upon agency theory are in the managerial PSB most valid. 
 While transitions in the governing party are expected to be associated with increased 
levels of mobility, it is now expected that mobility following a change in party should be higher 
the longer the previous party was in power. The reason being that the longer the previous 
government was in power the less confidence governments have that incumbents will 
enthusiastically work towards the new government’s policies. Equally important, and especially 
when it comes to the case of Canada, is the expectation that all newly elected heads of 
government should be associated with increased mobility. Loyalty is not oriented to the party 
but instead to the premier and her policy agenda. With policy directions coming from the centre, 
heads of government seek to ensure that loyalty is their personal policy agenda. Legislative 
strength is also expected to be positively associated with mobility for the same reasons as the 
spoils bargain: legislatively weak governments will refrain from making appointments due to 
their uncertain future.  
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Conclusion of Chapter Two 
This chapter reviewed previous research studying the causes of administrative mobility. It was 
shown that while a large body of research drawing upon organization and management studies 
has identified the personal characteristics, organizational features and market conditions 
associated with mobility, such research has overlooked power dimensions affecting turnover of 
bureaucratic elites. Drawing primarily upon principal-agent theory, a burgeoning body of 
research has begun to examine the relationship between political dynamics and mobility. 
Reviewing such research has uncovered an important puzzle: as researchers have begun to test 
hypotheses using longitudinal data from periods stretching back to prior to the 1980s the 
empirical results have failed to find any meaningful relationships. This chapter advanced the 
argument that these perplexing results may be that the relationship between politics and mobility 
varies over time across periods embodying distinct political-administrative relationships. Unlike 
previous research that has universally applied agency theory to explain the relationship between 
political dynamics and administrative mobility, this dissertation reformulates prominent 
hypotheses by situating government’s strategic actions within their sociohistorical context. 
 Drawing upon Hood and Lodge’s (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain, this 
chapter explained how the extent to which some political dynamics prod governments to move 
personnel in and out of administrative positions may vary according to the contours of the 
political-administrative relationship, specifically the type of competency and loyalty 
governments seek to foster amongst bureaucratic elites. Distinguishing between three ideal-type 
PSBs, this chapter revisited prominent hypotheses and outlined to what extent the nature of these 
relationships are expected to vary across PSBs. The next chapter outlines the research design, 
data and methods used to investigate this possibility. 
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Chapter Two Appendix I 
 
The Appointment Process of Deputy Ministers in Canada’s Provinces 
 
In Canada the appointment and dismissal of deputy ministers is the institutional prerogative of 
the first minister (Aucoin 2006), which, following challenges by disgruntled deputy ministers, 
has been reaffirmed by the courts at several times (Cooper Forthcoming). Officially, as specified 
in each province’s Public Service Act, deputy minister positions are Lieutenant-Governor-in-
Council appointments and are a special executive class excluded from the rules overseeing the 
appointment and dismissal of regular staff. 
 Although the first minister retains the power to nominate and dismiss DMs, it is common 
practice for the first minister to consult with others from both political and administrative 
milieus. In the initial days upon forming a government, the first minister receives advice 
concerning appointments from the Clerk of the executive council – the head of the civil service, 
and herself a deputy minister appointed by the premier – as well as members of the government 
and partisan advisors from the premier’s entourage. The nature of such consultation, however, 
is strictly advisory and is not institutionalized. As the ‘exclusive pleasure of the crown’, the final 
decision concerning the appointment, retention and dismissal of DM appointments is at the sole 
discretion of the first minister (Neilson 1984; Bourgault and Dunn 2014).15 
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Chapter 3. Research Design, Data and Methods 
 
Chapter three summary.  This chapter describes the research design, data collection, variable 
operationalization and methods used to test hypotheses between politics and mobility over time. 
The advantages and limitations of these choices are considered. Summary statistics of the 
principle variables contained in the dataset are analyzed.  
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Public administration is out of balance relative to other social 
sciences, and in general it is quite far behind with regard to 
analyzing data in meaningful ways. This is certainly a correctable 
situation…We encourage a greatly enhanced focus on empiricism 
and rigorous quantitative approaches. 
 
- Jeff Gill and Kenneth J. Meier (2000, 195) 
 
 
Public administration research also tends to recognize the 
importance of context, and qualitative research approaches 
contribute perspectives and insight on context that quantitative 
research cannot. 
 
- Larry S. Luton (2010, 10) 
 
 
If there is such a thing as hell on earth, it must be an academic field 
in which members are condemned to have the same conversation 
over and over ad infinitum. Like Sisyphus, public administration 
appears to have been sentenced to an eternal fate: Ours is to battle 
over our logic of inquiry but never to get anywhere. 
 
- Camilla Stivers (2008, 1008) 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Design 
At the dawn of the 21st century a succession of publications roused a spirited debate within 
public administration as to the most appropriate research design and methods to be used within 
the discipline (for example, Luton 2007; Meier 2005; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Gill and 
Meier 2000; Meier and O'Toole 2007). For some, these debates seemed all too familiar. Not 
more than 10 years earlier, an equally animated quarrel had taken place in political science 
following the publication of King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry (1994), 
which had provocatively proclaimed that social science should be dedicated to deductive theory 
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testing and that research design and methods should be undertaken with the objective of 
controlling for alternative explanatory variables and increasing observations of the dependent 
variable (for a review and critique of Designing Social Inquiry see, McKeown 1999).  
 While the sometimes callous tone and ad hominem jabs exchanged between 
‘qualitativists’ and ‘quantitativists’ certainly makes for entertaining reading (see for instance 
exchanges between Luton (2007, 2008) and Meier and O’Toole (2007)), others, more diplomatic 
in demeanour, note that depending on the nature of the question asked, quantitative and 
qualitative approaches can both be legitimate methods of research. Because there is more than 
one type of question, there is more than one logic of inquiry. Such is noted by Goertz and 
Mahoney (2012) who remark that whereas some research asks questions about the ‘causes of 
effects’, that being the specific causal mechanism or mechanisms that led to a particular outcome 
(e.g. what caused deputy minister Gérard Tremblay to leave his job in the Department of 
Labour?); others seek to understand the ‘effects of causes’, that being the average effect that an 
independent variable has on a dependent variable (e.g. what is the average effect of economic 
growth on employee turnover?). The former generally makes use of qualitative case studies of 
a few specific observations to pinpoint with greater accuracy the mechanism having brought 
about the outcome under question, whereas the latter tends to rely on quantitative statistics to 
analyze a large number of observations. Differences in qualitative and quantitative methods are 
therefore not necessarily epistemologically at odds with one another in their attempt to 
understand the social world. Rather, both approaches can be complementary, each trying to 
understand social phenomena, but doing so by asking fundamentally different types of 
questions. 
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 The research question asked in this project is: do the average effects that political 
dynamics have on administrative mobility vary across historical periods embodying different 
political-administrative relationships? Rather than seeking to identify the primary cause of 
administrative mobility in a few specific cases, this dissertation assumes that several variables 
can all effect mobility, but their average effects are not likely to be the same. To identify the 
average effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility across distinct PSBs while 
controlling for alternative variables, this work requires a large number of observations. 
 To this end, this project uses an original dataset of DM mobility in Canada’s provincial 
bureaucracies from 1920 to 2013. The unit of analysis is DM position-year observations. Rather 
than making the individual the unit of analysis and following her professional movement over 
a number of years, this projects examines DM positions year after year to determine whether a 
change has taken place in the person occupying the office.  
 There are two reasons for selecting the Canadian provinces. The first is methodological. 
As noticed by Veit and Scholz (Forthcoming), although mobility may be affected by several 
political variables, few empirical works have tested different independent variables 
simultaneously in a systematic manner. One likely reason for this is the difficulty of generating 
datasets with enough observations to overcome problems of multi-collinearity amongst 
competing independent variables. Avoiding an indeterminate research design while testing 
competing independent variables requires studies with a large number of observations (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
 Generating large-n datasets necessitates expanding the number of cases under study. 
Doing so by pooling across countries, however, introduces variation in variables endogenous to 
each case, such as institutions and political cultures. Interested in the extent to which political 
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dynamics such as a change in party prods heads of governments to remove and appoint 
administrative elites, this study desires a case selection reducing, and thus helping to control for, 
variation in institutional variables and political cultures across jurisdictions.  
 To do this, the sub-national governments of the Canadian provinces have been selected. 
Often praised by comparativists as an ideal case selection when desiring control for institutional 
variables (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 2011; Turgeon et al. 2014), comparing the Canadian 
provinces reduces variation in, and thus helps to control for, institutional variables to a much 
greater degree than would be attained even if comparing the national governments of countries 
sharing the same administration tradition (e.g. the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, 
and Canada). 
 In addition to offering less variation in institutional variables, the Canadian provinces 
are also an ideal case selection because of the unchecked power first ministers enjoy in 
nominating and dismissing DMs. If mobility is affected by politics, this should be observed at 
the provincial level of government in Canada where there are no formal institutions impeding 
such actions. Furthermore, although a systematic study with clear and comparable indicators 
has yet to be completed, some scholars have claimed that the close proximity politicians have 
with the citizenry at the provincial level of government has meant that staffing administrative 
personnel is marked by political considerations to a greater degree than at the federal level in 
Canada (English 1977; Aucoin 2006; White 2001; Zussman 2013).  
 The second reason for selecting the Canadian provinces is to contribute to the Canadian 
public administration literature by producing the first-ever historical study of DM mobility of 
all 10 provinces. Interest in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies is well merited. With the 
development of welfare state programs, provincial bureaucracies have grown both in size and 
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importance since the 1960s (Chandler and Chandler 1982), and now oversee some of the most 
essential public policies and programs affecting the lives of their inhabitants. Fortunately, 
scholarly interest in public administration at the provincial level in Canada has continued to 
grow over the last thirty years (Gow 1985; Dunn 1995; Lindquist 2000; Bernier, Brownsey, and 
Howlett 2005; Rouillard et al. 2008). Yet despite the growth in studies, gaining a comparative 
perspective across the provinces continues to be a challenge. Few studies have embraced 
methodological pleas for more interprovincial comparative studies (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 
2011; Turgeon et al. 2014; notable exceptions include, Dunn 1995; Bierling, Carroll, and 
Rosenblatt 2000; Mondou and Montpetit 2010).  
 In part, this is due to the tendency of researchers to undertake single case studies 
employing a unique theoretical lens and methodological approach. Most research on 
administrative elites in Canada tends to limit its analysis to only one province, often focusing 
on the ruling period of a single premier (for example, Neilson 1990).16 Provincial scholarship 
of administrative elites in Canada suffers from a more general trait within public administration 
of being more “comparable than comparative” (Derlien 1992, 279). The theoretical and 
methodological heterogeneity of these case studies renders generalizations concerning the 
effects of causes quite challenging.17 By studying all ten provinces with systematically 
comparative data this study makes more accurate interprovincial comparisons as to the effect 
that political dynamics have on mobility. 
 The choice to study DM level positions is based on their importance for governments as 
well as the power of first ministers to appoint and dismiss them. The period of 1920 to 2013 is 
selected so as to include the major periods of administrative history in the provinces; from before 
the development of the modern civil service, to the institutionalization of the professional 
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bureaucracy, and finally into the era of New Public Management.18 This provides a large number 
of observations over time and allows for testing whether the relationship between mobility and 
politics varies across historical periods embodying distinct PSBs. Collecting data from the 10 
provinces over 94 years produces 16, 660 observations – almost ten times greater than the 
previous large-n study of bureaucratic mobility in a parliamentary country (Ennser-Jedenastik 
2014a).  
 
Data 
Data was gathered using the annually published Canadian Almanac and Directory (henceforth 
referred to as the Almanac and Directory) in all years between 1920 and 2013.19  Information 
contained in the Almanac and Directory includes members of the government, the date of the 
last election, the name of each ministry, the legislation each ministry is responsible for,20 and 
the names of the executive and administrative personnel in each ministry. In addition to using 
the Almanac and Directory the legislative make-up of governments were verified using Siaroff’s 
(2015) Provincial Political Data since 1990 and Marchildon’s (2006) Provincial Coalition 
Governments in Canada. The greatest advantage of this data collection method is that it offers 
a highly comprehensive, systematic and standardized method of measuring DM mobility across 
all ten provinces over an extensive period of time. Despite its advantages, the data does have 
some limitations.  
 By only providing information at one point each year, the data does not measure more 
than one change in DM per year, and is thus a conservative estimate of mobility. By only 
providing the names of DMs, this method is also limited in its ability to collect data on the 
characters of personnel such as age and education. However, by studying DMs, concern over 
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excluding personal characteristics can be partially reduced. Still true today as it was in the past, 
studies of the individual characteristics of administrative elites in Canada have observed a good 
deal of homogeneity amongst this group. As a group, bureaucratic elites are less diverse than 
the populations to whom they serve; typically being white males and in their middle age (Porter 
1958; Sigelman and Vanderbok 1977; Gidengil and Vengroff 1997; Evans, Lum, and Shields 
2007; Evans, Lum, and Shields 2014). Therefore, while most personal characteristics cannot be 
identified and controlled for statistically, studying a group of persons with a greater degree of 
homogeneity than the general population reduces variation, and thus provides a slight degree of 
control that cannot otherwise be introduced into the empirical analysis.  
 Moreover, as previously mentioned, research has shown that the individual 
characteristics of staff influence mobility because of their association with the employee’s desire 
to leave the organization (Lewis and Park 1989; Arcand, Tellier, and Chretien 2010; Pitts, 
Marvel, and Fernandez 2011; Cho and Lewis 2012). The personal traits that administrative elites 
possess, however, are largely those that have a negative relationship with mobility, thus further 
reducing concern over the inability to control for personal characteristics. 
 Another limitation of the data is that it does not allow for distinctions to be made between 
different types of mobility. For instance, the data cannot differentiate between a DM demoted 
to a lower level position and one who has been fired. Mobility in this dataset is therefore the 
accumulation of voluntary departures, movement to other government positions (including 
promotions and demotions), and dismissal from the civil service. While information of the 
professional activities of removed DMs would allow for a more refined measurement of 
mobility, efforts to attain such biographical information such as consulting the annually 
published Canadian Who’s Who for the period understudy turned out to be unfeasible because 
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of the scarcity of information for observations prior to 1990. Interested in examining changes in 
the relationship between political dynamics and mobility across historical periods, the decision 
was made to measure mobility in a highly systematic manner over a longer period of time, rather 
than in a manner providing a richer measure of mobility but limited to a much shorter time 
frame.   
 
Variable Operationalization 
Dependent variable operationalization.  The dependent variable is a change in the person 
occupying a specific deputy minister position (often a department) in reference to the previous 
year; for example, whether the DM of Finance in Ontario in 2001 is the same as in 2000. A 
change was considered to have taken place if the name of the DM was different from the 
preceding year. Data was originally collected using a coding scheme of five mutually exclusive 
categories: no change in the DM (the same name as the previous year); change in the DM 
occupying the position (a change in name); vacancy in the DM position (the first year in which 
a position is vacant), the appointment of a DM to a newly created position (when a new 
appointment to a position which had not previously existed is observed for the first time), and 
removal of the DM following the abolition of the department (the first year in which a previously 
existing department no longer exists). Decisions to appoint a DM to a new department as well 
as removing an incumbent DM from her position by abolishing the department are both 
considered to encompass bureaucratic mobility. DM mobility was therefore recoded so as to 
include a change in DM, a new vacancy in the position, an appointment to a new department, 
and the removal of the incumbent DM following the abolition of the department, and given a 
value of ‘1’, meanwhile no change in DM was given a value of ‘0’. This system of coding allows 
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for the robustness of the findings from the statistical analysis to be conducted by using 
alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable and is discussed in further detail below. 
 As the first year of the dataset is a reference year, the data collected comprises 16, 514 
observations of the dependent variable with a meaningful value of either 0 or 1. Because DM 
mobility measures a change in personnel of a specific position within a department, attention 
had to be given to whether modifications in a department’s name reflected its termination. This 
issue was dealt with by applying standards used in research studying the survival of 
organizations (Peters and Hogwood 1988; Lewis 2002). The schema used, shown in Figure 3 in 
Annex I of this chapter (p. 72), focused on whether the organization’s primary functions 
remained the same or were fundamentally transformed.  
 
Independent variable operationalization. Changes in the governing party and premier were 
given a ‘1’ when there is a change and a ‘0’ when no such change has taken place.21 A lagged 
variable measuring the number of years since a change in government has occurred was also 
included. The legislative strength of government was coded using dummy variables to 
distinguish between majority, minority and coalition governments. In line with the hypotheses 
that governments not having a majority of seats are constrained in the degree to which they will 
remove and appoint administrative personnel, legislative strength was also coded as a binary 
variable with majority governments given a ‘1’ and minority and coalition governments given 
a ‘0’.  
 In accordance with the hypothesis that political parties on the ideological right are 
associated with greater levels of administrative mobility than parties on the ideological left, 
dummy variables were used to distinguish between each political party.22 In this coding a 
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coalition government where members of cabinet are drawn from more than one political party 
has been coded according to the political party of the premier. As an alternative, the ideology of 
political parties was also codded in a binary manner distinguishing between the ideological right 
(‘1’) and left (‘0’). While much empirical work in electoral studies has been undertaken to 
classify the dominant parties found in Canada along such ideological frontiers (Castles and Mair 
1984; Cochrane 2010), with the exception of a few notable cases (Wesley 2009; McGrane 2008), 
provincial parties have not been similarly scrutinized. Classification of these parties was thus 
based on secondary sources discussing their ideological orientation (Morton 1950; Lipset 1959; 
Macpherson 1962; Laycock 1990; Elkins 1976; Quinn 1979; Behiels 1985; Béland and Lecours 
2007). Parties espousing reliance on the market for the provision of services rather than 
government involvement were coded as ideologically right, whereas parties more favourable to 
state administered policies were coded as ideologically left; the Progressive Conservatives, 
Social Credit, The Saskatchewan Party and Union Nationale were coded as ideologically right; 
meanwhile the Liberal party, New Democratic Party, CCF, Parti Québécois, Progressive 
Party/United Farmers Party were coded as left. 
 
Control variable operationalization. Several control variables are also included in the dataset. 
A one year lagged variable of the number of departments in the province was included to control 
for the possibility that provinces with a larger resource pool of DMs may experience greater 
mobility. Even when there is no change in the first minister or the governing party, by 
representing an important political event giving the government a renewed mandate, it is 
possible that elections may also affect mobility, and has been included as a control. Following 
others suggesting that the age of a department may be negatively associated with mobility due 
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to the greater autonomy and independence possessed by departments that have endured the test 
of time (Verhoest et al. 2010; Niklasson and Pierre 2012; Park and Kim 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik 
2016), a continuous variable of the department’s age increasing by a value of one for each year 
after the first year it is observed was also included.  
 The time since a change in the DM position may also be related to mobility. The 
temporal dependence of the dependent variable is also a methodological issue commonly found 
in longitudinal data. How this issue has been addressed is discussed below in greater detail 
attending to the issue of serial-correlation. To identify whether DM positions filled by women 
experience greater mobility than positions filled by men, the gender of the DM in the position 
the previous year has been included.23 However, because mobility is identified by a change in 
name, there is the danger of over-reporting mobility amongst women, stemming from changes 
in their surname associated with marriage or divorce. This was checked by comparing levels of 
mobility in Québec after 1981, where a change in name due to marriage has since been 
prohibited, with the other nine provinces during the same period. The results show that DM 
mobility amongst women is higher in Québec (39 percent) than in the other nine provinces (32 
percent) where changes in name amongst women are expected to be more common, thus 
suggesting that no coding bias caused by legal changes in name has been introduced into the 
data (during this period the overall rate of mobility in Québec is 34 percent meanwhile overall 
mobility is 29 percent in the rest of Canada). 
 Studies also suggest that greater economic opportunity leads to higher levels of mobility 
(Kirschenbaum and Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 
2016). To control for this, annual percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP) has been 
included. Percent change in provincial GDP is gathered from Statistics Canada (2015) but is 
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only available from 1982. Prior to 1982, percent change in Canada’s overall GDP has been used. 
This data was gathered from Statistics Canada (1987) for data from 1926 to 1981, and from 
Urquhart (1986) for years before 1926.  
 While it is often stated that “Canadian politics is regional politics” (Simeon and Elkins 
1974, 397) there is little consensus as to the spatial bounders demarcating distinct political 
behaviours. This work follows a common distinction by controlling for region by using 
provincial dummy variables (Elkins and Simeon 1980; Henderson 2004; Wesley 2015). 
Alternatively, in line with others viewing political cultures as separated by larger geographic 
regions analysis was also conducted distinguishing between the West (BC, AB, SK and MN) 
and the Atlantic region (NB, NS, PEI and NL), Ontario and Québec (Blais et al. 2002; Godbout 
and Belanger 2002). 
 The demarcation of years into the three PSBs is based on previous research on the 
Canadian provinces (Dyck 1991; Lindquist 2000; Chandler and Chandler 1982; Love 1988; 
Gow 1985; Dunn 1995). The corpus of research suggests the presence of a spoils bargain prior 
to the Second World War (1920-1949), a Schafferian bargain between the postwar period until 
the end of the 1970s (1950-1979), whereas since the 1980s the relationship has moved towards 
a managerial bargain (1980-2013). The presence of political-administrative relationships 
embodying the principles of these PSBs during these blocks of time is also validated in the 
qualitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 examining differences in the contours of political-
administrative relationships and scrutinizing how these relate to the strategic appointment and 
dismissal of administrative elites. 
 Once completed the validity of the dataset was tested by comparing the values of some 
variables with similar data gathered elsewhere. Studying the personal characteristics of DMs in 
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Ontario between 1971 and 2007, Evans, Lum, and Shields (2014, 165) find that 21 percent of 
DMs are female. Isolating Ontario during the same period, the original dataset used in this work 
reports the exact same rate (21 percent). Studying the mobility of DMs in the Canadian 
provinces between 1988 and 1996 Bierling Carroll, and Rosenblatt (2000) report an average 
annual level of mobility of 27 percent, and studying DM mobility in the Canadian provinces 
and territories and between 1997 and 2006, Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa (2014, 321) observe a 
rate of 30 percent. This work’s data reveals levels of mobility that are almost exactly the same: 
27 percent between 1988 and 1996, and 29 percent between 1997 and 2006. However, because 
appointments to new departments as well as the first year following the abolition of a department 
have been classified in this dataset as constituting mobility, the final rate during these two 
periods is slightly higher at 33 and 35 percent, respectively. Finding similar values in these 
values as reported in other datasets suggests that an accurate and replicable data collection 
method has been employed.  
 
 
Description of Variables 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values, and the number of observations of the variables in the dataset. The average number of 
observations per province is 1 666, with differences generally following the population size of 
the province. Ontario, the largest province in terms of population, has 2, 094 observations. By 
comparison, the smallest province, Prince Edward Island (PEI), has 1, 149.24  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics, DM mobility 1920-2013 
Variable Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum N 
DM mobility  .24 .43 0 1 16 514 
      
Time since DM 
change 
4.98 4.72 1 33 15 982 
      
Party change .09 .28 0 1 16 660  
      
Time since party 
change 
9.36 8.78 1 43 16 660 
      
Premier change .15 .36 0 1 16 660 
      
Legislative strength      
Majority .90 .30 0 1 16 660 
Minority .06 .24 0 1 16 660 
Coalition .04 .19 0 1 16 660 
      
Political Party      
Pro. Conservative .37 .48 0 1 16 660 
Liberal .31 .46 0 1 16 660 
CCF/NDP .13 .34 0 1 16 660 
United Farmers/ 
Progressive Party 
.04 .18 0 1 16 660 
Social Credit .07 .26 0 1 16 660 
Saskatchewan Party .01 .10 0 1 16 660 
Union Nationale .03 .16 0 1 16 660 
Parti Québecois .03 .17 0 1 16 660 
      
Election .27     .44           0           1 16 660 
      
DM gender (Male) .90 .30 0 1 15 944 
      
Interim premier .05 .23 0 1 16 660 
      
Number of 
departments t-1 
20.53     5.95 3 35 16 564 
      
GDP growth 3.41 4.20 -20.00 14.98 16 660 
      
Department age 33.14 24.37 1 93 16 248 
      
Province      
BC .11 .31 0 1 16 660 
AB .11 .32 0 1 16 660 
SK .11 .31 0 1 16 660 
MB .09 .29 0 1 16 660 
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Variable Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum N 
ON .13 .33 0 1 16 660 
QC .11 .32 0 1 16 660 
NB .09 .29 0 1 16 660 
NS .09 .29 0 1 16 660 
PEI .07 .25 0 1 16 660 
NL .08 .27 0 1 16 660 
      
Public Service Bargain      
Spoils .18 .38 0 1 16 660 
Schafferian .33 .47 0 1 16 660 
Managerial .49 .50 0 1 16 660 
      
 
The mean of DM mobility within the dataset is 24 percent. The average number of years since 
there was a change in the DM is a little less than 5 years. The mean of political events are; 
election (.27), change in premier (.15) and change in governing party (.09). The means reflect 
temporal occurrences of an election approximately once every four years, a change in premier 
once every six years and a change in government once every ten years. Infrequent changes in 
party are in part explained by a few cases of high party entrenchment within the dataset: 41 
years of Conservative Party government in Ontario (1943-1984) and 42 years of Conservative 
Party government in Alberta (since 1971 until the end of the dataset).  
 The mean of legislative strength reflects the institutional tendency of the single-member 
plurality electoral system (first-past the post) to produce majority governments (Blais and Carty 
1987). Of the observations, 90 percent are under a majority government, six percent are under 
a minority and four percent under a coalition government.  
 To a degree, the data also reflects the tradition of a two-party system found in Canada’s 
federal party system (Carty and Cross 2010), with 37 percent of observations attained during a 
Conservative government and 31 percent from a Liberal party government. However, while 
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these two parties are the most prevalent, eight other parties have also formed government, 
although their presence is largely associated with specific regions.25 
 
Research Methods 
Quantitative methods. To test whether the relationship between administrative mobility and 
political dynamics varies across PSBs this dissertation primarily makes use of descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics are used to make bivariate comparisons between 
mobility and the explanatory variables. Inferential statistics are employed using logistic 
regression, which allows for the relationship between mobility and several predictors to be 
tested simultaneously, while additionally controlling for alternative factors identified by 
organization and management studies that may also possibly affect mobility.  
 Despite the methodological advantages that panel data offers researchers by providing 
repeated observations across units and over time, such as reducing collinearity between 
independent variables, increasing degrees of freedom, and exploring temporal dynamics (Hsiao 
2014), it also presents two important challenges which threaten to bias the estimates of standard 
errors and thus misrepresent the statistical significance of findings (Stimson 1985; Moulton 
1990). Both problems arise from the fact that the data are unlikely to meet the assumption of 
regression of observation independence (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). Instead, 
the values of observations in panel data are likely to exhibit temporal dependence and spatial 
correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). 
 Also referred to as serial correlation, the issue of temporal dependence is that with 
repeated observations of the same unit over time, for example DM turnover in the department 
of Health between 1920 and 2013, the value of an observation at a specific time is likely to be 
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affected by its own past values. The value of yi at time ti is not independent from the value of yi 
at time ti-1. For scholars in public administration such temporal dependence is likely to shock 
very few. Several eminent works remark that bureaucratic phenomena are highly path 
dependent, with present values being strongly shaped by their own previous value (Lindblom 
1979; Pierson 1994); as Meier maintains of panel data in public administration “serial 
correlation is almost a given” (1993, 403). When it comes to the mobility of administrative elites 
there are good theoretical reasons for suspecting that the mobility of personnel is related to 
whether mobility has occurred in the past (Borman and Dowling 2008; Pitts, Marvel, and 
Fernandez 2011).26  
 Researchers working with longitudinal data have developed a few different ways to 
address the issue of temporal dependence. One of the earliest methods recommended by Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker (1998) is to include dummy variables accounting for each increment of time 
since an event. While frequently used by researchers to address serial correlation (for example, 
Baten and Mumme 2013; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016), the inclusion of time dummies comes at a 
great cost to researchers, due to the difficulty of meaningfully interpreting the results of these 
temporal effects. Noting this, Carter and Signorino (2010) offer an alternative approach to 
address temporal dependence by advocating for models to include a cubic polynomial of time 
since an event; that being, adding time (t), time squared (t2), and time cubed (t3). Because of the 
improved ability to interpret time as a substantive variable, this method has become increasingly 
common in longitudinal data (for example, Gilardi 2010; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; 
Hollibaugh 2015; Arceneaux et al. 2016; Liang 2016). Beck (2010) however, continues to 
defend the use of time dummies by arguing that time is not a theoretical variable needing to be 
substantively interpreted. When it comes to the mobility of personnel however, a large body of 
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research does use time as a theoretical variable and substantively interprets its association with 
mobility. For this reason, to address serial correlation this work uses a cubic polynomial of time. 
  A second issue with panel data that potentially threatens the assumption of observation 
independence is unobserved heterogeneity across spatial units, also referred to as spatial 
autocorrelation (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Culpepper 2013). Most phenomena studied by social 
scientists are of a nested nature, with lower level observations embedded within a higher level 
order. For example, deputy minister positions in Canada are nested ascendingly in departments, 
provinces and regions. Importantly, the values of observations may not be independent from the 
higher level units in which they reside. Higher level entities may affect the values of lower level 
observations, resulting in a clustering of observations that violates the assumption of observation 
independence. 
 Like temporal dependence, researchers using cross-sectional data have developed 
different ways to address this problem. The two most common approaches are fixed effects and 
random effects models (for a detailed discussion and mathematical demonstration of fixed 
effects and random effects see, Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013).27 Traditionally, the 
most popular method used by social scientists is fixed effects, which accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity by using repeated measures of the lowest level observation to create person-
specific dummies to control for possible heterogeneity. As Allison explains, “[t]he essence of a 
fixed effects method is captured by saying that each individual serves as his or her own control. 
That is accomplished by making comparisons within individuals…and then averaging those 
differences across all the individuals in the sample” (2005, 3).  
 Despite being hailed as the ‘gold standard’ and the ‘default method’ to address 
unobserved heterogeneity amongst social scientists (Bell and Jones 2015, 149), fixed effects 
92 
 
also involve a great cost for researchers wanting to understand substantively the effects of time-
invariant variables. As observed by Firebaugh Warner, and Massoglia, “because fixed effects 
models remove the effects of all time-invariant causes…the standard fixed effects model is 
unable to estimate the effects of time-invariant measured causes...if the causes of interest are 
time-invariant, standard fixed effects is not appropriate…” (2013, 116). Accordingly, a growing 
number of applied researchers as well as methodologists have voiced their frustration with the 
use of fixed effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Beck and Katz 2001; 
Schurer and Yong 2012; Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013). For example, Bell and Jones 
argue that, “in controlling out context [time invariant variables], FE [fixed effects] models 
effectively cut out much of what is going on—goings-on that are usually of interest to the 
researcher, the reader and the policy maker” (2015, 134). 
 Interested in understanding the effects that time invariant higher level context (such as 
provinces) have on dependent variables, those unsatisfied with fixed effects models for 
substantive reasons, have advocated that researchers address unobserved heterogeneity by using 
a random effects model and cluster standard errors around the higher level entity believed to be 
responsible for correlation amongst observations (Huber and Shipan 2002; Jacobs and Kleban 
2003; Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007; Green and Vavreck 2008; Arceneaux and 
Nickerson 2009; Andersen and Mortensen 2010). Instead of assuming that unobserved 
heterogeneity is fixed, as is the case with a fixed effect model, the random effect model assumes 
that the effects randomly vary from a larger parameter.28 
 For the analysis in this dissertation, there are important theoretical reasons for believing 
that the data may exhibit unobserved heterogeneity due to the nesting of observations within 
provinces. Desiring to substantively interpret the effect that provinces may have on mobility this 
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dissertation addresses unobserved heterogeneity by using a random effects model and clusters 
standard errors around provinces. Alternative approaches were also used including a random 
effects model that clustered standard errors on departments as well as a fixed effect model. The 
results from these alternative models did not substantively alter the main results suggested from 
the model presented in this work.29 
 To avoid the problem of multi-collinearity amongst the explanatory variables a variance 
inflation factor test was conducted. Standard practice interprets scores higher than 10 as 
potentially having problematic levels of multi-collinearity (O’Brien 2007). The results from a 
variance inflation factor test between all the predictor variables report levels below 10 
suggesting no such problem.  
 Expecting that the nature and strength of the association between political variables and 
mobility should exhibit important differences across PSBs the regression models are tested 
separately for each PSB. Analysing temporal changes in relationships by testing the same model 
in different periods is an approach that has been used by researchers to identify modifications 
in relationships before and after particular temporal events. To test the whether new legislation 
in Chile reduced traffic fatalities, Nazif-Munoz et al. (2015) conduct regressions in the periods 
before and after the new legislation was introduced. Seeking to identify how the partisan 
affiliation of administrative elites has affected turnover, Ennser-Jedenastik (2014a) tests the 
same regression model in three different periods demarked by different coalitions of governing 
parties. Likewise, recently published in the Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Liang (2016) examines whether group-centric policies affect administrative outputs 
differently over time by testing the same model in four distinct periods. 
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 To examine the robustness of the findings, the regression models were tested using 
alternative coding of the dependent variable that excluded the appointment of persons to newly 
created departments as well as the first year following the abolition of departments. To ensure 
that the findings did not represent a strong relationship existing in only one province, the 
regression models were run with the exclusion of a different province each time. The historical 
periods were also recoded so as to begin the Schafferian bargain in Saskatchewan in 1945 and 
in Québec in 1960, along the lines of some research suggesting that these two provinces were 
the respective temporal leader and laggard, in the development of a professional civil service. 
Alternative coding for region, the legislative strength of the government and the political 
ideology of parties discussed above were also conducted. In all of these robustness tests, the 
main findings remained substantially unaltered. 
 The results from the logistic regressions are reported using odds ratios and predicted 
probabilities. Rather than report coefficients as commonly done with OLS regression, odds 
ratios are a conventional alternative when the dependent variable is binary. Odds ratios are 
simply the ratio between the odds of a particular value of the dependent variable given a specific 
value of the predictor variable compared to having the same value of the dependent variable 
given a different value of the predictor variable (Pampel 2009). For example, using the original 
data from this dissertation, Table 5 shows the results of a cross tabulation of mobility and an 
election. The odds of mobility when there is an election is 1, 194 to 3, 237 (or .369), meanwhile 
the odds of mobility when there is no election is 2, 836 to 9, 247 (or .307). The odds ratio is 
then arrived at by dividing these two odds. The odds ratio of DM mobility given that there has 
been an election than if there is no election is 1.20 (.369 divided by .307). 
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Table 5: Odds ratio calculation: Cross-tabulation of election and DM mobility 
 
Election Deputy Minister Mobility Total 
 No  Yes  
No 9 247  2 836 12 083 
Yes 3 237  1 194 4 431 
Total 12 484 4 030 16 514 
 
 
An odds ratio greater than one denotes a positive relationship, whereas a number fewer than one 
specifies a negative relationship. A value of 1.0 indicates no change in the likelihood of the 
outcome given differing values of the predictor. Odds ratios can then be interpreted as 
percentage changes in the odds of an outcome. This is accomplished when the value is greater 
than 1.0 by subtracting 1 from the odds ratios and multiplying by 100. When the value is less 
than 1.0, the percentage change in odds by simply subtracting the value of the odds ratio from 
1.0 (Acock 2010, 128). For example, using the data above, an odds ratio of 1.20 of mobility 
when there is an election can be interpreted as an increased percentage in odds of 20 percent 
(e.g. (.307 x .20) + .307 = .369). Conversely, an odds ratio between mobility and an election of 
0.95 would suggest a decrease percentage in the odds of mobility by five percent if there was 
an election than if there was none. 
 While commonly used, and more meaningful than the coefficients of log odds, 
researchers using logistic regression have increasingly begun to report the predictive 
probabilities of outcomes. The reason for doing so is that while odds ratios tell us about percent 
changes in odds, they say nothing substantively of the overall likelihood of the outcome itself. 
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For instance, an odds ratio of 2.00 means something different if the underlying probability of an 
event is .300 than if it is .030. Whereas the latter would result in an increase in probability from 
.300 to a level of .600 (now making the likelihood of the event a more probable outcome than 
not), the same increase percentage in odds for an event whose underlying probability is .030 
would increase to a level of .060 (still an unlikely outcome). The empirical results from the 
regression models thus also report predicted probabilities of mobility given particular values of 
explanatory variables while holding constant alternative variables at their observed value, as is 
common practice amongst scholars (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
 
Qualitative methods. In addition to the statistical analysis, this dissertation also undertakes a 
qualitative investigation to identify whether the motivations underpinning the appointment of 
administrative elites by governments have shifted over time in a manner that is corresponds with 
the preferences of governments in different PSBs. If variation between political dynamics and 
mobility stem, at least in part, from differences in the type of traits governments seek to 
encourage amongst bureaucrats in different PSBs, an additional means to validate this is to 
examine descriptions of political-administrative relationships over time, specifically focusing 
on the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and loyalty, as well as the reasons motivating 
governments to remove and appoint bureaucratic elites. 
  Finding descriptions conforming to theoretical expectations would add empirical 
support of a different nature, which, while less systematic and comprehensive than the 
quantitative statistical analysis, has the advantage of providing a closer examination of the 
underlying incentives of heads of government. This qualitative inquiry thus helps tie together 
the theoretical framework and the large-n analysis by illustrating how governments in distinct 
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PSBs use the strategic nomination of administrative personnel to encourage different types of 
competency and loyalty. 
 The qualitative inquiry is conducted by analyzing primary and secondary sources 
providing descriptions of political-administrative relationships in Canada’s provinces, with 
particular attention given to the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and loyalty as well as 
the considerations involved in staffing administrative elites. Fortunately, a rich body of case 
study material on the Canadian provinces has been produced by scholars in political science and 
history. Appearing in journal articles, books, as well as doctoral and master’s theses, there now 
exist hundreds of case studies touching upon to varying degrees political-administrative 
relationships in Canada’s provinces.30 Frequently based on elite-interviews and archival 
research, these secondary sources regularly provide insightful descriptions of nature of the 
bureaucracy’s loyalty and competency, and even glimpses into the government’s objectives 
motivating the staffing of administrative offices. 
  In addition to secondary sources, several types of primary sources have also been 
consulted. These include, firsthand written accounts by politicians, civil servants and political 
staffers; government mandated public inquires studying the bureaucracy; as well as various 
provincial and national newspaper articles often based on interviews with politicians, civil 
servants and political staffers. Analysis of these primary and secondary sources was oriented 
towards identifying the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and loyalty desired by 
governments as well as the reasons underlining the staffing of bureaucratic elites. 
 Still true today as it was noted over 30 years ago by Chandler and Chandler (1982), the 
provinces have not received uniform attention by researchers. Nonetheless, effort was taken to 
ensure that data was collected from each province. The information gathered from a variety of 
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sources has been compared and contrasted in a form of triangulation so as to draw more accurate 
conclusions. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter Three 
Canada’s provincial bureaucracies are an apt case selection to study whether the relationship 
between bureaucratic mobility and political dynamics has changed over time across distinct 
PSBs. Sharing the same administrative and political institutions, the extent to which political 
dynamics prod governments to remove and appoint administrative elites can be tested in 
Canada’s provincial bureaucracies without having to introduce a great deal of variation in 
institutional variables. The relationship between mobility and politics is tested with an original 
dataset of DM mobility from 1920 to 2013; a period that is long enough to explore possible 
changes in relationships across PSBs.  
 This chapter outlined the research design, data collection method and the 
operationalization of the variables of the quantitative analysis. Descriptive statistics of central 
variables were presented and discussed. The qualitative methods used to scrutinize whether the 
relationship between mobility and politics reflects changes in the types of competency and 
loyalty desired by government across PSBs were described.  
 The next two chapters present the results and discuss the findings of the empirical 
analyses. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) uses descriptive statistics to investigate the 
relationship between mobility and key political variables across the spoils, Schafferian and 
managerial bargains. In addition, the chapter uses primary and secondary sources to identify 
whether the strategic considerations underpinning the appointment of administrative elites 
reflect differences in the nature of the bureaucracy’s competency and loyalty desired by 
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governments in distinct PSBs. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) further scrutinizes the 
conclusions suggested in the first empirical chapter by using statistical regression to test 
simultaneously the association between mobility and several political variables while 
controlling for some alternative predictors identified by organization and management studies. 
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Chapter 3 Appendix I 
Figure 2: Flow chart classifying organizational persistence and termination  
 
Is there a change in name? yes 
Organization persistence 
Is a primary function of the previous organization maintained in the 
new name? (e. g. ‘Health’ to ‘Health and Welfare’) 
yes 
Organization persistence 
yes 
no 
 
Is the answer yes to at least two of the following; does the 
organization: 
-oversee the majority of the previous organization’s acts; 
-possess the same structural unites; 
-possess the same lower level administrative personnel carrying 
out similar functions. 
Organization persistence 
no 
Organization termination 
no 
Drawing upon Peters and Hogwood (1988); Lewis 
(2002) 
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Chapter 4. The Politics of Mobility: A Quantitative and 
Qualitative Descriptive Investigation 
 
 
Chapter four summary.  This is the first of two empirical chapters dedicated to testing whether 
the association between political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility in Canada’s provincial 
bureaucracies has changed over time across PSBs. After identifying temporal trends of mobility 
between 1920 and 2013, the association between mobility and key political variables is 
examined using descriptive statistics.  
 The analysis compares levels of mobility following a transition in the governing party; 
a change in party while accounting for the length of time the previous party was in power; a 
change in party accounting for which party has formed government; a change in premier; and 
the legislative strength of the government. To examine temporal variation between these 
variables and mobility analysis is conducted across periods embodying the spoils (1920-1949), 
Schafferian (1950-1979) and managerial (1980-2013) bargains.  
 The evidence generally supports the conclusion that the association between some key 
political dynamics and mobility has shifted across distinct PSBs. In particular, whereas a change 
in the governing party is associated with increased mobility during the spoils bargain, in the 
managerial bargain, even when there has been no change in party, newly elected premiers are 
now also positively associated with mobility. As expected, in the Schafferian bargain, the 
association between political dynamics and mobility is severely reduced.  
 In addition to descriptive statistics, this chapter uses primary and secondary sources to 
conduct a qualitative investigation as to whether; (a), there are observable differences in the 
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contours of political-administrative relationships of Canada’s provinces over the last 100 years; 
and (b), whether the motivations underlying the staffing decisions of administrative elites reflect 
changes in these relationships, specifically, the type of competency and loyalty governments 
desire bureaucratic elites to exhibit. This qualitative examination provides an additional means 
to assess whether the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically 
dismiss and appoint personnel varies across PSBs. This qualitative component provides a closer 
examination of the strategic considerations of governments in differing PSBs, and thus helps tie 
together the theory with the large-n analysis. The results from the qualitative analysis, generally 
confirm that governments in dissimilar PSBs have been motivated by different ends in their 
strategic decisions to remove, retain or appoint administrative elites. 
 
Temporal Trends in Mobility 
Figure 3 displays the average annual percentage of DM mobility for each decade between the 
1920s and the 2000s.31 In its aggregate, the data shows that up until the 1960s mobility was 
relatively stable. Rounding to the nearest whole number, the percentage of persons who were 
removed or appointed to a new position ranged between 11 and 14 percent. The 1960s marked 
the beginning of an upward trend in mobility, swiftly reaching 26 percent in the 1970s. From 
the 1980s onward, mobility has continued to rise, reaching a high of 35 percent in the 2000s.  
 As shown in Table 6, this temporal trend in the combined total of the observations is 
largely replicated separately in each province. An exception to the aggregate trend found in 
every province apart from Manitoba however, is a more pronounced fluctuation in mobility with 
higher peaks and lower dips in the first half of the 20th century. 
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Figure 3: Annual mobility in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies, by decade 
 
For example, as demonstrated in Figure 4 higher levels of mobility in British Columbia during 
the 1920s are followed by lower levels in the 1930s, whereas in Saskatchewan a low level of 
mobility in the 1920s is trailed by a higher level of mobility in the 1930s. When examining 
average rates of mobility, which aggregate all observations together, the extremities in the data 
observed between the 1920s and 1950s serve to cancel each other out. A likely explanation for 
this is discussed in greater detail below studying the link between a transition in party and 
mobility (p. 107). Here it simply suffices to note that while in the aggregate levels of mobility 
were low during the first half of the 20th century, when each province is considered separately, 
a greater fluctuation is observed during this period.  
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Table 6: Annual percentage DM mobility by province and decade 
 
1920s 
 
1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
British Columbia 14.43 
(97) 
 
9.85 
(132) 
9.80 
(153) 
18.99 
(179) 
9.48 
(211) 
30.73 
(218) 
34.65 
(228) 
45.71 
(245) 
40.96 
(354) 
27.46 
(1 817) 
Alberta 14.14 
(99) 
 
9.92 
(121) 
11.27 
(142) 
8.82 
(170) 
8.67 
(173) 
26.16 
(260) 
22.26 
(310) 
28.76 
(226) 
36.93 
(371) 
21.96 
(1 872) 
Saskatchewan 7.76 
(116) 
 
16.30 
(135) 
14.55 
(165) 
9.94 
(161) 
17.37 
(167) 
31.08 
(222) 
40.53 
(264) 
37.65 
(255) 
32.28 
(347) 
26.42 
(1 832) 
Manitoba 10.98 
(82) 
 
10.68 
(103) 
10.43 
(115) 
11.90 
(126) 
22.22 
(162) 
32.98 
(188) 
28.09 
(235) 
18.86 
(228) 
25.65 
(308) 
21.53 
(1 547) 
Ontario 10.83 
(120) 
 
14.84 
(155) 
13.69 
(168) 
10.88 
(193) 
15.35 
(228) 
29.61 
(223) 
33.96 
(265) 
35.77 
(274) 
37.24 
(435) 
25.78 
(2 071) 
Québec 7.84 
(102) 
 
15.44 
(136) 
7.34 
(177) 
6.40 
(203) 
20.61 
(228) 
30.94 
(223) 
33.06 
(248) 
37.04 
(243) 
39.94 
(328) 
25.11 
(1 888) 
New Brunswick 20.55 
(73) 
 
10.00 
(80) 
11.34 
(97) 
11.82 
(110) 
16.22 
(148) 
17.65 
(204) 
18.60 
(215) 
24.65 
(215) 
33.63 
(339) 
21.20 
(1 481) 
Nova Scotia 18.75 
(48) 
 
17.91 
(67) 
26.09 
(92) 
11.28 
(133) 
9.38 
(160) 
19.72 
(218) 
19.66 
(234) 
37.60 
(242) 
31.38 
(325) 
23.50 
(1 519) 
Prince Edward Island 10.00 
(40) 
 
14.71 
(34) 
29.63 
(54) 
12.50 
(104) 
13.67 
(139) 
15.76 
(184) 
31.37 
(153) 
45.73 
(164) 
28.57 
(266) 
25.04 
(1 138) 
Newfoundland & Labrador        – 
 
 
       – 69.23 
(13) 
9.33 
(150) 
9.36 
(171) 
24.41 
(213) 
23.58 
(229) 
31.73 
(249) 
35.49 
(324) 
25.13 
(1 349) 
Equally weighed provincial 
average32 
 
12.81 13.29 20.34 11.19 14.23 25.90 28.57 34.35 34.21 24.31 
 (Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parenthesis) 
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Figure 4: Fluctuations in DM mobility, selected provinces, 1920s -1950s 
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with a level of mobility of 69 percent during the 1940s. The high level of mobility is in part 
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and Labrador became a province of Canada and reintroduced responsible government through 
a democratic election. Since 1934, the province had been governed by a Commission of six 
members appointed by the British Prime Minister, which in the words of one of its 
Commissioners, was akin to a dictatorship (Lodge 1939). The election in 1949 was thus of great 
importance signifying much more than a mere change in government. By reintroducing 
representative self-government after a 15-year hiatus, the election marked a change in the nature 
of the polity from government by commission to representative democracy. Because of the 
uniqueness of this election, all subsequent analyses have been conducted with the inclusion and 
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Political Dynamics and Mobility: Evidence from Descriptive Statistics 
Change in the governing party. A principal hypothesis of research studying the politics of 
administrative mobility is that turnover increases the most following a transition in the 
governing party. This relationship is first tested by comparing the annual percentage of mobility 
when a change in the governing party has taken place with levels of mobility when no change 
in party has occurred. The results presented by decade in Figure 5 are quite revealing (exact 
percentages and the number of observations are provided in Table 11 Chapter 4 Appendix I, p. 
149).  
 During the first half of the 20th century, in the period embodying a spoils bargain, 
mobility is much higher following a change in party than when no such transition had occurred. 
Following a change in the governing party, mobility is 20 percent in the 1920s, 29 percent in 
the 1930s and 22 percent in the 1940s. When there was no change in party, mobility is 11 percent 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and 13 percent in the 1940s.  
 In the postwar period of the 1950s until 1980, in the epoch embodying a Schafferian 
bargain, a change in party is associated with a lower level of mobility than during the spoils 
bargain. After a transition in the governing party mobility is 15 percent in the 1950s, 17 percent 
the 1960s and 25 percent in the 1970s. When no such change in party took place, mobility is 11 
percent in the 1950s, 14 percent in the 1960s and 26 percent in the 1970s.  
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Figure 5: Annual DM mobility, discriminating for change in party, by decade 
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Overall absolute levels of mobility following a change in party are lower during the Schafferian 
bargain than they are following a change in government during the spoils bargain. Averaging 
all years together, during the Schafferian bargain mobility following a change in party is 22 
percent, whereas in the spoils bargain it is 24 percent. 
 Not only are levels of mobility following a change in party lower during the Schafferian 
bargain than in the spoils bargain, but the difference between levels of mobility following a 
change in party and all other years is much less in the Schafferian bargain than in the spoils 
bargain. Between 1920 and 1949, mobility is 24 percent following a change in government; 12 
percentage points higher than when there is no change in party (12 percent). The strong increase 
in mobility following a transition in the governing party during this period helps explain the 
fluctuations in mobility during the first half of the 20th century identified above in Table 6 and 
Figure 4 (p. 104-105). During the Schafferian bargain, however, mobility is 22 percent 
following a change in government, only 4 percentage points greater than mobility when there is 
no such change (18 percent). Transitions in party during the Schafferian PSB are thus not 
associated with as much of an increase in mobility as they are in other periods. 
 From the 1980s onward, during the managerial bargain, levels of mobility are once again 
higher following a change in the governing party. After a transition, mobility is 38 percent in 
the 1980s, 41 percent in the 1990s and 47 percent in the 2000s. Higher than when there is no 
change in party; 28 percent in the 1980s, 34 percent in the 1990s and 33 percent in the 2000s. 
Again, not only have the absolute levels of mobility increased following a change in party during 
the managerial bargain, but the difference between levels of mobility when there has been a 
change in party and those when no such change in party has occurred, as with the spoils bargain, 
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is once again more pronounced. Since the 1980s, mobility following a change in party is 43 
percent, 11 percentage points greater than when there has been no such transition (32 percent). 
 Evidence from this first analysis is congruent with theoretical expectations concerning 
the relationship between transitions in party and mobility across PSBs. During the spoils 
bargain, the high level of mobility following a transition in party followed by lower levels in all 
other years is in accordance with expectations that newly elected governments nominate partisan 
loyalists upon taking power and then allow these individuals to enjoy their position so long as 
the government remains in power. The evidence however, does not perfectly reflect the 
Schafferian bargain. In contrast to its ideal-type form, in which political dynamics should not 
affect mobility, changes in government are associated with increased levels. The degree 
however, to which mobility increases following a change in party than in all other years is 
considerably less than during the spoils and managerial bargains. Finally, as expected, during 
the managerial bargain changes in the governing party are associated with greater levels of 
mobility, thus suggesting that heads of government are once again strategically interfering in 
the appointment of administrative personnel upon taking power. 
 While the data presented in Figure 5 supports the claim that the extent to which a change 
in the party is associated with mobility varies across PSBs, transitions in party are not 
homogenous. Research suggests that differences in the nature of these transitions also affect the 
degree to which governments dismiss and appoint bureaucratic elites. Specifically, the length of 
time the previous party was in power and the ideology of the government. 
 
Change in party and time previous government was in power. According to some, the extent to 
which a newly elected government moves people in and out of bureaucratic offices is a function 
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of the length of time the previous party was in power. As the time the previous government was 
in power grows, so too does the skepticism that newly elected governments bear towards 
incumbents to implement new policies whose objectives may be different than, or even 
controvert, those they had been cultivating under the previous government.  
 From a theoretical perspective of PSBs however, this relationship should be limited to a 
managerial bargain where the strategic use of appointments is oriented to ensuring commitment 
to mobilizing resources in pursuit of realizing the government’s policy agenda. Factors likely 
exacerbating a government’s distrust that bureaucrats exhibit such responsive competence, such 
as the length of time the previous government was in power, are thus expected to be associated 
with an increased incidence of mobility. 
 During the spoils bargain, appointments are used to reward partisan loyalists for their 
support to the party and not as a means to check the power of the bureaucracy and ensure 
responsiveness to the government’s policy agenda. Elected parties are ubiquitously expected to 
be motivated by the desire to reward partisans for their electoral support, regardless for the 
length of time the previous party was in power. The desire to reward partisan supports is not 
expected to be any greater the longer the previous party was in power. As for the Schafferian 
bargain, just as with a change in government, it is expected that regardless of the time the 
previous government was in power, transitions in the governing party should have no bearing 
on levels of mobility.   
 This relationship is first tested by comparing mobility levels when there is a change in 
party discriminating for how many years the previous government was in power. Table 7 
displays the results of such a comparison discriminating between the length of time the previous 
party was in power when there is finally a change in government between; 4 years or fewer; 5 
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to 8 years; 9 to 12 years; and more than 12 years. The analysis is conducted for all years in the 
dataset as well as separately for each PSB (to improve visual interpretation, this data is 
reproduced in Figures 8 through 11 in Appendix II of this chapter p. 150-151).  
  
Table 7: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013 and PSB 
 1-4 years 5-8 years 9-12 years > 12 years 
Spoils-type bargain 20.45 
(44) 
 
21.25 
(80) 
20.00 
(80) 
34.78 
(69) 
Schafferian bargain 31.25 
(48) 
19.31 
(145) 
 
12.24 
(49) 
23.12 
(186) 
Managerial bargain 54.46 
(101) 
 
35.08 
(191) 
45.79 
(321) 
39.01 
(141) 
All years (1920-2013) 40.93 
(193) 
 
26.92 
(416) 
37.56 
(450) 
30.81 
(396) 
(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
 
The evidence suggests no clear relationship between the time the previous party was in power 
and mobility. Examining the relationship in all years shows that mobility following a change in 
party is highest when the previous government was in power for 4 years or less (41 percent) and 
9 to 12 years (38 percent), meanwhile levels of mobility are lower when the previous party had 
been in power for 5 to 8 years (27 percent) and 13 years or more (31 percent). 
 When this relationship is examined separately for each PSB the picture does not become 
any clearer. During the Schafferian and the managerial bargains the data does not indicate any 
clear relationship. With respect to the managerial bargain, this suggests that distrust towards the 
bureaucracy and the desire to reappoint administrative elites to secure responsiveness does not 
rise in tandem with the length of the time the previous government was in power. Surprisingly, 
in contrast to expectations, while in the spoils bargain levels of mobility do not rise as the length 
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of time increases to 12 years, after this amount of time, a transition in government is associated 
with higher levels of mobility.  
 This is in part due to a historical change in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador 
in 1949 which witnessed the end of Government by Commission and the reintroduction of 
responsible government, when upon forming government, the newly elected government 
replaced 9 of 13 positions. If excluded from the analysis, the level of mobility following a 
change in government with the previous government in power for more than 12 years is reduced 
to a level of 27 percent. In sum, in contrast to expectations the data suggests that length of time 
prior to change in government does not have any relationship with mobility during the 
managerial bargain. 
 
Mobility and political ideology. Another central hypothesis is that governments on the 
ideological right remove incumbents and appoint new personnel to a greater extent than other 
parties. This is believed to stem from higher levels of distrust parties on the ideological right 
harness towards the intentions of public servants whose jobs represent the intrusive public 
programs they hope to retract. From a perceptive of PSBs, the relationship between political 
ideology, like that of time prior to a transition in party, should be limited to the managerial 
bargain where the incidence of mobility is expected to be higher under circumstances that 
increase the government’s doubt about the willingness of bureaucrats to be responsive to, and 
implement, the government’s policy agenda. Governments on the right are thus expected to be 
associated with higher levels of mobility due to their higher levels of mistrust towards 
bureaucrats.  
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 During the spoils bargain, governments on the ideological right should not be more 
prone than parties on the left to dismiss and appoint bureaucratic elites. Staffing decisions are 
not aimed at reducing goal conflict and information asymmetry in order to ensure that executives 
manage resources towards realizing the government’s policy directives, but instead, are intended 
to encourage and reinforce loyalty to the party and its quest for power; something expected to 
be displayed regardless of right/left ideology. 
 In the case of Canada however, it is possible that in the spoils bargain the Liberal party 
will be associated with greater levels of mobility than other parties. Several case studies suggest 
that with the exception of the Liberal party many governments sought to bring an end to 
‘partyism’ and the practice of patronage (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; 
Smith 1975; English 1977; Campbell 1988; Laycock 1990; Dutil and MacKenzie 2011). 
 Desiring that bureaucrats possess policy relevant knowledge and display a devotion to 
providing impartial neutral advice on the basis of their expertise and experience regardless of 
the government in power and its ideological orientation, mobility is not expected to be higher 
for any particular party during the Schafferian bargain. This is not to say that ideological 
differences between parties in this bargain do not exist. But having a preference for the 
bureaucracy to possess technical competency and serial loyalty, governments on both sides of 
the ideological spectrum do not view dissenting opinions with as much wariness as is the case 
in the managerial bargain where governments have a preference for bureaucrats that are ‘can 
do’ managers rather than ‘wait a minute’ advisors (Dargie and Locke 1999, 181). In the 
Schafferian bargain, governments on the right and left are not only likely to expect, but in fact 
value, dissenting opinions from civil servants, viewing this as comprehending the candid and 
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expert advice provided by the bureaucracy rather than indicating goal conflict in need of 
correcting 
 Figure 6 displays levels of mobility by political party following a change in party and 
when no change in party has taken place between 1920 and 2013 as well as separately by PSB 
(actual percentages and the number of observations are provided in Table 13 Appendix III of 
this chapter p.152). Analysis of mobility by political party in all years suggests little difference 
in the two largest parties forming government across Canada’s provinces: the Liberals and the 
Progressive Conservatives. Upon taking power mobility for both parties is 32 percent. The more 
ideologically left leaning CCF/NDP is associated with a slightly higher level of 35 percent. 
Analyzing the relationship separately in each PSB however, reveals more pronounced 
differences in levels of mobility between parties across PSBs. 
  During the managerial bargain the results are generally supportive of the anticipation 
that parties on the left are associated with lower levels of mobility. The Progressive 
Conservative party does have higher levels of mobility when first coming to power (48 percent) 
than the more centrist Liberal party (37 percent) and the left-leaning NDP (39 percent). 
 The data suggests that governments on the ideological right are more distrusting of civil 
servants than other parties and dismiss incumbents and appoint new personal to a greater extent 
when they first come to power than parties on the left. Equally suggestive is that the 
ideologically right Saskatchewan Party has a high rate of mobility upon taking power (59 
percent).  
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Figure 6: DM mobility discriminating for political party, by PSB  
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The Parti Québécois (PQ) however, is also associated with a high level of mobility (64 percent). 
This is somewhat surprising, given that the PQ has generally been seen as being closer to the 
ideological left than the right (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996; Erk 2010) thus contradicting the 
standard hypothesis between ideology and mobility. A possible explanation for the high level 
of mobility observed with the PQ may be due to its ideological commitment to the independence 
of the province of Québec. Having a strong stance on such a crucial issue may lead the party to 
be more committed to reforming the state in its own vision than is traditionally witnessed 
alongside right/left ideological divisions, which are often claimed in Canada to be softened due 
to the practice of brokerage politics amongst catch-all parties (Meisel 1974; Carty and Cross 
2010). Some have noted that the degree to the commitment to large-scale reforms, which would 
include preparing for secession, lead governments to seek greater control of the bureaucracy. 
Robert Normand, deputy minister of Québec during the 1970s and 1980s made a remark to this 
point, commenting on the challenge that the arrival of the PQ under Premier René Lévesque in 
the 1970s presented to the public service: 
Le principe d’une fonction publique apolitique et permanente avait désormais droit de cité. 
L’arrivé au pouvoir de Monsieur Levesque posa un problème plus délicat en 1976. Il 
s’agissait d’un gouvernement porté par un parti politique à forte teneur idéologique et qui 
assumait le pouvoir non pas uniquement pour assurer le mieux-être de la population suivant 
des critères du bonne administration mais aussi pour réaliser une option politique qui se 
démarquait nettement de celle des partis traditionnels. (Normand 1984, 536) 
 
This may also explain why the CCF/NDP and the Saskatchewan Party exhibit higher levels of 
mobility than the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Party.33 As stated by Seymour Martin 
Lipset in his assessment of agrarian socialism in the Canadian Prairie Provinces: 
Members of the civil service [have] power to amend initiate and veto actions proposed...The 
political problem of the power and influence of the permanent civil service with its own 
goals and traditions was not important so long as the social and economic values of the 
bureaucracy and governing politicians did not conflict. The problem becomes crucial when 
a new political movement takes office and proposes to enact reforms that go beyond 
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traditional frames of reference...and upsets existing regulations within the bureaucracy. 
(1959, 309) 
 
 
Whereas the Liberal and Conservative Party have most commonly governed the provinces, the 
arrival of parties with policy agendas more divergent than the traditional brokerage approach 
(Young 1992), may be one factor for their higher incidence of mobility. 
 Turning to the Schafferian bargain, the evidence is partially supportive of the expectancy 
that there be no relationship between the political ideology of the party taking power and 
mobility. Most political parties generally exhibit similar levels of mobility following a change 
in government. Two important expectations are the Parti Québécois and the Union Nationale. 
Whereas the PQ has higher level of mobility of 40 percent the Union Nationale has a much 
lower level at slightly less than 10 percent. The higher level of the PQ addressed above may 
also explain the high level of mobility in this period. 
 The low level for the Union Nationale is perhaps surprising given the body of research 
that has identified the Union Nationale with practices of patronage (Quinn 1979; Behiels 1985), 
which according to some, was so extensive that it was impossible to distinguish between the 
political party and the bureaucracy (Boismenu 1981, 358). Yet especially following the death 
of the party’s founder and leader Maurice Duplessis in 1959, the Union Nationale under the 
brief rule of Paul Sauvé, undertook a series of reforms aiming to purge practices of patronage, 
install a meritocratic bureaucracy, and establish a relationship with the bureaucracy reflecting 
the contours of a Schafferian bureaucracy. When the Union Nationale was finally brought back 
to power in 1966 under Premier Daniel Johnson it approached political-administrative 
relationships quite differently than in the period of the spoils bargain. Administrative offices 
were no longer viewed as an instrument to secure partisan support, but instead were seen as a 
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means to harness expertise and effectively implement new policies, as they had also been under 
the previous Liberal government of Jean Lesage (1960-1966) (Gow 1985). For instance, 
responding to the request from DM Claude Morin that Québec Premier Daniel Johnson publicly 
declare his confidence in him, Johnson (1966-1968) advised the public servant that his retention 
in the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was an act ipso facto reflecting the premier’s trust. 
As recounted by Morin, Johnson replied to his request stating that: 
si je comprends bien…vous voudriez que j’exprime publiquement ma confiance envers 
vous. Il me semble que le fait de vous avoir gardé comme sous-ministre, au vu et au su de 
tout le monde, devrait suffire. Ma confiance, vous l’avez. Un tas de gens croyaient que je 
mettrais à la porte tous les hauts fonctionnaires nommés par Lesage. Je ne l’ai pas fait. Ça 
doit signifier quelque chose, n’est pas? (Morin 1991, 226)34 
 
That a party formerly associated with using administrative offices in a manner of patronage 
came to refrain from using these offices in an era embodying a Schafferian bargain, is supportive 
of changes across PSB in the degree to which political dynamics effect mobility. 
 The results presented in Figure 6 also suggest that during the spoils bargain some 
political parties are associated with higher levels of mobility than others. As suggested by some 
researchers in Canada, upon forming government, the Liberal party is associated with a much 
higher level of mobility than any other party; 31 percent for the Liberal party whereas excluding 
the Liberal party the average of all other parties weighed equally is 22 percent. Even more 
supportive of this research, in particular that of English (1977), is that the Conservative party 
had the lowest level of mobility upon taking power (17 percent).  
  
Change in premier. In addition to examining the relationship between transitions in the 
governing party and mobility, attention has also recently turned to changes in the head of 
government. Even when there was been no change in the party forming government, a newly 
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appointed head of government may desire that civil servants be loyal to her personal policy 
agenda. This is expected to be the case in the managerial bargain given the increasing 
importance of the head of government in setting the policy agenda and their preference that 
bureaucrats exhibit responsiveness to this agenda. During the spoils bargain, however, a change 
in the head of government when there has been no change in party should not influence mobility. 
This is because of the emphasis on partisan loyalty to the party rather than loyalty to the head 
of government and her policy agenda. In fact for a newly empowered premier from the same 
party as the previous premier to interfere in the staffing of administrative personnel would run 
the risk of frustrating supporters, driving them to shift their partisan support. Again, in the 
Schafferian bargain the relationship between change in premier and mobility is not expected to 
be present. 
 This relationship is tested by comparing levels of mobility following a change a premier 
with levels when no such change has taken place. Because a change in premier almost always 
encompasses a change in the governing party,35 the relationship between a change in the head 
of government and bureaucratic mobility is analyzed by examining all changes in premier as 
well as isolating only those changes in premier when the party has remained the same.  
 The results shown in Figure 7 strongly support expectations (exact percentages and the 
number of observations are provided in Table 12, Appendix I of this chapter p. 149). 
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Figure 7: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier 
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In the spoils bargain, only a change in premier alongside a change in party is associated with 
higher levels of mobility. Congruent with expectations, there is no increase in mobility when 
there has been a change in premier but the party has remained the same. 
 In the Schafferian bargain, a change in premier is not associated with a notably higher 
level of mobility. While all changes in premier are associated with a slightly higher level of 
mobility (19 percent compared to 18 percent when there is no change in premier), the rate of 
mobility following a change in premier when the party has not changed is lower (15 percent).  
 The evidence shown in Figure 7 also supports expectations concerning the managerial 
bargain. In this period, even when changes in premier do not involve a change in party, levels 
of mobility are higher. This suggests that the appointment of administrative elites is not oriented 
to ensuring partisan loyalty to the party, but instead is geared towards encouraging 
responsiveness to the premier’s policy agenda. As new premiers take power, even when they 
belong to the same party as the previous head of government, there now is a marked increase in 
mobility. Mobility is 42 percent for all changes in premier and 39 percent when there is a change 
in premier but the party has not changed, both greater than the average level of mobility when 
there has been no change in premier (30 percent). 
 While a change in premier, even when there has been no change in the governing party, 
is positively associated with mobility during the managerial bargain, not all new premiers may 
harness the same desire to control the bureaucracy. Some new premiers come to power 
supported by an election, whereas others find themselves nominated by the party following the 
departure of the previous premier. Often due to dissatisfaction amongst party members with the 
leader’s performance and concern about the party’s prospects to be re-elected to government, 
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premiers sometimes resign, with the party nominating a temporary ‘interim premier’ to head the 
government until the next election.36 
 It is probable that interim premiers have a different orientation to governing than those 
premiers that are elected to power. According to Savoie, one of the reasons for why there has 
been a centralization of power in the first minister is the personalization of politics, including 
election campaigns (1999, 96). As party leaders have come to assume greater responsibility for 
the electoral success of their party, they also now command a greater degree of control over the 
policy agenda (also see Pal 1992). This is not likely the case for interim premiers. Not having 
brought their party to electoral victory, interim premiers are unlikely to exhibit as much desire 
to control the policy agenda within cabinet as premiers whose position has been legitimatized 
by the electorate.  
 In addition having with a shorter time horizon in front of them until the next election as 
a newly elected premier, interim premiers may also be less prone to introduce new policies. In 
sum, if increased levels of mobility are associated with new premiers due to the desire to have 
responsive competence to their policy agenda, then the positive relationship between a change 
in premier and mobility should not be observed amongst interim premiers, who are unlikely to 
set the agenda and initiate new policies.37  
 Differences in levels of administrative mobility between interim premiers and those 
premiers who are newly elected-but-no-party-change (ENPC) are shown in Table 8. The results 
strongly confirm expectations. Comparing levels of mobility for interim premiers with ENPC 
premiers, shows much higher levels of mobility for the latter group. Aggregating all 
observations in every year, mobility for interim premiers is 25 percent whereas mobility for 
ENCP premiers is 38 percent. 
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Table 8: Mobility following a change in premier, 1920-2013 and by PSB 
 Change in 
premier, no 
change in party, 
with election 
(‘ENPC 
premier’) 
Change in 
premier, no 
change in party, 
without election 
(‘interim 
premier’) 
All changes in 
premier when no 
change in party 
No change in 
party or premier 
Spoils-type  
 
11.9 
(42) 
9.59 
(219) 
9.96 
(261) 
 
12.3 
(2 089) 
Schafferian  
 
19.5 
(82) 
13.19 
(144) 
15.49 
(226) 
 
17.87 
(4 825) 
Managerial  
 
54.04 
(161) 
34.36 
(521) 
39.00 
(682) 
 
30.91 
(6 687) 
All years 37.89 
(285) 
24.77 
(884) 
27.97 
(1 169) 
 
23.19 
(13 890) 
(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
 
Examining the relationship across PSBs shows that the difference in levels of mobility for 
interim premiers and ENCP premiers is most pronounced in the managerial bargain. In the 
spoils bargain differences in mobility between interim premiers and ENPC premiers are only 
slight, and in both cases the incidence of mobility is lower than in years when there has been no 
change in premier. This is in line with expectations that the strategic nomination of mobility is 
not oriented towards responsiveness to the head of government’s policy agenda, but instead is 
used to ensure loyalty to the political party. 
 In the Schafferian bargain, interim premiers do have a lower level of mobility (13 
percent) than ENPC premiers (20 percent). These levels however are not much different from 
when there has been no change in premier (18 percent). The greatest difference in levels of 
mobility between interim and ENPC premiers is in the managerial bargain. Annual levels of 
mobility for interim premiers are 34 percent whereas levels for ENPC premiers are twenty 
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percentage points higher (54 percent). This is congruent with expectations that it is during the 
managerial bargain where changes in the head of government are associated with increased 
mobility due to the desire to ensure responsiveness to the government’s policy agenda. When 
the desire to implement a new policy agenda is severely reduced, as presumed to be the case 
with interim premiers, the association between a new premier and mobility is concurrently 
lessened. The evidence shown in Table 8 is congruent with this claim.  
 It is possible to further test the theoretical explanation for lower levels of mobility for 
interim premiers by examining levels of mobility after the first election of the interim premier. 
If interim premiers refrain from reappointing bureaucratic elites because they are not yet in a 
position to introduce new policies and thus do not have the same need for responsive 
competence from the bureaucracy, it is reasonable to expect that when they are eventually 
elected to government, and are now in a position to govern according to their personal agenda, 
they will undertake an increased number of administrative appointments to ensure 
responsiveness to their agenda. 
 This possibility is tested by comparing levels of mobility following the first election in 
which interim premiers are eventually elected to government with levels of mobility following 
the re-election of ENCP premiers, as well as levels of mobility for all elections. The findings 
presented in Table 9 strongly confirm expectations.  
 In the managerial bargain, once they are elected, interim primers are associated with 
higher levels of mobility than when they had first came to power as an unelected interim; 46 
percent once they are elected compared to 34 percent when they first came to power, almost as 
high as when ENPC premiers are first elected (54 percent). Equally informative is that levels of 
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mobility when interim premiers are first returned to government after being elected is higher 
than when an incumbent premier (i.e. an ENCP premier) is re-elected (32 percent).  
 
Table 9: Mobility following election of interim and re-election of incumbent premiers 
 first election  
interim premier 
re-election incumbent 
premier excluding 
interim premiers 
all elections 
Spoils  12.50 
(80) 
13.39 
(433) 
17. 25 
(748) 
 
Schafferian  18.18 
(11) 
15.23 
(1 057) 
17.12 
(1 554) 
 
Managerial  46.25 
(160) 
31.96 
(1 214) 
37.53 
(2 129) 
 
All years 34.26 
(251) 
22.45 
(2 704) 
31.17 
(4 431) 
 
(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
 
The data is congruent with the inference that reelected incumbent premiers do not use their 
staffing powers to ensure responsive competence to the same extent as when an interim premier 
is returned to office following her first electoral victory. This is because the interim premier has 
not yet had the opportunity to pursue her policy agenda. Now having been elected, these former 
interim premiers are now better situated to govern according to their policy agenda. The data 
suggests that this being the case, they also seek to ensure responsiveness towards their agenda 
via a higher number of appointments and reappointments. 
 
Mobility and legislative strength. Research also suggests that a government’s legislative 
strength is related to bureaucratic mobility. In the Schafferian bargain legislative strength should 
ideally have no effect on mobility. During the spoils and managerial bargains however, 
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legislatively weak governments are expected to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel 
to a more limited extent than majority governments.  
 The relationship between mobility and legislative strength is tested in Table 10 by 
comparing levels of mobility during majority, minority and coalition governments. The results 
show only slight variation between majority and minority governments. In the spoils bargain, 
minority governments are associated with lower levels of mobility than majority governments, 
at 10 and 14 percent respectively. This relationship is not found in the Schafferian and 
managerial bargains however, where minority governments actually have slightly higher levels 
of mobility.  
 Mobility under a coalition government is lower in each PSB. In the spoils bargain 
mobility is 10 percent for coalition governments compared to 14 percent for majority 
governments. During the Schafferian bargain coalition governments have a level of mobility of 
nine percent whereas for majority governments it is 18 percent. 
 
Table 10: Mobility and legislative strength of government, 1920-2013 and PSB 
 Majority Minority Coalition 
Spoils-type bargain 13.84 
(2 363) 
 
10.34 
(116) 
10.53 
(437) 
Schafferian bargain 17.93 
(5 097) 
 
20.69 
(348) 
8.82 
(34) 
Managerial bargain 32.63 
(7 468) 
 
34.43 
(549) 
29.41 
(102) 
All years 24.64 
(14 928) 
 
26.95 
(1 013) 
13.79 
(573) 
(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
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As indicated in Table 10, the data for coalition governments from the Schafferian bargain 
constitutes a small number of observations (N=34) obtained from British Columbia in 1950 and 
1951. If analysis of mobility during majority governments is instead restricted to the period of 
the 1950s, the difference between coalition and majority governments is much less pronounced 
and closer in line with theoretical expectations. During the 1950s DM mobility under majority 
governments is 11 percent.  
 In the managerial bargain mobility for coalition governments is slightly lower (29 
percent) than majority (33 percent) and minority governments (34 percent). The difference 
however is not great. One possible explanation for why coalition governments are associated 
with lower levels of mobility but not minority governments is that the approach to governing of 
the former necessitates greater compromise with members from at least one other party, whereas 
minority governments led by only one party, as suggested by Bourgault (2011), may be 
governing the state with the same gusto as majority governments and hence seeking to secure 
loyalty from bureaucrats to their policy agenda. 
 
 
Underlying Motives of Appointments: A Qualitative Assessment 
The evidence above suggests two general conclusions. First, some political dynamics are indeed 
associated with bureaucratic mobility. A transition in the governing party, the partisan nature of 
the party elected, a change in premier as well as the legislative strength of the government, are 
all associated with varying levels of administrative mobility. Meanwhile no clear relationship is 
observed between mobility and the interaction between a transition in party and the length of 
time the previous party was in power.  
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 Yet secondly, the evidence suggests that the nature of the relationship between mobility 
and some of these variables do vary across historical periods. These temporal variances are 
postulated to stem from differences in the contours of PSBs. As shifts take place in the type of 
competency and loyalty governments want to see in bureaucrats, so too are there modifications 
in the extent to which certain political dynamics prod governments to remove incumbents and 
appoint new personnel. For instance, while a simple change in premier from the same party as 
the previous government may lead to an increase in mobility in a bargain emphasizing 
responsive competence to the first minister’s policy agenda, this may not be the case in a bargain 
instead emphasizing partisan loyalty to the party. 
 While the large-n quantitative data presented above is congruent with this argument, it 
does not provide direct evidence of shifts in the strategic considerations of governments that is 
theorized to explain variation in the relationship between politics and mobility across PSBs. 
Qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources provide an additional means to examine 
whether changes in the relationship between politics and mobility across PSBs varies in tandem 
with changes in the type of competency and loyalty desired by governments. This qualitative 
component thus complements the statistical analyses by imparting insight into the underlying 
motivations of governments concerning the staffing of bureaucratic elites across PSBs. The 
findings of this analysis are presented by Public Service Bargain.  
 
The spoils bargain: Unspecified competence and partisan loyalty. Research studying provincial 
politics in the late 19th and early 20th century suggests that the contours of political-
administrative relationships reflected to a great extent a spoils bargain (Dobie 1936; MacKinnon 
1951; Beck 1954; Hodgetts 1955; Scarrow 1957; Hodgetts and Dwivedi 1974; Chandler and 
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Chandler 1982; Granatstein 1982; Heintzman 1983; Gow 1985; Simpson 1988; Love 1988; 
Dyck 1991; Saywell 1991; Edward 2000; McDonald 2009; Banoub 2013).  
 Whereas thanks to the reforms spearheaded by Prime Minister Robert Borden (1911-
1920), federal political-administrative relationships had begun by the 1930s to move away from 
a spoils bargain (Hodgetts et al. 1972; Granatstein 1982), research studying the provinces 
suggests that similar changes did not transpire until the 1950s.38 During the first half of the 20th 
century governance in the provinces was of a minimalist nature. Consequently, governments 
expressed little concern with the competency that administrative officials should possess. More 
imperative was that bureaucrats display a partisan loyalty to the political party in government. 
This led governments to use administrative offices as a means to reward persons for their 
electoral support of the party. As summarized by Dyck in his description of the government’s 
relationship with the bureaucracy: 
 
The functions of provincial governments were minimal until well into the 20th century and 
the number of government departments was small. No particular qualifications were 
required for public employment, and provinces could afford to operate on the ‘spoils 
system’. Under this system, a wholesale turnover of public employees occurred whenever 
the government changed and each new government sought to reward its own friends. As in 
many other areas, the CCF government of Saskatchewan in the 1940s pioneered the first 
modern provincial public service in Canada, emphasizing expertise, permanence, and 
impartiality. (1996, 19) 
 
Public inquiries established by governments during this period also mention the bureaucracy’s 
lack of technical capacity. Like the British Northcote-Trevelyan report some 100 years earlier, 
these reports repeatedly blame such ineptitude on the penchant of governments to staff 
administrative personnel along partisan lines (Nova Scotia 1934; Kidd 1932). For example, a 
commission established by the Government of Newfoundland in the 1930s observed that 
bureaucratic appointments were used to reward partisan loyalty:  
130 
 
The spoils system has for years been in full force in Newfoundland. Given the conception 
that it is quite fair whilst one’s party is in power, to make what one can for oneself and 
one’s friends, it is natural that in the minds of many people politics should be regarded 
simply as job-farming. It has been the practice for each incoming Government to side-track 
or sweep away all Government employees who were either appointed by or were suspected 
of any connection, direct or indirect, with their predecessors, and to replace them with their 
own nominees, irrespective of the qualifications of the latter for the particular appointments 
assigned to them…The educated class, from which the administrative grade of the Civil 
Service is recruited, is very small: the members of it are all known, if not related, to each 
other: everyone knows everyone else’s business and it is a simple matter to ascertain which 
way any particular Civil Servant voted, or if he did not vote, what are the political leanings 
of his family and his relations. If he or they voted the wrong way, then, under the rules of 
the game, he must be deemed to have forfeited his appointment and must make way for a 
personal friend or supporter of the incoming Minister...In the case of the executive staff, 
post-election changes are commonly of a sweeping character…(Amulree 1933, 229-30).  
 
Opposition parties, journalists and interest groups frequently compared the relationship 
governments had with the bureaucracy to the ‘spoils system’ found in the United States and 
spoke against it as both a morally corrupt deed and a praxis linked to inefficient administration. 
In the Ontario legislature, a member of the opposition chastised the Liberal party remarking 
that: 
They have brought into Ontario the spoils system of the United States. Tammany Hall 
politics, if they continue, will destroy the political system of the Province and bring about 
a condition similar to that in the United States. But what do you expect to happend [sic] 
when you have an Administration dismissing hundreds of civil servants and replacing them 
with men whose only asset is their political influence? (The Globe 1935, 12) 
 
 
The ardent preference for partisan loyalty with little concern for any type of competency 
strongly reflects the contours of the spoils bargain. Importantly, the evidence also suggests that 
the appointment of personnel to administrative jobs was influenced by the desire to encourage 
and reinforce such traits within the bureaucracy; the exchange of jobs for support to the political 
party was part of the ‘rules of the game’ and was well understood by the public and 
administrative officials. For example, in his archival research studying the Liberal Party in 
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Alberta during the first half of the 20th century, Thomas comments on letters sent from the public 
as well as public servants to the government petitioning for administrative jobs based on their 
support to the party: 
 
From the moment that Rutherford [1905-1910] was believed to be the next premier he was 
importuned for appointment to the civil service. A few letters have survived....The 
applicants made no attempt to disguise the political nature of such appointments...A well-
equipped applicant for the important post of Deputy Commissioner of Education, already 
holding a responsible position, thought it proper to observe, “I am and always have been an 
ardent Grit. There is no one, in Northern Alberta at least, who will deny the truth of this 
statement. Of course if the Conservatives or the ‘Non-Partisans’ as they now call 
themselves are in the majority of the new Legislature, I hope for no such favours”. (Thomas 
1959, 30)  
 
 
 
The Schafferian bargain: Technical prowess and neutral competence. While in some countries, 
a Weberian bureaucracy has been identified as an important actor bringing about the 
development of the welfare state (Quadagno 1987; Stolleis 2013), in jurisdictions where a 
professional and meritocratic bureaucracy had not yet been established, the causality also ran in 
the other direction (Rothstein 1998). Wanting to extend the state’s involvement in society 
through the implementation of complex economic and social policies, governments became 
increasingly unsatisfied with the inefficiency of the patronage system. George Drew’s 22 Point 
Program and Leslie Frost’s Hospital Insurance and education reforms (Ontario), Jean Lesage’s 
Quiet Revolution (Québec), Walter Shaw’s and Alex Campbell’s Educational and Economic 
reforms (Prince Edward Island), Louis Robichaud’s Equal Opportunity Program (New 
Brunswick), and Tommy Douglas’ (Saskatchewan) Health Act, are all examples of some of the 
major policy initiatives undertaken by provincial governments in the postwar period requiring 
technical knowledge and planning (Young 1987; Morin 1991; Lindquist 2000; Johnson 2004; 
Evans 2008; Pasolli 2009; Murphy 2014; MacLauchlan 2014).  
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 With the nature of governance having shifted in the postwar years from a minimalist 
state to an approach emphasising greater involvement and technical planning, the type of traits 
governments desired the bureaucracy to possess also underwent a marked change. Bureaucratic 
competency went from an unspecified aspect in the spoils bargain, to a clearer stipulation for 
policy-relevant knowledge. Reflecting on the reasons for the change in political-administrative 
relationships in this period, Robert Normand, a deputy minister during the 1970s and 1980s in 
Québec, explained how such a shift in the nature of governance altered political-administrative 
relationships: 
 
C’est essentiellement la croissance du rôle de l’État qui a amené la structuration de la 
fonction publique et l’évanescence des pratiques de patronage que l'on connaissait 
auparavant. Tout un ensemble de facteurs y ont contribué : la naissance de l‘État-providence 
qui a suivi la crise des années 1930, la prise en charge de plusieurs secteurs par les 
gouvernements dans le but de soutenir l’effort de guerre de 1940 à 1945, l’accroissement 
du rôle des communications entre les peuples et la montée du syndicalisme qui remettait en 
cause l’ordre existant; tous ces facteurs favorisaient un accroissement des interventions de 
l’État dans les diverses sphères de l’activité. (Normand 1984, 524) 
 
 
In his history of the public administration in Québec between 1867 and 1970, Gow goes even 
further, pointing out how the development of complex policies and programs in the postwar 
period led to a desire for bureaucrats that possessed policy relevant knowledge. Gow remarks 
that: 
 
In the 1960s, relations between governments and civil servants changed considerably for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the government accepted collective bargaining of working 
conditions in 1965, the result of which was greatly increased job security and a proliferation 
of written material (contracts and regulations) which reinforced the trend towards 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, a new breed of civil servant was introduced at the upper 
echelons, who came to be known as technocrats. While some of these people had the 
scientific and technical training of the traditional specialists, much of the most important 
transformation was the hiring of specialists of the social sciences (economists, sociologists, 
social workers, business administration graduates, town planners and political scientists). 
These people possessed an analytical and planning capacity which, together with an 
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orientation favourable to state intervention, led them to take an entirely new attitude 
towards the private sector. They were prepared to plan for its development and to guide it 
in the name of the general interest which they were also prepared to help define. This 
tendency was eminently suited to the ambitions of the governments of those years, and it 
was widely remarked that the governments of Daniel Johnson [1966-1968] and Jean-
Jacques Bertrand [1968-1970], far from repudiating the policies and appointments of their 
Liberal predecessors, in fact reinforced them. By the end of the decade, many observers felt 
that the real work of government took place within the administration, while the legislators 
played to the gallery. (1985, 263) 
 
 
Importantly, Gow’s observations bring attention to another change in the relationship between 
the government and the bureaucracy during this period. Not only is bureaucratic competency 
now well defined, but governments also desire that administrative officials, on the basis of their 
expertise, have a principal advisory role in the formation of policy.  
 During the Schafferian bargain there is little concern that the roles of bureaucrats and 
politicians reflect the separation of tasks stipulated by the politics-administration dichotomy. 
Rather than being skeptical of the intentions of bureaucrats, governments are comfortable with 
their involvement in the selection of objectives based on their expertise and experience. Former 
DM Robert Normand, notes this changed attitude having taken place amongst politicians in the 
postwar years: 
Mais il n’y a pas que le nombre et la qualité des nouveaux arrivants qui expliquent la monté 
des hauts fonctionnaires; il y a aussi l’attitude des hommes politiques eux-mêmes. Je ne 
prétends pas que la qualité des hommes politiques a baissé au cours des années au profit de 
leurs fonctionnaires, bien au contraire. Je prétends cependant que l’attitude des hommes 
politiques a changé et qu’aujourd’hui ils hésitent beaucoup plus qu’avant à faire usage de 
leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires. La nature ayant horreur du vide, les champs qu’ils ont 
évacués ont été occupés par les fonctionnaires. (Normand 1984, 524-25) 
 
 
134 
 
In his study of political and bureaucratic elites in Ontario based on more than 400 interviews 
and surveys conducted in 1969-1970, Rich made a similar observation as to the role of public 
servants in developing policy, noting that: 
One deputy minister formulated the relationship in this way: “...Basic policy formulation is 
made within departments of government and not at the ministerial level. The minister either 
individually or collectively in cabinet exercised a veto power over the policies formulated 
by senior officials.” This view was rather widely shared by senior officials, and some 
ministers expressed views which were not very different. (1973, 209) 
 
Former Premier of Saskatchewan Allan Blakeney (1971-1982) also makes a comparable point. 
Drawing upon his time as a Minister in the 1960s, prior to becoming Premier, Blakeney depicts 
the ideal relationship between civil servants and politicians concerning the development of 
policy, placing civil servants and their expertise at the centre: 
The minister must be attuned to the views of the public and he must inject this element into 
the final determination of the departmental policy. To be attuned to public views, a minister 
must have time and he must have opportunity to consult, to circulate, and to listen. He must 
be in the position of receiving the signals from both the general public and the particular 
publics which his department serve. This also means, and let me stress this point, that the 
minister must hold himself aloof from the decision-making process until that process is in 
its final stages…The minister who permits himself to be enmeshed in that process finds that 
he has no time to perform his political function…How, then, do the permanent head and his 
senior division or branch heads best serve the minister? I believe that they should put 
forward to the minister recommendations based upon their best technical judgment 
tempered by their view of public reaction. Alternatively, they should frame their 
recommendations in two sets, one based upon technical considerations and the other 
introducing the element of public acceptability. (emphasis added, 1972, 43-44) 
 
 
Research from this period also generally describes political-administrative relationships as 
undergoing a shift in the loyalty of civil servants. The expectation that civil servants are loyal 
to the party in a personal manner has been replaced with the belief that bureaucrats should 
develop their professional opinion on the basis of their expertise and experience, and not 
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according to the political leanings of the government. Civil servants thus advise governments 
with the same candid spirit regardless of who is in power. Studying the staffing of DMs in BC 
under the NDP government during this period, Brand notes that: 
 
The persons sought to staff these units were individuals highly trained in the use of 
mathematical models, statistics, programme budgeting, and report writing and not people 
whose primary qualification for the job was their sympathy for the government’s policy 
objectives. (1974, 63) 
 
 
Significantly, being expected to advise all governments with the same professional and 
impersonal demeanour leads bureaucrats to develop a loyalty that is clearly beyond the party in 
power or the individual at the head of government. In many cases, descriptions during this era 
indicate a loyalty to the state (that is distinguishable from the government), their department or 
their profession. Loyalty to an entity beyond the government’s party or the premier’s policy 
agenda has corroborated the ability of civil servants to be seen as neutral and independent 
mandarins capable of serving those in government in an impersonal and professional manner. 
In contrast to the managerial bargain where loyalty is oriented to the policy agenda of the 
government, here politicians expect otherwise. Based on developing advice according to their 
expertise, civil servants in this era are expected to take what British Cabinet Secretary Sir 
Edward Bridges (1950) referred to in his treatise A Portrait of a Profession as a “departmental 
philosophy” (discussed in Chapter 2, p. 63). 
 Serial loyalty to the office of government thus encourages a loyalty that is independent 
of the government.  To use the terms of Hood and Lodge, the independent ‘judge-like’ loyalty 
of DMs found in Schafferian bargain encourages a ‘serial monogamous’ propensity of 
bureaucrats to serve differing governments with equal professionalism (Hood and Lodge 2006, 
117). Basing their advice on their expertise and experience gained from within the civil service 
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is incompatible with a partisan loyalty to a particular party or a particular policy agenda dictated 
by the government. In their study of bureaucratic elites in Alberta during this period, Richards 
and Pratt note that loyalty was oriented to the office of the state, not to the party or the policy 
agenda of any particular head of government: 
 
Confident of its own administrative competence and committed to a provincial strategy of 
development, this state-administrative elite sees Alberta as the logical arena for the 
advancement of its career opportunities and, like its private-sector counterparts, it is fiercely 
loyal to the province as a semi-sovereign political entity and deeply involved in the process 
of “province building”. (1979, 167-68) 
 
Based on his experience as DM in Saskatchewan, Johnson comments as to the likelihood for a 
DM to develop a departmental point of view. He determines that: 
And in fact he will. For one of his prime tasks is to try to develop an appreciation of long-
run social and economic trends as they affect or will affect the policies of his department. 
And then he evaluates these policies in that context…As for the minister, he would be more 
than surprised if his deputy seemed not to have a loyalty to his policies, or for that matter a 
taste for the “political facts of life”. (1961, 364)  
 
 
Grounding advice on their technical expertise and experience, and exhibiting a loyalty to an 
entity beyond the party in power or the policy agenda of the premier is emblematic of civil 
servants loyally serving any government of the day with a frank and open demeanour. As stated 
in his description of relationships with civil servants, Minister of Municipal Affairs in Ontario 
during the 1960s, Darcy W. McKeough, specified that: 
There is of course nothing irregular in senior civil servants offering advice to the 
government, particularly to their ministers...he cannot, unless he is a super being of some 
kind, ignore the collective wisdom and experience of his senior civil servants...This is not 
to say that the civil servant or the minister should be ‘yes-men’ for each other. What there 
must be is an inter-play of ideas, of suggestions, perhaps even argument, without turning 
into a full-scale and acrimonious debate…When a minister and his senior official disagree, 
the official should not resign but should set out his views clearly to his minister. Then, if 
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after due consideration his views are overruled, he should do his level best to carry out the 
policy of the government even thought [sic] he might not be in personal agreement with it. 
In my own operation, I have gone a step further. I have told my staff, “Don’t look to me for 
‘ideas’ – that’s your job. I may be capable of producing one of a hundred, if that. You bring 
them forward. It’s my job to decide what we carry forward - what we will sell - to Cabinet, 
to caucus, to the public - but don’t expect the politician to have all the ideas. I want bright 
people around me with bright ideas.” (1969, 3-4) 
 
In contrast to the managerial bargain, where detailed knowledge of issues and a propensity to 
provide honest advice to governments on the basis of such expertise is viewed by governments 
as indicative of information asymmetry and goal conflict needing to be controlled, this is not 
the case in the Schafferian bargain. Desiring that officials possess technical capacity and exhibit 
a willingness to provide candid expert advice, governments refrain from removing bureaucratic 
elites from their positions so as to foster such competency and loyalty.  
 Premier of New Brunswick Louis J. Robichaud (1960-1970) recognized that his 
ambitious policy objectives required greater bureaucratic capacity, and stated that the political 
leanings of personnel were of no concern: 
The new recruitment, and the use of dedicated staff already employed in the public service 
when we came to office, made it possible to create the administrative framework without 
which it would have been impossible to implement the massive legislative program which 
Equal Opportunity involved. It was indicative of the new administration’s attitude toward 
government that the political background of the teams of specialists was of no concern. The 
only prerequisites for employment were the ability to get things done and the acceptance of 
new challenges and new ideas and new solutions to both old and new problems. (as cited 
in, Pasolli 2009, 150) 
 
Evidence that the decision to retain civil servants due to their unique loyalty and competency is 
observed in Premier Richard Hatfield of New Brunswick (1970-1987) pronouncing in no 
uncertain terms, “I can’t understand why some political leaders insist on clearing out the upper 
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echelon of the public service when they come into office. You are just not able to pick up a 
deputy minister caliber individual on a street corner” (as cited in Savoie 1989, 40).  
 Equally supportive is that when Premier Edward Schreyer (1969-1977) of Manitoba was 
urged by political staffer Herb Schulz to boost the bureaucracy’s responsiveness by firing some 
elite bureaucrats, Premier Schreyer rejected the idea asserting that, “civil servants are employed 
for their technical qualifications and if we wish to encourage them to advise us, they must be 
protected against arbitrary dismissal...I say this with all the emphasis I can muster, THERE 
WILL BE NO POLITICAL FIRINGS” (emphasis in the original, Schulz 2005, 274).  
 This evidence above suggests that the strategic decision not to remove incumbents is 
congruent with a Schafferian bargain where governments desire bureaucrats who possess policy 
expertise and have a disposition to advise governments in a candid and impersonal manner on 
the basis on such expertise. To remove incumbents would not only weaken their policy specific 
expertise and experience, but would run the risk of destroying their propensity to provide 
forthright advice due to the fear that doing so could result in a demotion or outright dismissal. 
As stated a few years later by a former deputy minister in response to bureaucratic dismissals 
by Premier Frank McKenna in New Brunswick, “The public is not well served when you put an 
irrational fear of God into the minds of public servants. Dismissal of civil servants serves a 
political interest. It does not serve the interest of the public or of good government” (as cited in 
Lee 2001, 206). And again, more recently speaking of changes since the 1980s he has observed 
from his own experience as a civil servant, Jeff Patch stated that, “those who move up through 
the system and those who are given greater responsibility and are moved to what would be more 
favourable positions, are more likely those who would go with the flow rather than those who 
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would give feedback that is not consistent with what a minister would want to hear” (CBC 2014, 
par. 4). 
 Despite the general tendencies identified above, not all accounts of political-
administrative relationships between the 1950s and 1970s consulted in this qualitative analysis 
perfectly describe the principles of a Schafferian bargain. In his study of administrative elites in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Dunn (2014) notes that while the professionalism of the civil 
service did improve in the postwar years, the practice of awarding DM positions to reward 
support to the party was still evident in the 1950s. Furthermore, DMs under Premier Smallwood 
(1949-1972) played a reduced role in the development of policy. Dunn notes that a change in 
political-administrative relationship reflecting a Schafferian bargain described above did 
eventually occur, but this did not take place until the 1970s.39 Nonetheless, on the whole, 
evidence from the qualitative descriptions suggests that in the postwar years political-
administrative relationships did generally move away from the principles of a spoils bargain to 
that reflecting a Schafferian bargain. Wanting to harness amongst bureaucratic elites both 
expertise and a willingness to provide honest counsel, governments in the postwar period until 
the beginning of the 1980s did generally refrained from removing administrative personnel from 
their positions to a greater degree than was the case during the spoils bargain, and, as will be 
shown below, the managerial bargain. 
 
Managerial bargain: General manager and responsive competence. Evidence suggests that 
since the 1980s there has been a transformation in political-administrative relationships 
reflecting the principles of a managerial PSB.  A wave of newly elected premiers from various 
political parties expressed a newfound distrust of the bureaucracy. Critically, permanency of 
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position became seen as impeding the ability of democratically elected representatives to govern 
as well as responsible for producing various government inefficiencies (Lindquist 2000; Neilson 
1990).  
 Expertise and experience of policies were replaced with a preference for a ‘deliverer’ 
competency emphasizing the ability to take the government’s directives and ensure that 
resources were properly mobilized so as to realize objectives. Detailed knowledge of a 
department’s past policies and programs, which, just a short time ago under the Schafferian 
bargain had been welcomed, was now believed to be a source of bureaucratic power impeding 
the government’s ability to effectively realize its policy agenda. Whereas the notion that 
bureaucrats would have ideas and opinions that were different than the government during the 
Schafferian bargain was seen as acceptable and desirable due to their expertise, in the 
managerial bargain any view expressed by bureaucrats that was contrary to the government was 
now likely to be seen negatively negating the principle that governments set the policy agenda 
and bureaucrats manage resources towards this end. In other words, political-administrative 
relationships now closely reflect principal-agent theory, presuming that governments have a 
preference of responsive competence from bureaucrats, that is that they enthusiastically 
implement the government’s directives.  
 Evidence from the provinces supports the inference that since the 1980s, information 
asymmetry and goal conflict were seen as pathological and in need of subduing. In their study 
of Premier Grant Devine (1982-1991) in Saskatchewan, Michelmann and Steevs conclude that 
information asymmetry was one of the chief attributes the government sought to curb, remarking 
that:  
…the incoming ministers were acutely aware of their inexperience in governing, and felt 
vulnerable toward senior officials they did not trust. This fear, at least in a number of cases, 
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outweighed the policy expertise consideration that had induced some Conservatives to 
counsel caution. In the background, moreover, was the ever-present, almost haunting 
experience of the Clark government, and even, as a cabinet minister explained, the Thatcher 
government in Britain, both of which had, according to him, great difficulties because they 
had not made the necessary changes in their respective bureaucracies. (1985, 8) 
 
Evidence also supports the claim that in the managerial bargain the policy agenda is already 
presented to the bureaucracy fait accompli. Research largely confirms that governments are 
‘policy givers’ whereas civil servants are ‘policy takers’. One elite bureaucrat from the executive 
council in Alberta in the early 1980s described the new relationship between the bureaucracy 
and the government stating that “We stay right out of policy review and creation. We are an 
administrative operation. We won’t talk about the pros and cons of policy itself” (Bojechko 
1982, 23). Such an admission from a member of the executive council offers a striking contrast 
to the involvement of DMs in the development of policy favourably shown during the 
Schafferian bargain. One political reporter described changes in Ontario under Premier Mike 
Harris (1995-2002) noted that: 
 
…even impartial observers agree that the changes – both the numbers and the individuals 
involved – are part of a major alteration in the relationship between senior bureaucrats and 
politicians and their aides. Under the Conservatives, the bureaucrats have been all but 
excluded from policy development. Instead, they are expected to find the best ways of 
implementing the policies, even if they might have doubts about their wisdom....They [the 
government] defend their changes as an overdue rebalancing of the levers of government 
to ensure that elected representatives can implement the policies they promised their 
constituents. (Mackie 1997) 
 
 
Evidence suggests that this change in the contours of political-administrative relationships was 
not limited to governments on the ideological right. Similar alterations are detected under NDP 
Premier Bob Rae (1990-1995). A former deputy minister described such distrust towards the 
bureaucracy lamenting that, “The minister doesn’t believe a word I’m saying…many of the new 
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ministers, wear on their sleeves this suspicion [i.e. the intentions of deputy ministers], 
sometimes bordering on hostility” (Allen 1991). Furthermore, almost perfectly reflecting the 
public choice undertones of principal-agent theory, the NDP identified the failures of past 
governments as a result of information asymmetry and goal conflict, which favoured the ability 
of bureaucrats to thwart the government’s objectives. Based on interviews with civil servants 
and political staffers, one observer noted that: 
 
they [the NDP government] believe that the government of David Peterson lost its way 
between 1987 and 1990, mainly because it became a prisoner of the pet policies of the 
senior bureaucrats in each ministry. This government, they vowed, would set clear overall 
directions centrally through cabinet and ask the ministry experts to come up with ways of 
putting them into effect. (Allen 1991) 
 
One bureaucrat having served various governments in Québec since the postwar years described 
the recent reforms in political-administrative relationships by governments as constituting ‘the 
twilight of the mandarins’, and based on interviews with DMs who had served the government 
during the era of the Schafferian bargain, remarked that “from an unquestioned position of 
authority, the senior civil servants are now simply one part of a complex process of decision-
making that involves greater participation by ministers of state...and the political staff of 
ministers” (Fraser 1981). 
 Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador Brian Peckford also expanded his source of 
policy advice. Whereas when Peckford first took power in 1979 he spoke of staffing DMs in a 
manner of fostering independent advice congruent with the features of a Schafferian bargain, 
stating that “I encouraged a lot of internal promotion from within departments. I wanted 
independent people; I didn't want people who would just agree with me” (as cited in Dunn 2014, 
30), he had by the mid-1980s now preferred to develop policy from a small group of a few 
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political advisors and ministers within cabinet. Accordingly, this group began internal reviews 
of DMs according to their performance, deciding to demote, promote and dismiss DMs 
accordingly (Dunn 2014).  
 Alongside a change in competency from one emphasizing expertise and experience to 
one emphasizing the ability to realize objectives by managing personnel and resources, is a 
complementary change in the loyalty of the bureaucracy. No longer do governments desire 
officials to impersonally advise them in a demeanor reflecting a degree of independence and a 
willingness to speak truth to power. Doing so in fact is now seen as reflecting bureaucratic drift 
and contrary to the principle of top-down democracy, whereby the government sets the policy 
objectives and bureaucrats ensure that objectives are attained. Instead, governments in the 
managerial bargain now desire an executive type of loyalty, in which officials express a clear 
commitment to the policy agenda set by the head of government.  
 This executive loyalty to the head of government and her policy agenda is different than 
the spoils bargain where loyalty is to the political party. During the managerial bargain, whether 
one is a Tory or Grit is of no concern. Just as Margret Thatcher wanted to ensure that 
administrative elites be ‘one of us’, more important for heads of government in the managerial 
bargain is that DMs enthusiastically work towards the government’s policy agenda. Whereas 
under the Schafferian bargain, civil servants would be encouraged to offer candid policy advice 
that questioned the principles of policy decisions, such actions are now viewed as usurping 
democracy and the rule of the government. With the policy agenda now coming down from the 
head of government rather than percolating up from the departments, bureaucratic elites are to 
restrict their efforts to realizing the government’s objectives. For instance, a former principal 
secretary to Ontario Premier William Davis (1971-1985) noted that the new actions undertaken 
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by various governments were altering the working relationships between politicians and 
bureaucrats, and that “there is relatively little active opposition among civil servants to the 
government’s wishes” (Allen 1991). 
 Evidence suggests that these changes were undertaken by governments regardless of the 
party in power. In B.C. the Social Credit government sought to ensure that DMs were ‘on side’ 
concerning the government’s policy agenda (Ruff 1996, 170). In Ontario, Premier Mike Harris, 
explained his decisions concerning the staffing administrative elites stating, “What we will truly 
rely on is who is the professional within the bureaucracy? Who are the best? Who are good? 
Who understands the agenda? ... That’s more important than whether they were brought in under 
the Liberals or the NDP” (emphasis added, Mittelstaedt and Rusk 1995). The same is also 
reflected in descriptions by civil servants who admitted that now they were to be judged upon 
“the bases of two criteria: competence and the degree of comfort with the policy directions of 
the Common Sense Revolution [the Conservative policy agenda]” (Mackie 1997). Likewise, 
upon taking power in Manitoba, NDP premier Howard Pawley (1981-1988) dismissed several 
incumbent civil servants including DMs that had served Liberal, Conservative and even 
previous NDP governments over the last 20 years, and justified such decisions stating that 
executive bureaucrats must be compatible with the minister and the direction of policy 
spearheaded by the government (Cleroux 1982, 12). Evidence not only supports the view that 
governments on the ideological left strategically used the appointments control the bureaucracy, 
but also suggests that they did so even when civil servants had worked previously for the same 
party but under a different premier. 
 Premier Frank McKenna (1987-1997) of New Brunswick spoke of his manipulation of 
administrative personnel as a means to ensure loyalty to his agenda, and explained that “We 
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wanted loyal people who would work with us, and we wanted to send a signal to the system and 
to the province that things were different” (Lee 2001, 206). When asked whether he regretted 
dismissing incumbent DMs upon taking power in 1987, McKenna stated frankly: 
 
No. The only regret I have is that I did not get rid of more of them. I say this not for partisan 
reasons. Running government is in many ways like running a large business. You need 
competent and highly motivated people. (Savoie 2001, 86) 
 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Savoie, McKenna made such moves to ensure the bureaucracy was 
responsive to his policy agenda: 
 
McKenna’s clear preference was for “responsive competence” rather than “neutral 
competence.” The former is geared to the priorities of the political power of the day, while 
the latter speaks to the importance of unbiased advice, of speaking truth to power and 
maintaining the more traditional values of public service. McKenna had a strong bias for 
action and he expected the public service to fall in step. He knew what he wanted to 
accomplish and had little patience with public servants who were trained to see all sides of 
an issue and took professional pride in having a proper sense of detachment and 
nonpartisanship. (Savoie 2001, 87) 
 
 
Observers also noted that the removal of incumbents by the Conservative government in Ontario 
was undertaken with the intention to “cut the power of the bureaucracy, especially its ability to 
challenge government policies” (emphasis added, Mackie 1997). Based on interviews with DMs 
and his experience as a consultant for several heads of government in Canada as well as beyond, 
Plumptre spoke of the strategic reason behind such bureaucratic reappointment in a similar 
manner: 
 
What is to be gained by rotating deputy ministers? Perhaps changing DMS is thought by 
the prime minister to help put a new face on the government, rather like shuffling ministers. 
Some politicians may have a somewhat perverse fear that if DMS are too knowledgeable 
about their departments, their expertise could overpower that of their ministers. Some 
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turnover of deputy ministers is doubtless needed to prevent some departments’ policies 
from becoming too set in a particular course. (1987, 380) 
 
 
Appointing administrative elites who were ‘on side’ with the government’s policy agenda was 
thus seen as an effective means to discourage the bureaucracy from developing loyalty 
elsewhere (such as for example Bridges’ ‘departmental philosophy’) and encourage 
commitment to government’s policy agenda.  
 Finally, former Premier Tommy Douglas, not only the founder of the modern Medicare 
system in Canada but one of the early reformers leading to the Schafferian bargain in 
Saskatchewan (for detailed discussion of Douglas’ reforms to the bureaucracy in Saskatchewan 
see, Johnson 2004), and described by Dyck as “emphasizing expertise, permanence, and 
impartiality” (1996, 19) in the bureaucracy, had, by the 1970s, changed his outlook concerning 
the nature of political-administrative relationships. Some thirty years after he had first broke 
ways with the spoils bargain and had embarked upon establishing political-administrative 
relationships reflecting the principles of the Schafferian bargain, Douglas now viewed political-
administrative relationships in a manner congruent with a managerial bargain. Emphasizing the 
importance of using administrative offices as a means to encourage responsiveness to the 
government’s policy agenda and mitigate goal conflict and information asymmetry, Douglas 
confided in Premier Edward Schreyer that: 
 
When the people change government fundamentally, they expect fundamental change in 
government. This will not occur unless you change your senior administrators…there is a 
tendency, human but unfortunate in this case, for public servants to become so identified 
with, and so protective of, the programs they have been administering that they become 
obstacles to changes determined upon them by a newly-elected government. (as cited in 
Schulz 2005, 266-67) 
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Concerning the staffing of DMs Douglas advised Schreyer that in order to ensure the adequacy 
of the bureaucracy’s advice and compliance from public servants that he “find deputy ministers 
on whom you can depend explicitly. Competence is of essence but you are undertaking a small 
revolution and ideology will prove of importance” (Schulz 2005, 268). 
 
 
Conclusion of Chapter Four 
This chapter conducted a first set of empirical tests to examine whether the relationship between 
politics and bureaucratic mobility has changed over time across differing Public Service 
Bargains. Using descriptive statistics mobility was found to be associated with a transition in 
the governing party, a transition in the governing party and the partisan ideology of government, 
a change in premier, and the legislative strength of government. Importantly, the extent to which 
some of these dynamics were associated with mobility was found to vary across PSBs.  
 The evidence suggests that during the spoils bargain changes in the governing party had 
the greatest effect on mobility. When transitions in government were analyzed separately for 
each party the evidence suggests that the Liberal party was associated with higher levels of 
mobility than most other parties. During the Schafferian bargain, while some political dynamics 
were found to affect mobility, in particular changes in the governing party, the level of mobility 
associated with these dynamics was much lower than in other periods. Finally, in the managerial 
bargain, political dynamics once again were found to have a stronger association with mobility, 
in particular changes in the governing party as well as newly elected premiers. 
 In addition to descriptive statistics, this chapter also provides a qualitative analysis to 
ascertain whether variation in the relationship between mobility and politics over time reflects 
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changes in the contours of political-administrative relationships, specifically the nature of the 
bureaucracy’s competency and loyalty desired by governments. The results from the qualitative 
investigation lend additional support to the claim that as the contours of PSBs have shifted over 
time, so too, have there been changes in the extent to which political dynamics prod 
governments to strategically remove and appoint administrative elites. 
 While generally supportive of the conclusion that the relationship between certain 
political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility varies across PSBs, the evidence presented in this 
chapter does not test the competing strength of explanatory variables nor does it control for 
alternative explanations of mobility identified by organization and management studies. The 
next chapter provides a more arduous assessment by simultaneously testing competing variables 
as well as controlling for alternative predictors with the use of statistical regressions. 
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 Chapter 4 Appendix I  
 
Table 11: Annual mobility by decade, change in party. 
 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
No party 
change 
 
11.33 
(697) 
11.08 
(848) 
13.30 
(1 098) 
10.82 
(1 451) 
14.13 
(1 684) 
26.20 
(1 916) 
27.85 
(2 201) 
33.55 
(2 125) 
33.10 
(3 039) 
Party change 20.00 
(80) 
 
28.70 
(115) 
21.79 
(78) 
15.38 
(78) 
17.48 
(103) 
25.10 
(247) 
37.78 
(180) 
41.20 
(216) 
46.65 
(358) 
(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
 
Table 12: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier. 
 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
No premier 
change 
11.86 
(641) 
 
10.69 
(786) 
13.78 
(965) 
10.85 
(1 419) 
14.28 
(1 569) 
26.32 
(1 850) 
27.89 
(2 105) 
31.98 
(1 848) 
32.34 
(2 777) 
Premier change 13.97 
(136) 
 
24.29 
(177) 
14.22 
(211) 
13.64 
(110) 
14.68 
(218) 
24.60 
(313) 
34.06 
(276) 
42.80 
(493) 
44.35 
(620) 
Premier change 
no change in 
party 
5.36 
(56) 
13.89 
(72) 
9.77 
(133) 
13.33 
(45) 
12.17 
(115) 
22.73 
(66) 
27.08 
(96) 
44.04 
(277) 
38.19 
(309) 
(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses) 
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Chapter 4 Appendix II 
 
Figure 8: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013. 
 
 
Figure 9: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, spoils PSB 
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Figure 10: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, Schafferian PSB 
 
 
Figure 11: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, managerial PSB 
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Chapter 4 Appendix III 
 
Table 13: Mobility discriminating for political party by PSB 
PSB Party in Power Change in Party All Observations 
  Yes No  
                      
Spoils-type 
bargain 
Conservative 16.88 
(77) 
 
15.16 
(488) 
15.4 
(565) 
Liberal 31.43 
(105) 
 
11.27 
(1 304) 
12.78 
(1 409) 
CCF/NDP 27.78 
(18) 
 
20.69 
(87) 
21.9 
(105) 
United Farmers/ 
Progressive 
17.24 
(29) 
 
11.26 
(444) 
11.63 
(478) 
Social Credit 25.00 
(12) 
 
9.84 
(193) 
10.73 
(205) 
Union Nationale 21.88 
(32) 
 
8.66 
(127) 
11.32 
(159) 
 Average 24.18 
(273) 
 
12.07 
(2 643) 
13.20 
(2 916) 
Schafferian 
bargain 
Conservative 19.19 
(172) 
 
20.30 
(1 793) 
20.20 
(1 965) 
Liberal 20.75 
(106) 
 
15.57 
(1 413) 
15.93 
(1 519) 
CCF/NDP 23.53 
(51) 
 
23.78 
(614) 
23. 76 
(665) 
United Farmers 
 
23.08 
(13) 
 
6.90 
(87) 
9.00 
(100) 
Social Credit 26.19 
(42) 
 
13.86 
(808) 
14.47 
(850) 
Union Nationale 9.09 
(22) 
 
9.70 
(268) 
9.66 
(290) 
Parti Québécois 40.91 
(22) 
 
33.82 
(68) 
35.56 
(90) 
 Average 21.50 
(428) 
 
17.76 
(5 051) 
18.05 
(5 479) 
Managerial 
bargain 
Conservative 47.83 
(207) 
 
28.62 
(3 438) 
29.71 
(3 645) 
Liberal 36.50 
(263) 
 
34.41 
(2 017) 
34.65 
(2 280) 
CCF/NDP 38.61 
(202) 
 
33.22 
(1 189) 
34.00 
(1 391) 
Parti Québécois 63.64 36.78 40.45 
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PSB Party in Power Change in Party All Observations 
  Yes No  
                      
(55) 
 
(348) (403) 
Saskatchewan Party 59.26 
(27) 
 
30.00 
(120) 
35.37 
(147) 
 Average 42.97 
(754) 
 
31.66 
(7 365) 
32.71 
(8 119) 
All years Conservative 31.80 
(456) 
 
24.86 
(5 719) 
25.38 
(6 175) 
Liberal 31.86 
(474) 
 
22.41 
(4 734) 
23.27 
(5 208) 
CCF/NDP 35.06 
(271) 
 
29.58 
(1 890) 
30.26 
(2 161) 
United Farmers/ 
Progressive 
 
19.05 
(42) 
 
10.55 
(531) 
11.17 
(573) 
Social Credit 25.93 
(54) 
 
18.02 
(1 254) 
18.35 
(1 308) 
Union Nationale 16.67 
(54) 
 
9.37 
(395) 
10.24 
(449) 
Parti Québécois 57.14 
(77) 
 
36.30 
(416) 
39.55 
(493) 
Saskatchewan Party 59.26 
(27) 
 
30.00 
(120) 
35.37 
(147) 
 Average 33.13 
(1 455) 
23.56 
(15 059) 
24.4 
(16 514) 
(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parenthesis) 
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Chapter 5. The Politics of Mobility: A Difficult Test of Competing 
Explanations 
 
Chapter five summary. Using descriptive statistics the previous chapter identified important 
variances in the relationship between politics and bureaucratic mobility across the spoils, 
Schafferian and managerial PSBs. This chapter further scrutinizes these findings by using 
statistical regression to test the association between political dynamics and mobility while 
controlling for additional variables possibly affecting mobility identified by organization and 
management studies. 
 Even when controlling for these alternative factors, the empirical evidence supports the 
conclusion that the nature with which politics affects bureaucratic mobility has varied over time 
across distinct PSBs. During the spoils bargain a transition in the governing party has a 
significant and positive relationship with mobility, while a change in premier has none. The 
association between political dynamics and mobility is severally reduced during the Schafferian 
bargain, producing few significant results. Meanwhile in the managerial bargain, a newly 
elected premier, regardless of whether or not the governing party has changed, has a strong 
association with mobility.  
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Regression Models 
The evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that the relationship between mobility and some key political 
variables does vary across historically contingent PSBs. Greater confidence can be placed in 
these conclusions by testing hypotheses while controlling for alternative factors that may also 
affect mobility. In this chapter mobility is regressed against the key political dynamics examined 
in the previous chapter in a series of models. Each model is regressed separately in the spoils 
(Models 1-7.A), Schafferian (Models 1-7.B) and the managerial bargains (Models 1-7.C).40 
 Each model includes a number of control variables. These are: an election, the gender of 
the person in the DM position the previous year, the length of time since there has been a change 
in the DM position, the number of departments in the province (lagged one year), the age of the 
department (lagged one year), percentage change in GDP, and the province (dummy variables 
using Ontario as the reference group). As mentioned in Chapter 3, to address the problem of 
serial correlation a cubic polynomial of time has been used (attained by additionally including 
time since a change in DM position squared and cubed). To address the potential problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity a random effects model is used and standard errors have been 
clustered at the provincial level.  
 In Model 1 mobility is regressed on a change in government. Model 2 regresses mobility 
against a transition in party with an interaction measuring the time the previous party was in 
power (referred to in the regression tables as ‘entrenchment’). Coded in the model as a 
continuous variable, the time of party entrenchment was alternatively coded using ordinals of 
1-4; 5-8; 9-12 and greater than 13 years, as presented in Chapter 4. The results remained 
unchanged (statistically insignificant) and are not reported. Model 3 and 4 examine whether 
mobility is greater for some political parties than others. Model 3 introduces dummy variables 
156 
 
for each party (Conservative Party used as a reference group), which is useful to examine 
whether mobility is greater under some parties than others in all years. Noting however, that 
mobility may be the greatest when governments first come to power, Model 4 uses an interaction 
term between transition in party and the partisan nature of each party. This model compares 
whether mobility is higher when a particular party comes to power relative to other years for 
this party. The results of the first four models are presented in Table 14.  
 The relationship between mobility and a change in premier is examined by regressing 
mobility against all changes in premier in Model 5 and additionally in Model 6 which adds the 
arrival of an interim premier as a control. Model 7 adds the legislative strength of the 
government using dummy variables (majority is the reference group). The results from Models 
5 through 7 for each PSB are presented in Table 15.  
 The results report odds ratios. As explained in Chapter 3 (p. 95), a number greater than 
one indicates a positive association whereas a number less than one points towards a negative 
relationship. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates no change in the likelihood of mobility. In addition 
to odds ratio the predicted probability of mobility for key variables is also included. As described 
in Chapter 3 several alternative models encompassing alternative coding of some variables as 
well as a fixed effects model were tested to determine the robustness of the results. In none of 
these alternate approaches were the main results substantially altered. 
 
Spoils bargain. The results from the regression models generally confirm inferences made in 
the previous chapter concerning the relationship between political dynamics and mobility during 
the spoils bargain. The results show that overall a transition in the governing party has a strong 
association with mobility. In Model 1.A, even when controlling for various alternative factors, 
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a change in the governing party increases the odds of mobility by approximately 100 percent 
relative to when there is no such change. As expected, the length of time the previous 
government was in power does not have a statistically significant relationship with mobility. 
These relationships are congruent with the spoils bargain, where the government’s intention in 
appointing persons to bureaucratic offices is to encourage partisan support to the party and not 
to diminish the power of the bureaucracy and ensure loyalty to any particular policy agenda.  
 The findings also show that when first forming government some parties are associated 
with higher levels of mobility than others, although not along lines of a clear right/left political 
ideology. Model 3.A suggests that when examining mobility for all years there are only slight 
differences between parties, a finding also shown in Figure 6 (Chapter 4, p. 115). Theoretically, 
it is expected that governments will nominate and remove administrative elites when they first 
gain power. This is first tested in Model 4.A by including an interaction between a transition in 
the governing party and the political party that took power. The results support the conclusion 
made in Chapter 4 based on the descriptive statistics. Mobility when the Conservative Party first 
forms government is significantly lower than that of the Liberal Party and Social Credit. The 
findings clarify that while mobility during the spoils bargain does increase when there is a 
change in the governing party, the degree of mobility is not as great for the Conservative Party 
compared to others, thus supporting earlier research suggesting that until the first half of the 20th 
century, the Liberal Party practiced patronage to a greater extent than others, and most notably 
the Conservative Party (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; Smith 1975; 
English 1977; Campbell 1988; Dutil and MacKenzie 2011). 
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Table 14: Mobility, logistic regression models 1-4 across PSBs 
  
Spoils Bargain 
 
 
Schafferian Bargain 
 
Managerial Bargain 
                                 
 Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  
Covariates 1.A 2.A 3.A 4.A 1.B 2.B 3.B 4.B 1.C 2.C 3.C 4.C 
             
party change 
 
2.08*** 
(.427) 
1.78 
(.543) 
 
2.05*** 
(.411) 
.94 
(.368) 
1.66* 
(.392) 
.92 
(.380) 
1.51* 
(.300) 
1.23 
(.515) 
1.47** 
(.279) 
1.70 
(.471) 
1.45 
(.282) 
2.40*** 
(.509) 
entrenchment  .99 
(.008) 
 
   .98 
(.019) 
   1.00 
(.014) 
  
party change x 
entrenchment 
 1.02 
(.014) 
   1.05 
(.029) 
   .99 
(.022) 
  
 
PC (reference) 
 
 
            
Liberal   .85 
(.129) 
.66** 
(.090) 
 
  .72** 
(.088) 
.69** 
(.092) 
  1.134 
(.243) 
1.27 
(.239) 
CCF/NDP   1.76** 
(.350) 
1.88* 
(.536) 
 
  .65** 
(.083) 
.63** 
(.094) 
  1.09 
(.241) 
1.23 
(.269) 
United Farmer/ 
Progressive 
  .76 
(.350) 
.64 
(.221) 
 
  .28*** 
(.032) 
.20*** 
(.022) 
    
Social Credit   .58 
(.220) 
.46* 
(.167) 
 
  .671 
(.171) 
.66 
(.169) 
  .92 
(.144) 
.98 
(.149) 
Sask. Party 
 
          1.00 
(.162) 
.91 
(.149) 
 
UN   .58* 
(.140) 
.50* 
(.162) 
 
  .21*** 
(.030) 
.21*** 
(.031) 
    
PQ       1.07 
(.150) 
1.02 
(.153) 
  1.48 
(.309) 
1.43 
(.279) 
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Spoils Bargain 
 
 
Schafferian Bargain 
 
Managerial Bargain 
                                 
 Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  
Covariates 1.A 2.A 3.A 4.A 1.B 2.B 3.B 4.B 1.C 2.C 3.C 4.C 
party change x  
PC (reference) 
 
            
party change x       
Liberal 
   3.92* 
(2.41) 
 
   1.38 
(.673) 
   .41** 
(.121) 
party change x 
CCF/NDP 
   .652 
(.356) 
 
 
  1.26 
(.881) 
   .43 
(.216) 
party change x 
United 
Farmers/Progressive 
 
 
  1.97 
(.937) 
   4.18** 
(1.74) 
    
party change x 
Social Credit 
 
   3.68** 
(1.654) 
   1.25 
(.504) 
   1.31 
(.27) 
party change x 
Sask. Party 
 
           1.15 
(.247) 
party change x UN  
 
 2.51 
(1.30) 
 
   1.07 
(.416) 
    
party change x PQ        1.37 
(.634) 
 
   1.15 
(.247) 
 
election 
1.17 
(.150) 
1.19 
(.156) 
1.17 
(.152) 
1.17 
(.157) 
 
.74* 
(.100) 
.74* 
(.103) 
.73** 
(.089) 
.74* 
(.100) 
1.47* 
(.279) 
1.18 
(.189) 
1.19 
(.190) 
1.19 
(.193) 
number of  
departments   t-1 
 
1.08 
(.091) 
 
1.07 
(.086) 
1.07 
(.084) 
1.05 
(.086) 
 
1.06** 
(.020) 
1.05* 
(.024) 
1.04 
(.022) 
1.04 
(.023) 
1.00 
(.019) 
1.00 
(.013) 
1.00 
(.022) 
1.00 
(.020) 
department age .987 
(.015) 
.99 
(.015) 
.99 
(.015) 
.99 
(.015) 
1.00 
(.003) 
1.00 
(.003) 
1.00 
(.003) 
1.00 
(.003) 
.998 
(.001) 
 
1.00 
(.001) 
1.00 
(.001) 
1.00** 
(.001) 
Male t-1 – – – – .85 
(.219) 
.86 
(.221) 
.88 
(.241) 
.88 
(.245) 
.81 
(.056) 
 
.81** 
(.057) 
.82** 
(.060) 
.83** 
(.060) 
t 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.06 1.06 1.27** 1.27*** 1.27** 1.27** 
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Spoils Bargain 
 
 
Schafferian Bargain 
 
Managerial Bargain 
                                 
 Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  
Covariates 1.A 2.A 3.A 4.A 1.B 2.B 3.B 4.B 1.C 2.C 3.C 4.C 
(.095) (.094) (.09) (.090) (.070) (.060) (.074) (.073) (.088) 
 
(.088) (.090) (.088) 
t2 1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.005) 
 
.98* 
(.009) 
.98* 
(.009) 
.98* 
(.009) 
.98* 
(.009) 
t3 1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.013) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.001) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
 
1.00* 
(.000) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
BC .88 
(.136) 
.87 
(.131) 
.93 
(.136) 
.93 
(.151) 
.97 
(.051) 
.75 
(.228) 
1.42 
(.256) 
1.45* 
(.259) 
1.19 
(.111) 
 
1.20** 
(.071) 
1.19 
(.164) 
1.14 
(.147) 
AB 
 
1.17 
(.266) 
1.17 
(.278) 
1.63 
(.796) 
1.64 
(.766) 
.71*** 
(.015) 
.59*** 
(.085) 
.85 
(.116) 
.86 
(.117) 
.71*** 
(.037) 
 
.68 
(.162) 
.76** 
(.078) 
.79* 
(.076) 
SK .99 
(.052) 
1.01 
(.070) 
 
.828 
(.096) 
.857 
(.114) 
1.19** 
(.068) 
.90 
(.290) 
1.71*** 
(.187) 
1.76*** 
(.234) 
.99 
(.065) 
1.00 
(.060) 
1.01 
(.060) 
.98 
(.101) 
MB .915 
(.338) 
.913 
(.339) 
 
1.07 
(.612) 
1.03 
(.560) 
1.55*** 
(.176) 
1.13 
(.477) 
1.98*** 
(.198) 
2.04*** 
(.264) 
.51*** 
(.065) 
.51*** 
(.039) 
.51*** 
(.075) 
.48*** 
(.068) 
ON (reference) 
 
            
QC .67*** 
(.019) 
.71*** 
(.057) 
.868 
(.115) 
.88 
(.122) 
.94 
(.036) 
.72 
(.237) 
1.83*** 
(.242) 
1.86*** 
(.252) 
1.10 
(.111) 
 
1.11 
(.082) 
.90 
(.170) 
.88 
(.160) 
NB 1.62 
(.874) 
1.58 
(.832) 
1.61 
(.778) 
1.46 
(.756) 
.89 
(.098) 
.65 
(.246) 
.89 
(.094) 
.90 
(.116) 
.65 
(.070) 
 
.65*** 
(.036) 
.644*** 
(.075) 
 
NS 2.21 
(1.32) 
2.18 
(1.33) 
2.23 
(1.19) 
2.03 
(1.16) 
.64*** 
(.059) 
.48* 
(.155) 
.90*** 
(.124) 
.72** 
(.087) 
.70 
(.073) 
 
.70*** 
(.040) 
.71*** 
(.067) 
.72*** 
(.066) 
PEI 2.72 
(2.37) 
2.62 
(2.178) 
2.65 
(2.102) 
2.26 
(1.90) 
.80 
(.111) 
.61 
(.214) 
.90 
(.124) 
.94 
(.177) 
.92 
(.213) 
 
.94 
(.131) 
.91 
(.213) 
.85 
(.185) 
NL – – – – .82* 
(.081) 
.63 
(.173) 
.92 
(.089) 
.95 
(.114) 
.75** 
(.082) 
.72** 
(.079) 
.74** 
(.088) 
.72** 
(.079) 
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Spoils Bargain 
 
 
Schafferian Bargain 
 
Managerial Bargain 
                                 
 Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  
Covariates 1.A 2.A 3.A 4.A 1.B 2.B 3.B 4.B 1.C 2.C 3.C 4.C 
 
GDP Growth 1.00 
(.013) 
 
1.00 
(.013) 
1.00 
(.013) 
1.01 
(.014) 
1.06*** 
(.015) 
1.06*** 
(.018) 
1.06** 
(.020) 
1.06** 
(.020) 
1.00 
(.014) 
1.00 
(.015) 
1.00 
(.015) 
1.00 
(.015) 
Constant .033** 
(.04) 
 
.04** 
(.037) 
.04** 
(.042) 
.061* 
(.068) 
.048*** 
(.027) 
.075** 
(.073) 
.070*** 
(.041) 
.070*** 
(.041) 
.349 
(.202) 
 
.390 
(.210) 
.362 
(.209) 
.39 
(.210) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-881.18 -880.82 -878.05 -872.09 -2148.9 -2142.3 -2124.6 -2123.0 -4595.2 -4577.10 -4591.64 -4577.10 
Wald chi2  
 
.0037 .0080 .0046 .0010 .0000 .0000 .00000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
 
 
Pseudo R2  
 
.224 .224 .227 .232 .168 .171 .178 .178 .102 .102 .102 .105 
N 2801 2801 2801 2801 5273 5273 5273 5273 7 739  7 739 7 739 
Random effects model. Robust standard errors clustered around province in parentheses.   
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 15: Mobility, logistic regression models 5-7 across PSBs 
 Spoils Bargain 
 
Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain 
                   
 Model  Model  Model  Model Model  Model Model Model Model 
Covariates 5.A 6.A 7.A 5.B 6.B 7.B 5.C 6.C 7.C 
          
party change 
 
1.02 
(.298) 
.99 
(.614) 
1.12 
(.707) 
1.17 
(.590) 
.80 
(.357) 
.73 
(.349) 
1.77** 
(.294) 
1.07 
(.238) 
1.09 
(.240) 
PC (reference) 
 
         
Liberal 
 
.66** 
(.081) 
.66** 
(.081) 
.65** 
(.087) 
.69** 
(.092) 
.70** 
(.092) 
.72** 
(.092) 
1.25 
(.243) 
1.29 
(.242) 
1.29 
(.245) 
CCF/NDP 
 
1.84* 
(.550) 
 
1.84* 
(.564) 
1.70* 
(.629) 
.63** 
(.094) 
.63** 
(.085) 
.60** 
(.090) 
1.19 
(.259) 
1.18 
(.251) 
1.19 
(.246) 
United Farmer .63 
(.232) 
.63 
(.241) 
.730 
(.239) 
.20*** 
(.023) 
.19*** 
(.024) 
.17*** 
(.020) 
 
   
Social Credit .45 
(.188) 
 
 
.45 
(.198) 
.50 
(.203) 
.66 
(.170) 
.66 
(.173) 
.55*** 
(.173) 
.99 
(.150) 
1.02 
(.145) 
1.03 
(.142) 
Sask. Party 
 
      .89 
(.137) 
.86 
(.125) 
.83 
(.112) 
 
UN .49* 
(.164) 
 
.49* 
(.164) 
.48* 
(.179) 
.21*** 
(.030) 
.22*** 
(.030) 
.22*** 
(.030) 
   
PQ    1.02 
(.153) 
1.02 
(.151) 
1.04 
(.142) 
 
1.32 
(.282) 
1.40 
(.282) 
1.40 
(.277) 
party change x PC 
(reference) 
 
         
party change x 
Liberal 
3.96* 
(2.48) 
3.96* 
(2.49) 
3.61* 
(2.06) 
1.38 
(.667) 
 
1.36 
(.658) 
1.35 
(.713) 
.42** 
(.122) 
.41** 
(.119) 
.41** 
(.118) 
change x CCF/NDP .67 
(.390) 
.66 
(.392) 
.62 
(.326) 
1.25 
(.873) 
 
1.23 
(.857) 
1.14 
(.816) 
.48 
(.236) 
.55 
(.269) 
.55 
(.271) 
party change x 
Farmers/Progressive 
1.94 
(.89) 
 
1.96 
(.95) 
1.72 
(.747) 
4.38** 
(2.24) 
6.36** 
(2.86) 
5.96** 
(2.70) 
   
party change x SC 
 
3.73** 
(1.79) 
3.72** 
(1.80) 
3.46** 
(1.45) 
1.25 
(.500) 
1.24 
(.500) 
1.15 
(.505) 
   
party change x 
Sask. Party 
 
      1.29 
(.271) 
1.27 
(.271) 
1.28 
(.271) 
party change x UN 2.56 
(1.43) 
2.56 
(1.43) 
 
2.38 
(1.19) 
1.08 
(.420) 
1.03 
(.408) 
1.10 
(.463) 
   
party change x PQ    1.37 
(.630) 
1.37 
(.633) 
1.43 
(.703) 
 
1.21 
(.247) 
1.15 
(.234) 
1.16 
(.262) 
premier change .90 
(.261) 
.94 
(.712) 
.90 
(.680) 
 
1.05 
(.298) 
1.61 
(.508) 
1.68 
(.561) 
1.38 
(.267) 
2.52** 
(.800) 
2.46** 
(.780) 
interim premier  .95 
(.649) 
1.01 
(.681) 
 .49** 
(.120) 
.47** 
(.120) 
 
 .44** 
(.126) 
.45** 
(.129) 
majority  
(reference) 
 
         
minority    .68*   1.30   1.00 
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 Spoils Bargain 
 
Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain 
                   
 Model  Model  Model  Model Model  Model Model Model Model 
Covariates 5.A 6.A 7.A 5.B 6.B 7.B 5.C 6.C 7.C 
(.115) 
 
 
(.217) (.113) 
coalition    .78 
(.142) 
  .31*** 
(.070) 
 
  .74*** 
(.062) 
election 1.16 
(.157) 
1.16 
(.168) 
1.17 
(.171) 
 
.74* 
(.099) 
.70* 
(.101) 
.70* 
(.100) 
1.18 
(.196) 
1.07 
(.198) 
1.07 
(.197) 
number of  
departments   t-1 
1.05 
(.085) 
 
1.05 
(.084) 
1.05 
(.089) 
1.04 
(.023) 
1.03 
(.023) 
1.03 
(.025) 
.99 
(.022) 
.99 
(.021) 
.99 
(.021) 
department age 
 
.99 
(.015) 
.99 
(.015) 
.99 
(.014) 
1.00 
(.003) 
 
1.00 
(.003) 
1.00 
(.003) 
1.00* 
(.001) 
1.00* 
(.001) 
1.00* 
(.001) 
Male t-1    .88 
(.246) 
 
.88 
(.243) 
.89 
(.249) 
.83** 
(.060) 
.82** 
(.056) 
.82** 
(.056) 
t 1.03 
(.091) 
 
1.03 
(.096) 
1.02 
(.092) 
1.06 
(.073) 
1.06 
(.071) 
1.06 
(.072) 
1.26** 
(.089) 
1.26** 
(.088) 
1.26** 
(.088) 
t2 1.00 
(.010) 
 
1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.010) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.005) 
1.00 
(.005) 
.98* 
(.009) 
.98* 
(.009) 
.98* 
(.009) 
t3 1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00 
(.000) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
1.00* 
(.000) 
BC .93 
(.150) 
 
.93 
(.147) 
1.03 
(.218) 
1.45* 
(.255) 
1.45* 
(.259) 
1.86*** 
(.220) 
1.11 
(.144) 
1.10 
(.134) 
1.10 
(.137) 
AB 
 
1.67 
(.825) 
 
1.67 
(.824) 
1.44 
(.613) 
.87 
(.116) 
.87 
(.120) 
1.01 
(.110) 
.77** 
(.074) 
.78** 
(.072) 
.78** 
(.066) 
SK .86 
(.114) 
.86 
(.115) 
.89 
(.156) 
 
1.76*** 
(.256) 
1.77*** 
(.212) 
1.93*** 
(.201) 
1.02 
(.100) 
1.05 
(.095) 
1.09 
(.093) 
MB 1.03 
(.554) 
1.03 
(.529) 
1.06 
(.488) 
 
2.04*** 
(.256) 
2.07*** 
(.249) 
2.14*** 
(.311) 
.49*** 
(.071) 
.49*** 
(.067) 
.49*** 
(.066) 
ON (reference) 
 
         
QC .87 
(.127) 
.87 
(.127) 
.86 
(.136) 
 
1.86*** 
(.247) 
1.85*** 
(.236) 
1.93*** 
(.201) 
.90 
(.179) 
.89 
(.169) 
.89 
(.171) 
NB 1.45 
(.74) 
1.46 
(.712) 
1.51 
(.800) 
 
.90 
(.119) 
.90 
(.117) 
.93 
(.156) 
.61*** 
(.071) 
.61*** 
(.067) 
.61*** 
(.071) 
NS 2.01 
(1.13) 
2.02 
(1.12) 
2.05 
(1.24) 
.72** 
(.086) 
.71** 
(.085) 
.70** 
(.100) 
 
.70*** 
(.064) 
.70*** 
(.062) 
.70*** 
(.062) 
PEI 2.24 
(1.86) 
 
2.24 
(1.84) 
2.30 
(2.02) 
.94 
(.172) 
.92 
(.169) 
.93 
(.210) 
.86 
(.200) 
.82 
(.176) 
.82 
(.180) 
NL    .94 
(.113) 
.92 
(.115) 
.93 
(.139) 
 
.71** 
(.082) 
.68** 
(.072) 
.69** 
(.075) 
GDP growth 
 
1.01 
(.014) 
1.01 
(.014) 
1.01 
(.014) 
 
1.06** 
(.021) 
1.06** 
(.021) 
1.06** 
(.022) 
1.00 
(.015) 
1.01 
(.016) 
1.00 
(.016) 
Constant .063** 
(.067) 
.063** 
(.066) 
.060* 
(.067) 
 
.070*** 
(.041) 
.073*** 
(.042) 
.073*** 
(.045) 
.377 
(.216) 
.391 
(.216) 
.383 
(.213) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-872.00 -872.00 -871.21 -2123.0 -2121.6 -2118.5 -4570.4 -4561.4 -4560.7 
Wald chi2  .0014 .0021 .0033 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
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 Spoils Bargain 
 
Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain 
                   
 Model  Model  Model  Model Model  Model Model Model Model 
Covariates 5.A 6.A 7.A 5.B 6.B 7.B 5.C 6.C 7.C 
 
Pseudo R2  
 
.232 .232 .233 .178 .179 .180 .107 .108 .109 
N 2801 2801 2801 5273 5273 5273 7 739 7 739 7 739 
Random effects model. Robust standard errors clustered around province in parentheses.  *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, 
***p < 0.001 
 
The relationship between mobility and a change in party is robust; statistically significant in the 
other models introducing changes in premier and the legislative strength of the government. 
 In the spoils bargain, a change in premier, as expected, has no relationship with mobility. 
Nor is there a statistically significant relationship between mobility and an interim premier. 
Legislative strength is shown to have a negative relationship with mobility. Both minority 
governments and coalition governments have a negative association with mobility compared to 
a majority government, although the relationship is only statistically significant for minority 
governments.  
 During the spoils bargain few of the control variables have statistically significant 
relationships with mobility. This helps clarify trends in mobility shown in Figure 5 Chapter 4 
(p. 107) where very low levels of mobility were interrupted by changes in the political party. In 
other words, the results suggest that during the spoils bargain, apart from a change in party, 
bureaucratic mobility was affected by little else.  
  
Schafferian bargain. The results from the regression models help clarify the relationship 
between political dynamics and mobility during the period associated with the Schafferian 
bargain. First, in contrast to expectations, transitions in the governing party do lead to increased 
rates of mobility. Shown Model 1.B, while a change in the governing party is positively 
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associated with mobility, the magnitude of this relationship is lower than during the spoils 
bargain (an odds ratio of 1.66 versus a ratio of 2.08). What’s more, the relationship is not very 
robust. Once additional predictors are introduced to the model the relationship is generally no 
longer present. As the evidence suggested in Chapter 4, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the time the previous government was in power and the mobility of 
administrative elites.  
 The results also do not indicate that governments on the ideological right are associated 
with higher levels of mobility upon taking power than parties on the left. In fact upon forming 
government, all parties are associated with higher levels of mobility than the Conservative Party, 
although only the United Farmers has a statistically significant relationship. 
 The regression also shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
changes in premier and mobility; although interim premiers do have a negative and statistically 
significant association. The findings also show that in contrast to theoretical expectations, 
coalition governments do have a statistically significant and negative relationship with mobility. 
Although as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is important to keep in mind that coalition governments 
were gathered in the first two years of the 1950s and that when mobility levels of majority 
governments are compared during this decade with levels in coalition governments the 
difference is much less pronounced. 
  It is also worth mentioning a few control variables. As shown in Figure 3 in Chapter 4 
(p. 103), following the postwar period, there was a trend of increasing incidence mobility in all 
years, especially during the 1970s. The empirical evidence presented above generally indicates 
that this increase is not due to political dynamics. This leads to the question: if not due to political 
factors, what then helped bring about the noticeable increase in mobility during the 1960s and 
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1970s? While the objective of this dissertation is not to explain all factors causing mobility, but 
rather, to examine whether the average effect that political dynamics have on mobility has 
changed over time, the statistical analysis of the data does allow for some comment on the non-
political factors leading to the rise in mobility during this period.  
 In their study of DM mobility in Canada’s federal government Bourgault and Dion note 
that apart from the manipulation of administrative personnel by governments, mobility began to 
increase in the 1960s due to the increased number of deputy ministerial positions and the 
increased competition for these positions arising from the professionalization and 
commodification of policy expertise (1989a, 143).  
 Based on the original dataset used in this work, Figure 12 shows that the average number 
of departments in the Canadian provinces did rise during these years – from 14 in 1950s, 18 in 
the 1960s, to 21 in the 1970s; an increase of 50 percent in 30 years. Importantly, more 
departments generally represent not only more DMs but also more bureaucrats in slightly lower 
executive levels, who are able to compete for DM positions. Research from organization and 
management studies suggest that such growth in the labour pool of candidates increases the 
likelihood of mobility (Fredrickson , Hambrick, and Baumrin 1988; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 
2016). The results from regression models do show a positive association between the number 
of departments and mobility (odds ratio approximately 1.05). The relationship is not very robust 
however, only being significant in models 1.B and 2.B. 
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Figure 12: Average number of departments in provincial bureaucracy, 1920-12013 
 
 
Organization and management studies also suggest that economic growth is positively 
associated with mobility (Kirschenbaum and Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013). As 
the economy develops so too are there more employment opportunities, and thus greater levels 
of mobility as individuals leave their positions for new prospects. This is particularly important 
during the postwar period where the 1960s to 1970s bore witness to the commodification of 
policy expertise with the emergence of the consulting and lobbying industries (Saint-Martin 
1998). For example, in 1963 the Canadian Association of Management Consultants was 
established. During this same time a growing number of think tanks were founded, such as the 
Institute for Research on Public Policy (1972), The Fraser Institute (1974), and the Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (1980). Thus whereas an increase in economic opportunities may 
normally be associated with mobility this is all the more likely the case during the postwar 
period where a quantitative expansion in GDP was also accompanied by a qualitative change 
with the emergence of a new market subsector as the provision of expertise became 
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commodified. Mobility therefore increases in all years during this period as individuals move 
between positions to seek new and emerging opportunities. 
 Figure 13 shows Canada’s GDP between 1926 and 1986. The spiked increase during the 
1970s is congruent with the large jump in mobility. The regression further supports this 
relationship. Economic growth has a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
mobility. For every one percentage increase in GDP the odds of mobility increases by 6 percent. 
Together the expansion of the size of government and the expanding labour market opportunities 
in the policy industry help explain the overall rise of mobility in all years witnessed during the 
30 years proceeding from the postwar period. 
 
Figure 13: Real GDP (Canada) 1926-1986  
 
(Source: Statistics Canada 1987, index year 1981) 
 
Managerial bargain. The results from the regression models 1.C through 7.C generally reinforce 
the conclusions made in Chapter 4 concerning the relationship between politics and mobility 
within the managerial bargain. It contrast to the spoils bargain, where mobility was most 
strongly associated with a transition in party, during the managerial bargain the data suggests 
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that changes in the head of government matter more. As expected the data shows that the 
relationship is not true of interim premiers. Change in premier only has a statistically significant 
relationship once interim premiers are controlled for (Models 6.C and 7.C). In Model 6.C, a 
change in premier is associated with an increased percentage in the odds of mobility by almost 
150 percent whereas interim premiers, have a negative and statistically significant association 
with mobility.  
 While the results show that changes in the head of government matter more than 
transitions in party, it would be erroneous to infer from this data that changes in party do not 
lead to escalations in mobility; they do. What the evidence does suggest however, and what is 
argued here, is that during the managerial bargain, it is not a change in the partisan nature of 
the political party holding office that explains why a transition in party will lead to an increase 
in mobility; but instead, because a change in party almost always involves a change in the 
individual heading the government,41 it is a change head of government and not the fact that this 
person is a member of a different political party, that leads to an increase in mobility. This is 
empirically supported by regression Models 6.C and 7.C indicating that when testing 
simultaneously a change in party and a transition in the head of government, the latter is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of approximately 2.5, whereas a change in 
the head of government, found to have a statistically significant relationship with mobility when 
a change in premier and an interim premier are excluded from the model, is no longer the case 
once a change in the head of government and interim premiers are introduced (p > 0.05). 
 This is consistent with theoretical expectations that newly elected heads of government 
do not strategically use the nomination of bureaucratic offices as a reward to reinforce partisan 
support of the party, but instead to ensure loyalty to the first minister and her personal policy 
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agenda. The same inference that is also supported in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 
indicating that, to paraphrase the statement from Premier Harris, the question of whether one 
“understands the agenda is more important than whether they were brought in under the Liberals 
or the NDP” (cited above, p. 144). Otherwise stated, loyalty to the executive and her agenda 
rather than being a partisan supporter to the party is the key consideration in staffing 
bureaucratic elites.  
 Furthermore this loyalty to the premier’s policy agenda is the exact opposite of the 
association that a change in premier and a transition in the governing party have with mobility 
during the spoils bargain. In the spoils bargain, Model 6.A shows that when a change in premier 
and an interim premier are introduced to the model, the association is not significant between 
mobility and a change in premier (p > 0.05). In the spoils bargain, the stronger relationship 
remains a transition in the governing party. 
 The points above can be appreciated by examining Figure 14 presenting the predicted 
probability of mobility given there has been a change in premier discriminating for whether this 
involves a change in party or not. During the spoils bargain, in the absence of a transition in 
party new premiers arriving at the head of government have substantially lower levels of 
mobility than new premiers resulting from a transition in party (a probability of .18 compared 
to .11). Without a change in party, new heads of government feel little need to dismiss 
incumbents.  Yet during the managerial bargain, newly elected premiers regardless of whether 
or not there has been a change in party, are associated with higher levels of mobility than when 
no change in premier or party takes place.  
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Figure 14: Mobility, predicted probability when change in premier 
 
Predicted probability of mobility when change in premier; assuming random effect is zero. Party change = party change (1), premier change (1), 
election (1), interim premier (0). No party change = change in party (0), premier change (1), election (1), interim premier (0). Interim premier = party 
change (0), premier change (0), election (0), interim premier (1). All other covariates held constant at their observed value. Probability of mobility 
when there is no change in premier and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line. Based on coefficients from 
Model 7 without an interaction term between party change and party dummies. 
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Interestingly, newly elected premiers from the same party as the previous government are 
associated with slightly higher levels of mobility than premiers alongside a new political party. 
This finding is also suggested in Chapter 4 with the use of descriptive statistics where mobility 
following a change in party in the managerial bargain was 43 percent whereas ENPC premiers 
had a mobility rate of 54 percent. This is not the first work to find such an intriguing result. 
Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup (2014) in their study of mobility in Denmark make a 
similar finding, which they suggest is explained by the greater familiarity heads of government 
from the same party have with administrative functions and personnel than those from a different 
party, and thus leads them to be less cautious in moving administrative personnel. 
 The data also show that when a new premier is merely an interim the probability of 
mobility is reduced. Importantly, the substantive reduction in the probability between a change 
in premier and an interim premier, is greatest during the managerial bargain. Whereas the 
difference between levels of mobility for interim premiers and all new premiers when there has 
been no party change is very small in other periods, during the managerial bargain the difference 
becomes much more pronounced. This is congruent with theoretical expectations that interim 
premiers lack the necessary condition explaining why mobility is positively associated with new 
heads of government: the desire for bureaucrats to be committed to the leader’s policy agenda 
and manage resources to attain policy objectives. Limited in their ability to set the policy agenda 
within cabinet as well as lacking the time horizon to introduce new directions in policy, interim 
premiers have much less need to ensure competency and loyalty from bureaucrats and hence are 
associated with lower levels of mobility than are newly elected premier. 
 As to whether in the managerial bargain governments on the ideological right are 
associated with higher levels of mobility than governments on the left, the evidence is somewhat 
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supportive. While in all years there is no substantive difference between parties, the results from 
the models examining the interaction between party change and political parties indicate that 
the left-leaning NDP and centre-left Liberal party have lower associations with mobility than 
the Conservative Party, although only the difference with the Liberal party is significant. An 
alternative means to appreciate the relationship is presented in Figure 15 displaying the 
predicted probability of mobility for each party when taking power. 
  Finally, while there is no difference between majority and minority governments in the 
managerial bargain, coalition governments are negatively associated with mobility. To better 
appreciate the substantive differences between legislative strength mobility Figure 16 displays 
the predicted probability of mobility by majority, minority and coalition governments during 
each PSB. As stated in Chapter 4, the data suggests that in the managerial bargain the absence 
of any difference between minority and majority governments is congruent with the argument 
that in the contemporary era minority governments govern in a similar manner as majority 
governments, that being to introduce changes in policies and programs, and accordingly, seek 
to ensure that bureaucrats are responsive to their policy agenda.  
 Coalition governments, however, are associated with lower levels of mobility. The 
findings here suggest that something else other than the weaker legislative strength (also shared 
by minority governments) is responsible for the lower level of mobility of coalition 
governments. Instead it could be the case that the sharing of power between two or more parties 
weakens the head of government’s disposition to unilaterally control the governing apparatus 
including levels of responsiveness from the bureaucracy.  
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Figure 15: Mobility, predicted probability when change in party by PSB 
 
Predicted probability of DM mobility when transition in governing party by each party; assuming random effect is zero. Premier and election held at 
change (1), caretaker held at (0). All other covariates held constant at their observed value. Probability of mobility when there is no change in premier 
and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line. Based on coefficients from Model 7.
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 During the managerial bargain, several control variables are also associated with 
mobility. As with previous studies positions previously occupied by men have lower levels of 
mobility than those held by women. As with the Schafferian bargain, GDP growth is associated 
with increased mobility, albeit here the relationship is not statistically significant. The time the 
DM has been in his or her position has a positive and statistically significant association with 
mobility. For every year a DM has been in their position the odds of a change increases by 26 
percent, an association that is much greater during the managerial bargain than during other 
periods.  
 Figure 17 displays the predicted probability of mobility for time in position controlling 
for all other variables. The results show that up until the first ten years, each year the incumbent 
has been in the same position the probability of turnover substantively increases. The positive 
association between the previous time in the same position and mobility is congruent with the 
managerial bargain where this is likely to be viewed by governments as a key source of two 
central bureaucratic pathologies. That being: (a) goal conflict; where too much time in the same 
department fosters loyalty amongst bureaucrats to their department; and (b) information 
asymmetry; where extended time in the same department will lead bureaucrats to know more 
details of policies and programs than politicians, which they could then use to their own 
advantage. To abate these pathologies and ensure loyalty to the government’s policy agenda, 
bureaucrats cannot remain in any one position for too long a time. It is therefore not of minor 
importance then that it is during the managerial bargain and not the previous PSBs that time in 
position is most strongly associated with mobility. 
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Figure 16: Mobility, predicted probabilities by legislative strength 
 
Predicted probability of DM mobility by legislative strength; assuming random effect is zero. All other covariates held constant at their observed 
value. Probability of mobility when there is no change in premier and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line 
Based on coefficients from Model 7. 
 
 
Majority
Minority
Coalition
Majority Minority
Coalition
Majority
Minority
Coalition
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Spoils Bargain Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain
177 
 
Figure 17: Mobility, predicted probability by time DM in position 
 
Predicted probability of mobility by number of years DM has been in her position. Assuming random effect is 
zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from Model 7. 
 
The results from the regression models also show some variation across provinces. Appendix I 
of this chapter (p. 180-182) displays the predicted probability of mobility by province based on 
the coefficients from regression Model 7 during each PSB. Noticing such differences across the 
provinces while controlling for predictors leads to new questions concerning possible 
explanations of interprovincial variation. While identifying the reasons for provincial 
differences is beyond the objective of this dissertation, one possibility may be the variety of 
parties observed within each province. 
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Otherwise stated, governments in these provinces interfere to a greater extent in administrative 
affairs including the staffing of personnel. The data shows that there is some support of these 
claims. British Columbia does have higher levels since the Schafferian and managerial bargains, 
while Québec has higher levels during the 1950s through to 1980.  
 A more interesting case is the Atlantic Provinces (NS, NB, PEI and NL). While during 
the spoils bargain, the Maritime Provinces (NS, NB and PEI) are associated with higher levels 
of mobility than the other provinces (albeit this difference is not statistically significant), after 
the postwar period, these provinces generally exhibit lower levels. Admittedly speculative, one 
possible reason for this could be that in contrast to every other province, the Atlantic Provinces 
have been almost exclusively governed by only two parties: the Liberals and Conservatives (the 
exemption being the NDP government in Nova Scotia in 2009-2013). A regular shifting between 
two predominantly brokerage parties may have led to overall lower levels of mobility.  
Conversely, political entities having been governed by a greater variety of parties with a broader 
range of political ideologies may positively affect levels of mobility in ways that have yet to be 
appreciated. 
 An alternative hypothesis (but one that is not necessarily unrelated to the variety of 
parties forming government) could be that mobility is tied to the degree of divisions and political 
cleavages within society. The Atlantic Provinces, generally a political entity embodying a lower 
degree of heterogeneity, could be have lower levels of mobility than provinces whose political 
landscapes are home to a greater diversity of perspectives. One commentator of the 
administrative style within the Atlantic Provinces for instance notes a “relative absence of 
ideological or societal cleavages dividing the two main parties” (Johnson 2005, 95). Briefly 
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mentioned here, these points remain speculative and are only some of the possible explanations 
needing further study. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter Five 
Using statistical regression this chapter undertook a more rigorous test to examine the 
relationship between key political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility across distinct PSBs. 
Even when controlling for alternative variables identified by organization and management 
studies the evidence suggests that the relationship between mobility and some key political 
dynamics does exhibit a great deal of temporal variation. This is congruent with theoretical 
expectations that governments in different PSBs strategically appointment administrative elites 
to reinforce fundamentally different types of competency and loyalty. The final chapter 
concludes this work by reviewing the main findings and the implications these have for 
scholarship studying administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics.  
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Chapter 5 Appendix I 
 
Figure 18: Predicted probability of mobility by province, spoils-type bargain (1920-1949) 
 
Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from 
Model 7. 
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Figure 19: Predicted probability of mobility by province, Schafferian bargain (1950-1979) 
 
Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from 
Model 7. 
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Figure 20: Predicted probability of mobility by province, managerial bargain (1980-2013) 
 
Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from 
Model 7. 
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Chapter Six. Conclusion  
 
Chapter six summary. This concluding chapter reviews the main objective, central argument, 
empirical evidence as well as the main conclusions of this work. The implications that the 
findings have for the study of administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics are addressed. 
Consideration is also given to the utility of PSBs as a framework for understanding the strategic 
actions of governments. In light of the conclusions, this chapter revisits the long-standing debate 
within public administration concerning the proper relationship between politics and 
administration. The chapter closes by considering the limitations of this work as well as 
highlighting a few promising avenues for future research.  
184 
 
Main Objective, Central Argument, Empirical Evidence and Conclusion 
 
Recognizing the important consequences that personnel turnover can have on an organization’s 
performance, research in public administration as well as organization and management studies 
have become increasingly interested in identifying the causes of mobility. Yet despite good 
reasons for supposing that the mobility of bureaucratic elites may be influenced by 
considerations of power, the greater part of this research has paid scant attention to the effects 
of political dynamics. For example, a recent report by the Public Service Commission of Canada 
(2008) dedicated to better understanding the trends and causes of turnover, makes no mention 
that amongst executives, mobility may also be influenced by political variables. 
 In contrast to the above, the last few years have borne witness to a growing body of 
research studying the relationship between mobility and politics. As identified in Chapter 2 
however, despite its merits this research has faced some challenges. While traditionally the 
absence of large datasets has impeded researchers from simultaneously testing competing 
explanatory variables, more recent research using larger longitudinal datasets by drawing upon 
observations from further back in time before the managerial era of governance, have failed to 
find meaningful relationships between key political variables and administrative mobility 
(Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014). Answering this 
puzzle has been the main objective of this work.  
 In Chapter 2 the central argument was made that a likely reason for this conundrum may 
be the fact that the relationship between mobility and political variables varies over time in 
tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships. Drawing upon Hood 
and Lodge’s (2006) concept of Public Service Bargain the relationship between central political 
variables and bureaucratic mobility was re-examined from a new theoretical perspective. 
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Distinguishing between three ideal-type Public Service Bargains – spoils, Schafferian and 
managerial – each varying according to the nature of governance, the nature of the 
bureaucracy’s competency as well as the nature of the bureaucracy’s loyalty, it was postulated 
that the extent to which certain political variables prod governments to dismiss incumbents and 
appoint new personnel is conditioned by the contours of the broader political-administrative 
relationship embodied in each bargain. It was theorized that governments strategically use elite 
administrative positions as a means to encourage certain types of competency and loyalty 
amongst the bureaucracy. Because however, the type of loyalty and competency that 
governments desire vary across bargains, it stands that which political variables prod 
governments to remove incumbents and appoint new personnel will also vary. 
 In the spoils bargain, the nature of governance is of a minimal character and there are 
scant specifications concerning the bureaucracy’s competency; loyalty however, is of a partisan 
nature towards the governing party. Transitions in party therefore prod governments the most 
to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel. During the Schafferian bargain, governments 
seek to encourage policy relevant knowledge amongst bureaucrats as well as a willingness to 
advise governments in a forthright manner and on the basis of such expertise. To foster such 
competency and loyalty politicians strategically leave bureaucratic elites in their positions. 
Ideally, in the Schafferian bargain, political dynamics are no longer associated with bureaucratic 
mobility. 
 In the 1980s, with the emergence of a managerial bargain, there has once again been a 
shift in the competency and loyalty that governments desire bureaucrats to display. Detailed 
knowledge of policies and programs is now seen as a problem of information asymmetry turning 
the politician into Weber’s (1991, 232) ‘dilettante’ and potentially obstructing the government’s 
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ability to realize its policy agenda. Instead, governments seek bureaucrats who are able to 
effectively manage personnel and resources towards realizing the government’s policy agenda. 
Loyalty, for its part, is no longer of an impersonal manner, as was the case in the Schafferian 
bargain, but instead is oriented to the policy agenda as established by the head of government. 
Seeking to foster such competency and loyalty, changes in the head of government (she who 
sets the policy agenda), rather than merely a transition in the governing party, is believed to 
have the greatest association with bureaucratic mobility. After outlining the theoretical 
framework (Table 2 p. 60) the most dominant hypotheses between political dynamics and 
mobility were revisited and situated within each PSB (Table 3 p. 68). 
 Variation in the relationship between political dynamics and administrative mobility was 
tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in Canada’s 10 provincial 
governments from 1920 to 2013 – the largest-n study of elite administrative turnover in a 
parliamentary country to date (N = 16, 660). Four central hypotheses – a transition in the 
governing party, the political ideology of the government, a change in the head of government, 
and the government’s legislative strength – were tested with descriptive statistics and logistic 
regression. Evidence from the quantitative analysis as well as a qualitative inquiry identifying 
the motivations underpinning the staffing decisions of administrative elites across PSBs 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, generally support the conclusion that the extent to which some 
key political dynamics have prodded governments to reappoint administrative elites has varied 
over time across distinct PSBs. A review of the hypothesized relationships between political 
dynamics and mobility across PSBs and the conclusions from the empirical results are 
summarized below in Table 16.  
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Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and conclusions  
 
Spoils-type Bargain Schafferian Bargain Managerial Bargain 
                   
 theoretically 
expected 
empirically 
demonstrated 
theoretically 
expected 
empirically 
supported 
theoretically 
expected 
empirically 
supported  
                 
H1) Transition in 
the party is 
positively 
associated with 
mobility 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
H2) Transition in  
party AND time 
previous party in 
power is 
positively 
associated with 
mobility 
 
No No No No Yes No 
H3) 
Ideologically 
right 
governments are 
positively 
associated with 
mobility 
 
No No No No Yes Yes 
H4) Change in 
premier is 
positively 
associated with 
mobility 
 
No No No No Yes Yes 
H5) Legislative 
strength 
is positively 
associated with 
mobility 
 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Contributions 
Whereas predominant explanations of bureaucratic appointments drawing upon principal-agent 
theory universalize the intentions of governments underlying the appointment of bureaucratic 
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elites, this project makes an original contribution to the study of bureaucratic mobility by 
theoretically situating the actions of first ministers within their social-historical context, and 
then empirically showing that the relationship between mobility and key political dynamics 
varies over time alongside across distinct PSBs. The historical contingency of hypotheses is 
particularly worth emphasizing as scholars make greater use of longitudinal data. Researchers 
should be mindful that different periods of time may embody distinct political-administrative 
relationships and thus poorly reflect the underlying theoretical assumptions held by agency 
theory. While researchers using panel data have made great pains to understand the effects of 
time, they generally do so by treating it as a continuous variable. This work has shown that time 
can also be a categorical variable; representing significant shifts in political-administrative 
relationships. 
 By applying the concept of PSB to situate the strategic actions of governments within 
their sociohistorical context, this work has used the concept of a PSB in a novel manner by 
examining how the contours of political-administrative relationships mediate the degree to 
which political dynamics prod governments to strategically staff administrative elites. The use 
of the concept to explain variation in the strategic behaviour of governments deviates from the 
dominant manner PSBs has been used by scholars in public administration as a means to identify 
and describe changes in the roles of bureaucrats over time and across countries (Lodge 2010; 
Bourgault 2011; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 2011; 
Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; van der Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; 
Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013). 
 Noting the restricted manner in which PSBs has been applied by previous research, 
and the failure of scholars to ask questions as to whether PSBs influence the strategic behaviour 
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of politicians and bureaucrats (rare exceptions include, Hood 2002; Elston Forthcoming), some 
have suggested that “it might be questioned how compelling the PSB approach is” (Elston 
Forthcoming, 4). This is unfortunate; especially considering that Hood clearly believed the 
concept possessed the theoretical prowess to explicate how the social-institutional context of 
political-administrative relationships mediated the strategic actions of politicians and 
bureaucrats (Hood 2000, 8). By providing one of the first applications of PSBs to formally 
postulate and empirically test how the strategic actions of governments is mediated by the 
contours of differing PSBs, this work attests to the utility of the concept to explain the strategic 
behaviour of governments. 
 By studying the mobility of DMs over approximately 100 years in Canada’s 10 
provincial governments, this work also makes an important empirical contribution to the study 
of Canadian politics. A key issue in the field has been the increasing centralization of power in 
the hands of the first minister (Hockin 1977; White 2005; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 
2005). Admittedly, while only one indicator, the evidence presented in this work suggests that 
over the 20th century this has most definitely been the case. While during the first half of the 
20th century only newly elected governments shuffled bureaucratic personnel, by the 1980s the 
trend was clearly in place that all newly elected heads of government, regardless of whether a 
transition in party had occurred, engaged in a game of bureaucratic ‘musical chairs’ in order to 
secure loyalty to their policy agenda. Loyalty to the premier and her policy objectives rather 
than the party corroborates the thesis most prominently voiced by Donald J. Savoie, who, 
speaking of the power invested in the first minister has proclaimed that, “[in Canada] Cabinet 
has now joined Parliament as an institution being bypassed” (1999, 362).  
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 The findings of this work also have implications for policies concerning administrative 
personnel. During the last 20 years, concern has been voiced by some over what they perceive 
as ‘alarmingly’ high levels of mobility (Osbaldeston 1989; Lewis 1991; Coté and Holland 
2007). While such works frequently focus on various non-political factors associated with 
mobility such as labour market opportunities, this work provides a strong reminder that political 
dynamics can also be an important cause of mobility amongst bureaucratic elites. 
 The increased degree to which administrative careers are influenced by politics, 
frequently referred to by scholars in public administration as ‘politicization’, has also been noted 
with concern by some believing that by strengthening the link between the careers of 
administrators with the achievement of government’s policy agenda, the willingness of officials 
to provide honest counsel to governments has been weakened. According to Aucoin, things have 
recently gotten so out of hand so as to justify a new era of governance, which he refers to as 
New Political Governance (Aucoin 2012). According to Aucoin, “at best, this politicization 
constitutes sleazy governance; at worst, it is a form of political corruption that cannot but 
undermine impartiality and, thereby, also management performance to the extent that it assumes 
management based on nonpartisan criteria” (2012, 178).  
 Prominently, in its report as to the causes of the Sponsorship Scandal, the Gomery 
Commission identified the linkage between political considerations and the careers of civil 
servants as a contributing factor to the questionable actions of some deputy ministers. The 
Commission reported that: 
The concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister is a phenomenon of modern 
Canadian government which has been noted with concern by academics and commentators. 
The dangers created by that concentration are demonstrated by the “sponsorship scandal.” 
As shown by the evidence, if a proposal or program is perceived as being supported by the 
PMO, politicians and public servants alike, mindful of the effect that opposition might have 
upon their careers, hesitate to object to it in any fashion, no matter how ill-conceived or 
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poorly administered it may be. This undermines the whole concept of a professional and 
non-partisan public service, fearlessly giving objective advice to its political masters. 
(Gomery Commission 2005, 434) 
 
For those persons concerned about the increasing extent to which governments are staffing 
bureaucratic elites as a means to foster responsive competence and rescind the willingness of 
bureaucrats to provide candid advice, the evidence presented in this work is likely to be 
troublesome. The fact that mobility in the present era of the managerial bargain is strongly 
linked to the arrival of a newly elected head of government may lead some to refrain from 
providing advice that contradicts the accepted view of the government. 
 While the strategic appointment of administrative elites may influence the type of advice 
bestowed to governments, to then go one step further and say that this should be otherwise, 
remains a fundamental normative position. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this 
work (p. 5-8), the question as to whether or not governments should have the power to appoint 
and dismiss administrative elites is tied to a long-standing debate concerning the proper 
relationship between politics and administration. This normative issue cannot be settled by 
empirical proofs. Perhaps frustrating to some, no evidence presented in this work permits for a 
pronouncement in favour of either side of the debate. Whether heads of government should have 
a free hand in staffing bureaucratic elites remains a political question. While isolating the careers 
of bureaucratic elites may improve the impartiality of the civil service and lead to better policy 
decisions, democracy says nothing about making the technically ‘right’ decision. One need not 
go any further in political thought than Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War to discern 
this point. While various conceptions of the term exist (Urbinati 2006), a dominant 
understanding of representative government is the rule of those democratically elected in a free 
and fair election. A technical decision made by an un-appointed bureaucrat, while possibly a 
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sound choice on the basis of expertise and experience, may go against the very will of people. 
In an op-ed piece, former deputy minister Arthur Kroeger, himself having testified to the 
Gomery Commission as to the willingness of deputy ministers to unquestioningly appease the 
Prime Minister’s policy agenda (Greenway 2004), had taken to defending the principle of 
representative government despite the poor decisions made by politicians and bureaucrats 
during the Sponsorship Scandal, asserting that “it is not in itself [the events of the Sponsorship 
Scandal] an adequate reason for calling into question our system of representative government 
– in which elected people have the last word” (Kroeger 2006). 
 
Limitations and Future Avenues for Study 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this study does have some limitations. First, by operationalizing 
mobility as the departure of an incumbent and an appointment to a new DM position, this study 
has used a broad measurement of mobility. While the reason for doing this was to ensure a 
systematic and comparable measure in 10 provinces over approximately 100 years, the data does 
not make any distinction as to the career backgrounds of new appointees nor does it tell us 
anything about what happened to those removed. While claims are sometimes made that the 
career background of those appointed to elite bureaucratic offices is qualitatively different in 
the more contemporary managerial era than during the era of the spoils bargain (Flinders and 
Matthews 2010) – where the latter often have few credentials or technical skills whereas the 
former are more likely to have some policy relevant skills – few studies have empirically 
verified whether this is indeed the case. Future research identifying the background of 
appointees as well as the whereabouts of those removed in Westminster countries would be 
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useful to better clarify whether politically motivated staffing decisions reflects a more ‘bounded’ 
type of politicization (Meyer-Sahling 2008). 
 This study has examined the influence of political dynamics in jurisdictions where there 
has been a great deal of centralization of power in the premier and where there are little 
institutional constraints limiting her ability to appoint and dismiss elites. Considering however, 
that the first minister’s role in bureaucratic appointments has recently been restricted in some 
countries such as the UK and New Zealand (Elgie 1998; Aucoin 2006; Pond 2008; Institute for 
Public Policy Research 2013; Paun, Harris, and Magee 2013; Matthews and Flinders 2015), 
research comparing mobility prior to and after these reforms would be a valuable contribution 
improving our understanding of the efficiency of these reforms.  
 A cautionary word must also be said about the applicability of this work’s findings to 
other jurisdictions. While it is often universally held that managerial bargains began to appear 
in most developed countries in the 1980s, it remains to be shown whether the shift from a spoils 
to a Schafferian bargain occurred at the same time as identified in this study. Scholars seeking 
to consider historical changes in PSBs in other jurisdictions should be attentive to qualitative 
research providing descriptions of political-administrative relationships when identifying the 
approximate temporal periods marking shifts in PSBs.  
 This study has examined DMs in line departments and the executive council. Officials 
in crown corporations are beyond the focus of this work. Studies of executive appointments to 
these quasi-governmental organizations (quangos) in various countries suggest that political 
dynamics do also affect mobility (Skelcher 1998; Park and Kim 2014). No studies have yet been 
published studying this in Canada. Exploring this question is also a promising future avenue of 
research. Having identified potential problems with sampling back in time, if the relationship 
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between political dynamics and mobility of elites in these offices is comparable, including 
observations from such agencies, boards and commissions could be a viable alternative to 
generate larger datasets. 
195 
 
Notes 
 
1 As discussed in detailed in Chapter 2 (p. 40) the unilateral power enjoyed by first ministers has recently been 
limited in a few countries, in particular the United Kingdom and New Zealand.  
 
2 The term 'political dynamics' is used as a short-hand to refer to variables associated with the features of the 
government – such as the political ideology of the governing party, the length of time the previous party was in 
power, or change in the head of government – believed to be associated with mobility.  The use of the term is not 
used with the intention to refer to political aspects within the broader society such as protests or strikes. 
 
3 To claim that the preferences of actors vary through historical periods of time is different than rational choice 
institutionalists that situate the strategic actions of persons within formal institutions. While such institutions 
unquestionably influence behaviour by affecting the costs and availability of information, transparency of actions, 
and the number of actors engaging in interactions, rational choice theorists do not go so far as to scrutinize how 
macro structures shape the axiomatic preferences of actors themselves. The point here, and that raised by more 
sociological thinkers, is that the more macro social institutional context exists prior to the individual. While the 
actions of individuals are the means through which social phenomena take shape, the underlying preferences of 
actors and their interactions with the social world, is strongly shaped by the larger social historical context they 
find themselves apart of.  
 
4 When referring to bureaucratic elites, this work predominantly does so referring to the very highest public 
official position, which in Canada is referred to as the deputy minister. Except when specifically speaking of 
elites within Canada, the use of deputy minister can apply to the equivalent positions found in other countries 
under differing names, such as permanent secretary (UK), secretary-general (Ireland), departmental secretary 
(Australia), chief executive (New Zealand) state secretary (‘Staatssekretär’ Germany), and Deputy Secretary 
(United States). This work also uses the term first minister to refer to the head of government. This is done so as 
to be applicable to both national and sub-national heads of government, which are frequently referred to in 
Canada distinctly as the prime minister and premier, respectively. Whereas some prefer to distinguish between 
national and sub-national bureaucracies by use the term public service to refer to the latter and civil service to the 
former (Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2007) no such distinction has been made. The corpus of public officials 
constituting the public administration is referred interchangeably throughout as the civil service, public service 
and the bureaucracy. 
 
5 Reflecting on trends in the public service since his removal by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006,  
Himelfarb is more negative, and goes on to qualify his earlier comment adding that “I wonder what proportion of 
public servants would say this today” (Himelfarb 2013). 
 
6 That is not to say that departures by bureaucratic elites are not affected by politics. Faced with a new political 
master, bureaucrats whose political orientation or policy objectives are incompatible with their own may decide 
to leave their position. Furthermore, one should also be careful in claiming that first ministers have no influence 
in preventing departures. Case studies have documented the persuasiveness of first ministers in retaining civil 
servants (Morin 1991; Podger 2007; MacKinnon 2004) Even when key individuals wish to leave the civil service, 
receiving a call from the first minister (or on her behalf) can pursue an individual to remain in their position. 
 
7 Not all agree that even when recruiting from within the civil service, the increasing manipulation of 
administrative offices possesses no threat to the integrity of civil servants. Aucoin (2012) for instance, fears that 
even if first ministers resort to recruiting from within the civil service, such ‘deputy churn’ will likely foster the 
belief that promotion comes to those who are overtly enthusiastic of the government’s agenda, and therefore may 
cause a degradation of these civil service. 
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8 The degree to which Borden ride the government of patronage, however, is claimed by English as limited to the 
apex of administrative positions, “Like so many Canadian politicians, Borden discovered that what seemed 
rational in opposition was impracticable in power. Thus very little changed. Borden did succeed in depoliticizing 
senior administrative posts, especially those on regulatory bodies. This was in accordance with progressive 
dogma which held that such bodies must exist 'beyond politics’…” (1977, 74). 
 
9 A related literature on ‘caretaker government’s, similarly suggests that under similar constraints governments 
undertake less ambitious policy reforms  (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014). 
 
10 An important exception to this is work by Bourgault and Dion who study DM mobility in Canada’s federal 
bureaucracy between 1867 and 1987. Importantly, in their study Bourgault and Dion found differences in the 
extent to which mobility increased following an election over time. They note that “from the beginning of 
Confederation, changes in the ruling party had little appreciable impact on the mobility of deputy ministers” 
(1989a, 139). According to the authors, the reason for this is explained in part by the: (a) marginal differences in 
the ideologies of transitioning governments; (b) low number of transitions between parties; and (c), the strong 
consolidation of the British (Westminster) tradition in which civil servants are viewed as politically neutral 
administrators and there is a low tolerance for political patronage. 
 
11 Hood and Lodge acknowledge that they are not the first to use the concept of a ‘bargain’ to describe political-
administrative relationships (Schaffer 1973; Savoie 2003). 
 
12 This is not to necessarily say that changes in the perception of governance are the central cause of shifts in 
PSB. Changes in PSBs could instead be brought about by various causes.  
 
13 Maintaining a focus on the prerogative of first ministers to appoint bureaucratic elites justifies focusing on the 
perspective that the governments have towards the bureaucracy. However, it is also possible to approach the issue 
from the bottom-up and examine the perspective of bureaucrats in each Public Service Bargain. Surveying 
statements from civil servants throughout this period supports the conclusion that civil servants having been 
cognizant of the contours of each bargain.  
 
14 Permanency was also the main objective of Britain’s Nothcote-Trevelyan Report, generally viewed as the 
foundation of the professional bureaucracy and laying the ground work for the eventual Schafferian Bargain.  In 
its introduction the report stated: 
 
It cannot be necessary to enter into any lengthened argument for the purpose of showing the high importance 
of the Permanent Civil Service of the country in the present day. The great and increasing accumulation of 
public business, and the consequent pressure upon the Government, need only to be alluded to; and the 
inconveniences which are inseparable from the frequent changes which take place in the responsible 
administration are matter of sufficient notoriety. It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the 
Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, 
occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and 
to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, 
assist, and, to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them. (The Northcote-
Trevelyan Report  1954, 1) 
 
15 A possible exception to this is the province of Alberta. In 2006 based on research conducted on its behalf, the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (the Gomery Commission) 
suggested that the province of Alberta had recently moved changed the process of nominating DMs by reducing 
the part played by the premier, and now stood as a notable difference in comparison to the other nine provinces as 
well as the Federal government. Criticizing the traditional process of nominating DMs in the Canadian variant of 
Westminster and praising recent changes in Alberta, the Commission noted that: 
Appointees, in effect, are beholden to the Prime Minister who appointed them, and the Clerk who advised 
him/her to do so. According to this reasoning the appointment process may compromise an appointee’s ability 
to concentrate on what is good for his or her department, since appointees may ‘feel a greater sense of loyalty 
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to [the Prime Minister and the Clerk] than to the Ministers with whom they have to work on a daily basis’. 
As a remedy the Commission recommends that the system of open, transparent competitions for deputy 
ministers used in Alberta be adopted. This system includes consultation with ministers…. Candidates are 
interviewed by a panel that includes individuals from outside government, and two or three names are 
presented to the relevant minister, who presents his/her choice to Cabinet. The Premier retains veto over 
appointments, but so far has not been exercised. (cited in O’Neal, Smith and Stilborn 2006, 10) 
Furthermore the Gomery report claimed that “the Deputy Minister of the Executive Council of the Government of 
Alberta insists that there is no turning back and that the process currently in place enjoys wide support, including 
that inside government” (Gomery Commission 2006, 150). 
 The suggestion that Alberta’s nomination process now involves a decreased influence of the Premier has 
been received with caution by some. For instance, in a particularly unfavourable assessment, Hubbard and Paquet 
take issue with the Commission’s conclusions claiming that they were founded on “sloppy work” and that “it is not 
so much what Justice Gomery did not know that was problematic— it was what he thought he knew that was not 
in fact so” (2007, 9). Precisely, concerning the nomination of DMs, there are good reasons for being skeptical of 
the conclusion by the Gomery Commission that the reduced role of the premier in Alberta has permanent and 
institutionalized. The Commission’s claim that the appointment process of DMs in Alberta is based on an interview 
conducted in 2005 by Donald J. Savoie with Ron Hicks the Clerk of the executive council of the province at that 
time. This evidence seems problematic because it is based on the oral statement rather than a formalized procedure 
supported by documents or the creation of an official body. Specifically, at time the interview Hicks was Clerk for 
Premier Ralph Klein who had been premier since 1992. With such a long-standing premier in power, in a province 
that had not had a change in party since 1971, it is not surprising that the nomination of DMs may have begun to 
be undertaken with less involvement of the Premier. 
 The problem, however, that such a process has not been institutionalized and the system remains 
fundamentally weak. The degree to which the premier delegates such tasks to others, and removes herself from the 
process is itself at the exclusive discretion of the premier. Under the Public Service Act DM appointments remain 
stipulated as, “made by order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the recommendation of the department 
head” (Alberta 2000). 
 Reviewing the process of DM appointments in Alberta, Tupper also takes issue with Gomery’s 
conclusions claiming that “Alberta’s deputy minister selection is dynamic and sometimes modified in light of 
changing conditions and needs. Procedures thus vary as political and economic circumstances change and as the 
deputy of executive council interprets them. They are not carved in stone for others to replicate and admire” (2014, 
267). Recent changes in Premier further suggest that Tupper is correct. On the first day in power, following his 
election as premier in Alberta, Jim Prentice appointed a new clerk of the executive council as well as DMs to 
several departments. Explaining the reason for such a change, the Order in Council stated that “deputy minister 
appointments were among the top items of business decided at the first meeting of Premier Prentice’s new Cabinet, 
which met immediately following the swearing-in ceremony” (Alberta 2014). Such decisions being taken by 
Cabinet immediately following the formation of government, suggests not only an opaque process, but that the 
appointment of DMs can remain if the premier so desires a highly political process.  
 
16 An important exception to the trend case study is work by Bierling, Carroll and Rosenblatt (2000) who study the 
mobility of deputy minister in the provinces between 1988 and 1996, and Bierling, Carroll and Kpessa (2014) who 
update the data to include mobility rates until 2007. Yet by beginning their studying during the apex of NPM 
reforms a historical perspective is left wanting.  While the bureaucracies of the Canadian provinces have undergone 
institutional changes over the last 100 years, we have little systematically comparable data to with which to analyze 
and study whether these differences have altered the association to which political dynamics are associated with 
mobility. The period of 1920 to 2013 is therefore selected to include the major historical periods of administrative 
history in the provinces, ranging from the period prior to the development of the modern civil service, into the 
period of the professional bureaucracy, through to NPM reforms and into the present era. 
 Restricting their analysis to the use of descriptive statistics, both studies find that there is no general trend 
between elections and mobility rates of deputy ministers. For instance, between 1988 and 2007 some provinces 
such as British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador exhibited an increased rate in mobility in the first year 
following an election by 50%, while in other provinces such as Québec and Ontario, there was actually a decrease 
in mobility (Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa 2014, 320). Although their use of a comparative method to study the 
mobility of deputy ministers is a welcome contribution to provincial studies, these works nevertheless do have 
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some shortcomings. The most prominent of these is the failure to distinguish between elections where the 
incumbent party has been re-elected and those where there has been a change in government. Yet as the authors 
themselves note, re-election of the same government likely results in little adjustments to staff, whereas in the 
pursuit to increase control of the bureaucracy a transition in the governing party should lead to an increase in 
mobility (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenblatt 2000, 201). The inconclusive findings of the authors could very well be 
the result of failing to distinguish between elections resulting in a change in government and the re-election of the 
same party. 
17 This problem is summarized by Wiseman in his review of one such edited work studying transformations in 
provinces’ bureaucracies, noting that:: 
 
For example, James Iain Gow notes that Quebec’s Civil Service Commission was “the last to be 
formed in Canada” in 1943 (p. 288). But we learned from Donald Savoie that New Brunswick’s also 
made its debut that year (p. 262), and both these “facts” come after John Crossley informed us that 
Prince Edward Island’s CSC [Civil Service Commission] only appeared in 1963 (p. 211). So, which 
was last? This is a minor quibble, but an explicit comparative analysis would have had to confront 
and reconcile such discrepancies...We need comparative analysis because political theory or science, 
like all theory or science, depends on comparison. Without that, what we have is more institutional 
description and/or history…The task is daunting; perhaps local government practices lend 
themselves more to case studies. (2001, 135) 
 
18 All provinces are included in the entirety of the time period except for the province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, which having joined Confederation in 1949, is included in the dataset as of this year. 
 
19 Before 1948 the publication was under the name of The Canadian Almanac and Miscellaneous Directory. 
 
20 Departmental Acts are only included in publications since 1974. Prior to this year however, the Almanac and 
Directory mentioned when newly named departments oversaw the functions of a previous department. 
 
21 Generally a straight forward issue of categorization one issue is with changes in the government arising from 
the dissolution of a coalition government to a single party. Following research studying parliamentary countries 
in Europe (Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a; Ennser-Jedenastik 2014b), a change in the party membership of a coalition 
government to a single party was considered to be a change in party. 
 
22 Following Johnston (2013) the CCF and NDP have been coded together. Following Morton (1950) the 
Progressive Party and the various provincial United Farmers parties have also been coded together. 
 
23 Prior to the 1980s initials rather than the given name is provided. Such cases were coded as male. The reason for 
this was the tendency of the Almanac and Directory to use the title of Mrs. or Ms. prior to 1980 thus suggesting 
that attention had been given to identify women though such a technique.  
 
24 In considering trends of the dataset taken as a whole, it is important to be mindful that such trends do not perfectly 
reflect averages across provinces. Larger provinces with more observations skew the average towards their own 
values. 
 
25 With the exception of a brief interlude of the New Democratic Party (NDP) forming government in Nova Scotia 
(2009-2013), the Atlantic Provinces have only endured Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments. The 
same is also true of Ontario, where a brief Coalition government between the United Farmers Party and the Labour 
Party (1920-1923) and an NDP government (1990-1995) broke a pattern of Liberal and Conservative governments. 
The greatest diversity in political parties has been observed in Québec and the Western provinces. Reflecting its 
strong provincial identity and desire for increased autonomy in social policies (Quinn 1979), Québec has had two 
nationalist governments: the Union Nationale and the Parti Québecois. Reflecting a period of vast social changes 
and populist thought during the first half of the twentieth century (Laycock 1990), the Prairie Provinces experienced 
various United Farmer Party governments, coalition governments as well as more recently the Saskatchewan Party. 
Finally, British Columbia has had a mix of Conservative, Liberal, Social Credit and NDP governments.  
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26 In addition to the substantive reasons for addressing temporal dependence, there are also statistical tests 
available that can identify its presence. Conducting a Wooldridge test (Drukker 2003) also shows the presence of 
serial correlation in the data, and further justifies the inclusion of corrective measures used in the regression 
models to address this issue. 
 
27 Allison explains the difference between fixed effects and random effects stating that “…a fixed effects model 
treats unobserved differences between individuals as a set of fixed parameters that can either be directly estimated 
or partialed out of the estimating equations. In a random effects model, unobserved differences are treated as 
random variables with a specified probability distribution” (Allison 2009, 2). 
 
28 How the fixed effects model address unobserved heterogeneity is explained by Firebaugh Warner and Massoglia 
stating that:   
 
The random effects approach treats this individual-specific effect as randomly varying, whereas the 
fixed effects approach treats it as fixed for each individual…Unlike a fixed effects approach, random 
effects estimation does not discard variation across individual units. The additional information 
inherent in the between-unit variation implies several advantages for the random effects approach 
over the fixed effects approach. (2013, 117) 
 
29 Another more recent alternative to fixed effects and random effects is multilevel or hierarchical linear models. 
This work, however, has followed the approach of Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo. Advocating that: 
 
While no statistical method is without its limitations, we argue that simply adjusting standard errors 
for clustering in data is an easy-to-implement methodology that requires fewer assumptions than the 
alternative technique, hierarchical linear modeling, and that the calculation of standard errors is not 
subject to the current computing limitations that HLM [hierarchical linear models] is. (2007, 456) 
 
30 Despite the rich compendium of information the picture in not equally complete in every province. Some 
provinces such as Manitoba and Prince Edward Island have not received as much scholarly attention as their peers. 
 
31 The years 2000 to 2013 constitute the 2000s.  
 
32 Average mobility reported in this table is different than the average mobility of the entire dataset in Figure (p. 
106). The difference is attributed to that in this table mobility in calculated according to province and then weighted 
equally, whereas mobility of the entire dataset is biased towards those provinces with a greater number of deputy 
ministers. 
 
33 For this reason it could also be argued that the Liberal party in Québec is more ideologically committed than the 
Liberal party in other provinces, In fact evidence suggests this is true. In Québec, upon taking power in the 
managerial bargain, the Liberal party is associated with a level of mobility of 43 percent, which is 8 percentage 
points higher than levels of mobility in the same period when the Liberal party took power in provinces outside of 
Québec (35 percent). 
 
34 Empirical scrutiny of whether Premier Daniel Johnson removed incumbent civil servants with this project’s 
dataset supports his claim that he generally left untouched the cadre of civil servants. Of the 24 deputy ministers, 
three were removed, and one position was abolished, thus providing a relatively low mobility rate of 16 percent.  
 
35 The most common exception to this case would be when a coalition of parties forming government has broken 
down without resulting in the dissolution of government and the election of a new party but instead the head of 
government of the former coalition now forming a minority government under her sole political party. 
 
37 A related literature on caretaker governments, similarly suggests that under these constraints governments 
undertake less ambitious policy reforms (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014). 
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38 Evidence also suggests that the practice of federal politics at the provincial level was also slower to change from 
Ottawa’s efforts to purge the practice of patronage. As noted by English (1977) in his study of the Federal 
Conservative Party: 
 
Provincial Tories were outraged with the end of patronage, and F.B. McCurdy public works minister 
chided Prime Minister Borden that such reforms were “certainly unsuited to Nova Scotia where the 
local provincial government continues to care for its supporters”. (1977, 226) 
 
39 Dunn states of the Moores era that “Of course, DMs and ADMS were still chosen by the premier, but there was 
a more technocratic and less political basis for choosing them. (2014, 28)” 
 
40 This is a different approach than attempting to identify the most efficient and parsimonious model for each period, 
which would entail presenting models encompassing a different set of variables for each period. With the objective 
to identify whether there are observable differences in the association between political dynamics and mobility over 
time the same models are applied across PSBs.  
 
41 The exception to this would be if the party membership of a coalition government changed while the head of the 
government remained in her position.  
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